Brown v. Brown
| Decision Date | 06 November 1970 |
| Citation | 462 S.W.2d 201 |
| Parties | Virginia Gregory BROWN, Appellant, v. B. B. BROWN, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Louis G. Kirtley, Owensboro, for appellant.
William M. Gant, Owensboro, for appellee.
The appellant was granted a divorce from appellee and awarded custody of the only child of the parties, a boy 9 years of age. The parties were married in 1948. The appellee was ordered to pay $35 per week for the benefit of the child and to pay his emergency expenses. A house and lot, title to which was in appellant's name, was adjudged to be sold along with certain enumerated pieces of antique furniture, and the proceeds therefrom to be divided equally between the parties.
This appeal followed. No cross-appeal is prosecuted. We affirm.
Appellant's contention reduced to specifics is that she was entitled to more alimony, either lump-sum or periodic, and that the trial court erred in ordering the sale of the house and lot.
The approximate total worth of all the property in the name of the parties at the time of the divorce was $16,000. The expected income of appellee for the fiscal year following the divorce was $7,500. The appellant will realize from her one-half the sale price of the house and lot and the antique furniture approximately $8,000, or one-half the worth of the estate. Appellant contends that this is insufficient and that she should have been adjudged periodic future alimony in addition to lump-sum alimony. We are inclined to think there is some merit in her contention. But in view of the liberality of the lump-sum alimony, we cannot say that the failure to also award her monthly alimony for the future is an abuse of discretion. Cf. Ralston v. Ralston, Ky., 396 S.W.2d 775, and CR 51.
The appellant argues vigorously that the chancellor erred in adjudging a sale of the house and lot when the title was in her name. Her contention is that her husband deeded the property to her to defeat his creditors and that equity will not disturb such a situation. With this argument we cannot agree. The appellee purchased and paid for this property, and sometime before the divorce was granted, he transferred the title to appellant, he claims, to stop the appellant from nagging him. She says that the deed was made to her under fraudulent intent to defeat his creditors.
We need not resolve this conflict for the elementary reason that regardless of in...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Stephanski v. Stephanski
...alimony are within the sound discretion of the chancellor and, unless that discretion was abused, we accept the decision. Brown v. Brown, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 201 (1971); Itschner v. Itschner, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 54 (1970); Reynolds v. Reynolds, Ky., 458 S.W.2d 783 (1970); Jackson v. Jackson, Ky., 4......
-
Beggs v. Beggs
...We are not convinced that the values assigned by the court fall into that category; therefore, they will not be disturbed. Brown v. Brown, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 201 (1971). Referring to KRS 403.060(2) and 403.065, the chancellor '* * * since restoration of property applies to property not dispose......
-
Schrecker v. Schrecker, No. 2007-CA-000668-MR (Ky. App. 3/7/2008), 2007-CA-000668-MR.
...of appellate review, and we fail to see what further findings of fact or conclusions of law were necessary. See also Brown v. Brown, 462 S.W.2d 201 (Ky. 1970). David's substantive argument is that the trial court erred in assigning him the entire marital debt because the amount of the debt ......