Beggs v. Beggs

• Decision Date: 31 March 1972
• Citation: 479 S.W.2d 598
• Parties: Ruby T. BEGGS, Appellant, v. Thomas J. BEGGS, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 598

479 S.W.2d 598

Ruby T. BEGGS, Appellant, v. Thomas J. BEGGS, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 31, 1972.

John Lane Ackman, Williamstown, for appellant.

D. K. Floyd, Berry & Floyd, Carrollton, for appellee.

STEINFELD, Chief Justice.

Appellant Ruby T. Beggs and appellee Thomas J. Beggs were married on August 4, 1945. Belinda Gail, born January 31, 1953; Thomas Glenn, born July 20, 1956, and Clyde Jefferson, born March 28, 1958, are their three children. The parties lived together as man and wife until the 9th day of February, 1969. On February 21, 1969, Ruby sued Thomas for an absolute divorce, care and custody of the children, an allowance for their maintenance, lump-sum alimony and incidental relief. Thomas counterclaimed, demanding that Ruby's complaint be dismissed, that he be granted a divorce, custody of the children and '* * * a property settlement restoring to him all of the property that he has caused to be conveyed or transferred jointly to * * *' Ruby. Later Ruby withdrew her original complaint and by amendment claimed alimony, maintenance for the children and an adjudication of her property rights together with incidental relief, but no divorce. With the issues so drawn, Ruby failed to take proof; whereupon, Thomas presented his proof and later Ruby sought by proof to fully present the facts.

The trial court granted a divorce to Thomas, custody of the children to Ruby, with an allowance of $300 per month for their support, and authorized Ruby and the children to live in their residence until all the children reach 18 years of age, at which time the residence is to be surrendered to Thomas.

Ruby has appealed from the judgment claiming that it was through the joint efforts of the parties that the property which they own was acquired. She argues that if she had sought a divorce she would have been entitled to one; that it was erroneous to award the divorce to the husband, and that this caused the court to divide the property contrary to the rules we announced in Colley v. Colley, Ky., 460 S.W.2d 821 (1970).

At the time of the marriage neither party owned any property. Thomas studied to become a Doctor of Chiropractic. To aid him in his educational pursuit, Ruby, a qualified schoolteacher, secured a position in that profession and continued to teach regularly or as a substitute until 1961, with leaves of absence during her three pregnancies. Thomas became a licensed chiropractor and engaged in that profession until 1969, when he became partially disabled.

The parties acquired several parcels of real estate, stocks, savings accounts, an interest in a joint venture, office equipment, furniture and automobiles. Some of this property was jointly owned and other was registered in individual names. Ruby inherited approximately $10,000 from her mother. There was disagreement among the witnesses as to the exact values of some of the items. The chancellor stated: 'A resume of the property, debts, effect of inheritance and net worth of the parties as shown by their respective proof is as follows:

The trial court also found:

'In addition to the above property, there were certain items of property that were mentioned in the record, some with values assigned, and some without. The property in that category consists of a 1966 Lincoln automobile of the value of $1665.00, a 1963 Jeep of the value of $342.00, a 1967 Ford Station Wagon with no assigned value and furniture with no assigned value, sufficient to furnish an eight room residence. There was also a fishing cabin approximately 20 20 at Cumberland Lake that is in the joint names of the parties that Dr. Beggs testified sits on lots that cost from four to six hundred and which he built in two weeks and on week-ends with materials that cost $400.00. Mrs. Beggs, on the other hand, without any qualification as an expert or showing any knowledgeable experience in real estate, testified that this cabin and lots are worth $5700.00.'

The court accepted the values asserted by Ruby, finding the net accumulated property to have a value in excess of $100,000. In her brief Ruby contends that the proof indicated the property was worth $120,000.

Civil Rule 52.01 directs us not to set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. We are not convinced that the values assigned by the court fall into that category; therefore, they will not be disturbed. Brown v. Brown, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 201 (1971).

Referring to KRS 403.060(2) and 403.065, the chancellor wrote:

'* * * since restoration of property applies to property not disposed of 'at the commencement of the action' by the terms of the Statute, and the action began in February of 1969,...