State v. Resendiz-Fortanel
| Citation | 959 P.2d 845,131 Idaho 488 |
| Decision Date | 29 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 23387,D,RESENDIZ-FORTANE,23387 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Federicoefendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
Robert L. Crowley, Jr., Rigby, for respondent. Robert L. Crowley, Jr. argued.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a charge for driving without privileges. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Federico Resendiz-Fortanel was convicted of driving under the influence and driving without privileges in July of 1994. As a result, his driving privileges were suspended from July 21, 1994, until January 17, 1996. When the period of his suspension expired, Resendiz failed to file for reinstatement. 1 Subsequently, on June 21, 1996, Resendiz was stopped by a police officer for running a stop sign. He was arrested and charged with felony driving without privileges in violation of I.C. §§ 18-8001(1) and (5). The offense qualified as a felony because it was Resendiz's third citation for driving without privileges within a five-year period. See I.C. § 18-8001(5).
Resendiz moved to dismiss the charge, asserting that although he had failed to have his driving privileges reinstated, his driving privileges were not "suspended" at the time of his arrest. The prosecutor opposed Resendiz's motion, arguing that the plain language of I.C. § 18-8001, when read in conjunction with the statutes governing the suspension and reinstatement of driving privileges, clearly demonstrates that once an individual's driving privileges are suspended, they remain suspended until a reinstatement fee is paid. After considering these claims, the district court determined that because Resendiz was eligible to have his driving privileges reinstated, his privileges were no longer suspended at the time he was cited for driving without privileges despite his nonpayment of a reinstatement fee. Rather, Resendiz was operating a motor vehicle without a valid license and he was subject to prosecution pursuant to I.C. § 49-301(1), which requires all persons who drive any motor vehicle upon a highway to have a valid Idaho driver's license. Accordingly, the district court granted Resendiz's motion to dismiss. The state then filed an appeal.
This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. Browning, 123 Idaho 748, 749, 852 P.2d 500, 501 (Ct.App.1993); Hanks v. State, 121 Idaho 153, 154, 823 P.2d 187, 188 (Ct.App.1992). However, "[s]eperate statutes dealing with the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously, if at all possible, so as to further the legislative intent." State v. Maland, 124 Idaho 537, 540, 861 P.2d 107, 110 (Ct.App.1993). Nevertheless, "[w]hen two statutes cover the same subject matter, the more specific will prevail." Id.
The state asserts that once Resendiz's driving privileges were suspended, they remained suspended until he took affirmative steps and met all requirements for reinstatement. The state argues that because Resendiz failed to have his driver's license reinstated, he was subject to prosecution for driving without privileges pursuant to I.C. § 18-8001(1) rather than driving without a license pursuant to I.C. 49-301(1), and the district court erred in dismissing the information against him. Idaho Code § 18-8001(1) provides that
[a]ny person who drives or is in actual physical control of any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state with knowledge that his driver's license, driving privileges or permit to drive is revoked, disqualified or suspended in this state or any other jurisdiction is guilty of a misdemeanor.
The district court found I.C. § 18-8001 to be inapplicable and determined that the only offense Resendiz could be prosecuted for would be a violation of I.C. § 49-301(1), which provides that "[n]o person ... shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway unless the person has a valid Idaho driver's license."
The state argues that because the legislature has not provided for automatic reinstatement of driving privileges at the end of a period of court-ordered suspension, the legislature intended that absent formal reinstatement by a driver, driving privileges remain suspended indefinitely for purposes of I.C. § 18-8001. On appeal, the state now relies on I.C. § 49-1208(2) to support this proposition. 2 Section 49-1208(2) provides that [w]henever the department or a court suspends, or the department revokes a resident's driver's license or nonresident's driving privilege by reason of a conviction, forfeiture of bail, or upon a plea or finding of guilty, the license or privilege shall remain suspended or revoked unless the person shall have previously given or shall immediately give and maintain proof of financial responsibility. (emphasis added).
Despite the specific language contained in I.C. § 49-1208(2), a number of other applicable statutes are in apparent conflict with I.C. § 49-1208(2)'s explicit mandate. For example, I.C. § 49-328(1) provides that "[w]hen the period of revocation, disqualification or suspension has expired, or the reason for the revocation, disqualification or suspension no longer exists, the department shall reinstate the driver's license or driving privileges on application of the driver." (emphasis added). This section presumes that a suspension is limited to a specific time frame, and following the expiration of that time period, a driver's license is no longer suspended and will be reinstated upon application. In addition, I.C. § 49-120(30) (renumbered at I.C. § 49-120(31)) defines the "suspension of [a] driver's license" as "the temporary withdrawal by formal action of the department or as otherwise provided in this title of a person's driver's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, which temporary withdrawal shall be for a period specifically designated by the department." (emphasis added). This section suggests that a period of suspension must be temporary, a proposition contrary to the state's assertion that driving privileges may be perpetually suspended. Read together, sections 49-328(1) and 49-120(30) recognize the temporary nature of a license suspension for a definite period of time, while I.C. § 49-1208(2) mandates that a suspension continue indefinitely unless a driver maintains proof of financial responsibility.
Resendiz argues that this Court in State v. Clifford, 130 Idaho 259, 939 P.2d 578 (Ct.App.1997), resolved this issue by way of dictum. In Clifford, the defendant's driving privileges were suspended for three months following his conviction for underage consumption of alcohol. Simultaneously, he was granted a restricted permit to drive for purposes of work and health only. Two months later, a police officer observed the defendant driving into the parking lot of a bowling alley. Upon inquiry, the defendant informed the officer that his destination was the bowling alley, a purpose related neither to work nor health. The defendant was cited and subsequently found guilty by a magistrate judge for driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001. On appeal, the defendant argued that by exceeding the scope of his restricted driving permit, he was guilty of driving with an invalid license, I.C. § 49-301, but not guilty of driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001.
This Court rejected the defendant's argument and held that when he operated a motor vehicle for reasons unrelated to work or health during the three month suspension period, that is, for purposes outside the scope of his restricted permit, he drove without any privileges whatsoever and had been properly charged. In dictum, we also noted that
if Clifford [the defendant] did not have his privileges...
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