Belanger v. Yorke

Decision Date25 February 2020
Docket NumberDocket: BCD-19-115
Citation226 A.3d 215
Parties Rebecca W. BELANGER v. Lisa M. YORKE
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Christopher E. Pazar, Esq., and William J. Kennedy, Esq. (orally), Drummond & Drummond, LLP, Portland, for appellant Rebecca W. Belanger

Chris Neagle, Esq. (orally), Troubh Heisler, LLC, Portland, for appellee Lisa M. Yorke

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN,* JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.**

Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

Concurrence/Dissent: JABAR, J.

GORMAN, J.

[¶1] Rebecca W. Belanger (Belanger) and Lisa M. Yorke (Yorke) each claim to have taken title to a piece of property by way of a deed delivered to her by Brad Belanger (Brad). Brad deeded the property to his daughter, Yorke, before he deeded it to his wife, Belanger, but Belanger recorded her deed before Yorke recorded hers. As the trial court (Business and Consumer Docket, Mulhern, J. ) explained, "[t]his is a case about a piece of real property that a man inherited from his parents and seems to have conveyed to both his wife and his daughter (his wife's stepdaughter) at different times during his life.... Both women now claim exclusive title to the property, and have sued each other for, inter alia, a declaratory judgment to that effect."

[¶2] The complex procedural history of this case includes cross-motions for partial summary judgment and, later, a request for judgment based on a stipulated record; both of these decisions are currently before us. In ruling on the summary judgment motions, the court concluded "as a matter of law" that 33 M.R.S. § 480, which requires the signature of a nonowner spouse on a transfer of real property in certain circumstances, was not an affirmative defense to Yorke's ownership claim. Later in the proceedings, based on a stipulated record, the court (Duddy, J. ) found that Brad's deed to Belanger was not supported by consideration and that, therefore, she was not a bona fide purchaser of the property for purposes of Maine's recording statute, 33 M.R.S. § 201 (2018). Concluding that resolution of the consideration issue rendered all other contested issues moot, the court entered an order of final judgment, holding that Yorke owned the property. Belanger challenges both of these rulings on appeal. After reviewing the stipulated facts and the applicable law, we affirm the ruling regarding section 480, vacate the final judgment entered on behalf of Yorke on the issue of consideration, and remand to the trial court to address unresolved issues.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶3] The parties stipulated to the following relevant facts.1 In 1976, Brad acquired property located in West Bath (the Camp) through a deed from his parents. Belanger and Brad were married on October 1, 1977. This was Brad's second marriage.

[¶4] In 1977, shortly after their marriage, Brad and Belanger entered into an oral agreement (the 1977 Agreement) by which each would deed his or her separately-owned real estate to the other as his or her joint tenant. In 1978, Belanger conveyed property on Prospect Street in Bath (the Prospect Street Property) to herself and Brad as joint tenants. Brad did not reciprocate by deeding the Camp to himself and Belanger in 1977 or 1978. Instead, in 1978, Brad and Belanger agreed to postpone the transfer until after his parents died. Although Brad's parents died in 1984 and 1989, Brad did not deed the property to himself and Belanger after either death.

[¶5] In 2005, Brad deeded the Camp to Yorke, his daughter from his first marriage. Yorke did not record the deed until many years later, because she wanted to give Brad time to tell Belanger about it. Neither Yorke nor Brad ever did tell Belanger of the deed's existence.

[¶6] In 2016, during Brad and Belanger's mutual estate planning process, Brad executed a deed transferring the Camp to himself and Belanger as joint tenants, consistent with the 1977 Agreement. Belanger recorded her deed on June 29, 2016. Yorke recorded her deed on July 15, 2016. Brad died on August 21, 2016. He was survived by Belanger and by three adult children, including Yorke. Yorke learned of the 1977 Agreement between Brad and Belanger after Brad's death.

[¶7] Belanger filed her initial complaint in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County)2 on April 14, 2017, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment establishing her as the sole legal owner of the Camp and damages for slander of title. Yorke filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment establishing her, not Belanger, as the sole legal owner of the property and asserting a claim of undue influence. Both parties purported to have taken title by way of the deeds delivered to them by Brad.

[¶8] On April 24, 2018, Belanger filed a motion for partial summary judgment with regard to her declaratory judgment and slander of title claims and seeking judgment in her favor on Yorke's counterclaims. In that motion, she argued that as Brad's widow she had a superior claim to the property because Brad's transfer to Yorke was invalid in view of the fact that Belanger did not sign the deed as required by 33 M.R.S.A. § 480 (1999) ;3 that she held superior title by operation of the Maine Recording Act, 33 M.R.S. § 201 ; that Yorke's deed was invalid because it failed to adequately describe the property; that Yorke was estopped from claiming a right to the property by the affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel and laches; and that Yorke's claim of undue influence against Belanger must fail as a matter of law. Yorke countered with her own motion for partial summary judgment on the section 480 issue and the affirmative defenses Belanger had raised.

[¶9] On November 2, 2018, after oral argument, the court (Mulhern, J. ) issued an order (the Combined Order) granting Yorke a partial summary judgment as to the section 480 issue, concluding "as a matter of law that 33 M.R.S. § 480 is not an affirmative defense to Ms. Yorke's ownership." The court determined that genuine disputes of fact remained as to Belanger's claims of slander of title, estoppel, and laches, and denied her motion for summary judgment as to those issues. It also found that genuine disputes of material fact remained regarding Yorke's claim of undue influence and denied summary judgment on that count.

[¶10] As the matter proceeded toward trial, Yorke sought leave to file a second motion for summary judgment, having identified a discrete legal issue that she believed could resolve the case: whether Brad's deed to Belanger was supported by consideration. The court (Duddy, J. ) denied this request as untimely but agreed to consider motions for judgment on the issue if the parties could agree on a stipulated record and abbreviated briefing schedule. The parties so agreed, submitted a stipulated record, and briefed the issue.

[¶11] On March 7, 2019, the court entered a judgment on the stipulated record in favor of Yorke. The court found that Belanger provided no "new consideration" to Brad in 2016 and noted that Brad's verbal 1978 promise to transfer the property to Belanger "was unenforceable due to the statute of frauds." Based largely on those findings, the court determined that Brad's deed to Belanger "was not supported by consideration, and thus [Belanger] was not a bona fide purchaser for the purposes of Maine's Recording Act." Shortly thereafter, the court issued a final judgment, concluding that Yorke owned the real estate at issue and that, "[a]s a result of the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the Combined Order and Stipulated Record Order, all other claims raised by the parties are moot."

[¶12] Belanger appeals, asserting that the court erred in holding that Yorke's ownership of the property is not barred by section 480 and that there had been no consideration for the 2016 deed to her.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Title 33 M.R.S.A. § 480

[¶13] As discussed above, the court ruled on the section 480 issue in the context of Yorke's motion for summary judgment. "We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, and consider both the evidence and any reasonable inferences that the evidence produces in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment has been granted in order to determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact." Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC , 2016 ME 85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242 (quotation marks omitted). A genuine issue of material fact exists "when a fact-finder must choose between competing versions of the truth, even if one party's version appears more credible or persuasive." Id. (quotation marks omitted). When there is no genuine issue of material fact, "we review de novo the trial court's interpretation and application of the relevant statutes and legal concepts." Id. ¶ 13 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶14] At the time of Brad's transfer to Yorke, there were two sets of circumstances under which a transfer of real estate to someone other than a bona fide purchaser required the signature of the transferor's nonowner spouse. 33 M.R.S.A. § 480. Relevant to this case is the provision in subsection 480(1) requiring the signature of a nonowner spouse when "[t]he transfer requires signature pursuant to [ 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-202(1) ]."

[¶15] Title 18-A M.R.S.A. § 2-202(1) (1998),4 in turn, required signatures of nonowner spouses for "[a]ny transfer under which the decedent retained at the time of his death the possession or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the property." If an owner of real estate transferred the property without the signature of a nonowner spouse, any subsequent "claim of the nonowner spouse under probate, divorce or any other laws, shall be against the proceeds of that conveyance and not against the real estate." 33 M.R.S.A. § 480.

[¶16] Belanger argues that Brad "retained the possession [or] enjoyment of" the Camp property at the time of his death, and thus her signature was required on the Yorke Deed. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Belanger, however, ...

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