Portland Reg'l Chamber of Commerce v. City of Portland
| Decision Date | 06 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Cum-21-31 |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
| Parties | PORTLAND REGIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE et al. v. CITY OF PORTLAND et al. |
John J. Aromando, Esq. (orally), James R. Erwin, Esq., Joshua D. Dunlap, Esq., and Sara A. Murphy, Esq., Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, for appellants Portland Regional Chamber of Commerce; Alliance for Addiction and Mental Health Services, Maine; Slab, LLC; Nosh, LLC; Gritty McDuff's; and Play It Again Sports
Shelby H. Leighton, Esq. (orally), Valerie Z. Wicks, Esq., and David G. Webbert, Esq., Johnson, Webbert & Garvan, LLP, Augusta, for cross-appellants Caleb Horton and Mario Roberge-Reyes
Dawn M. Harmon, Esq., and Jason Caron, Esq. (orally), Perkins Thompson, P.A., Portland, for appellees City of Portland and Jon Jennings
Kasia S. Park, Esq., Jeana M. McCormick, Esq., and Sara P. Cressey, Esq., Drummond Woodsum, Portland, for amicus curiae Maine Association for Community Service Providers
Benjamin K. Grant, Esq., McTeague Higbee, Topsham, for amici curiae Maine AFL-CIO, Maine Center for Economic Policy, The Proper Cup, Maine State Building & Construction Trades Council, Southern Maine Workers’ Center, People First Portland, Maine Small Business Coalition, and Portland Hunt and Alpine Club
John R. Brautigam, Esq., John R. Brautigam, Esq., LLC, Falmouth; Benjamin Gaines, Esq., Gaines Law, LLC, Portland; and Zachary L. Heiden, Esq., and Emma E. Bond, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation, Portland, for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation and League of Women Voters of Maine
Gerald F. Petruccelli, Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, for amicus curie Maine State Chamber of Commerce
Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, JJ., and CLIFFORD, ARJ.
[¶1] Portland Regional Chamber of Commerce and other entities1 (collectively, the Chamber) appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J. ) granting summary judgment against the Chamber on its claims that voter-initiated legislation establishing an emergency minimum wage in Portland violates the Maine Constitution and the Portland City Code. Caleb Horton and Mario Roberge-Reyes (Intervenors) cross-appeal from the court's determination that the emergency minimum wage provision is not effective until January 1, 2022. We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] The pertinent facts are not contested and are drawn from the summary judgment record. See Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC , 2016 ME 34, ¶ 25, 133 A.3d 1021. In July 2020, the required number of Portland voters submitted to the City of Portland a petition in support of a direct voters’ initiative to amend Portland's minimum wage ordinance. The initiative included a section incrementally increasing the regular minimum wage on an annual basis and a provision (the emergency provision) that provided for a higher minimum wage—one-and-one-half times the regular minimum wage—when the governor or the City of Portland declares a state of emergency. On November 3, 2020, the City of Portland held its general municipal election, and the voters approved the initiative; the City of Portland released the amended official results on November 6, 2020. See Portland, Me., Code § 33.7 (Nov. 3, 2020). The pertinent portions of the newly passed legislation read:
[¶3] The City of Portland announced that it would not enforce the emergency provision until January 1, 2022. On December 1, 2020, the plaintiffs, all employers with employees in Portland, filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief against the City of Portland and Jon Jennings, in his official capacity as City Manager of Portland (collectively, the City). They asserted that the initiative was invalid under the Maine Constitution and the Portland City Code and that, if it was valid, it would not take effect until January 1, 2022. Horton and Roberge-Reyes, employees at the Whole Foods store in Portland, were granted intervenor status as defendants and cross-plaintiffs; they filed a cross-claim seeking declaratory relief establishing the effective date of the emergency provision as December 6, 2020, and injunctive relief compelling the City to enforce it.
[¶4] The Chamber moved for summary judgment on its complaint. The Superior Court concluded that the emergency provision was validly enacted pursuant to the Maine Constitution and the Portland City Code. It determined that the home rule provision in the Constitution, in conjunction with statute, granted municipalities greater legislative authority and therefore expanded the scope of direct initiatives. Accordingly, it granted summary judgment against the Chamber on its validity claims. The court then determined that the language of the emergency provision was unambiguous and established an effective date of January 1, 2022. It dismissed Intervenors’ cross-claims.
[¶5] The Chamber timely appealed from the judgment declaring that the emergency provision was valid, and Intervenors timely cross-appealed from the determination that the emergency provision becomes effective on January 1, 2022. See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2021) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1). We granted expedited consideration of this appeal.
[¶6] The Chamber argues that the emergency provision was not validly enacted under the Maine Constitution and the Portland City Code because the initiative is not limited to exclusively municipal affairs. It asserts that the home rule provision of the Constitution is irrelevant because it gives greater power to municipalities as political subdivisions of the State but does not expand the scope of direct voters’ initiatives. The City defends the validity of the initiative.
[¶7] On appeal from a summary judgment decision, "we review de novo the trial court's interpretation and application of the relevant statutes and legal concepts." Belanger v. Yorke , 2020 ME 24, ¶ 13, 226 A.3d 215 (quotation marks omitted). We review constitutional interpretation issues de novo. Bouchard v. Dep't of Pub. Safety , 2015 ME 50, ¶ 8, 115 A.3d 92. "Constitutional provisions are accorded a liberal interpretation in order to carry out their broad purpose, because they are expected to last over time and are cumbersome to amend." Allen v. Quinn , 459 A.2d 1098, 1102 (Me. 1983). "[T]he constitutional validity of a citizen initiative is evaluated under the ordinary rules of statutory construction." League of Women Voters v. Sec'y of State , 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996). Accordingly, such laws "carr[y] a heavy presumption of constitutionality." Id.
[¶8] Last year we reiterated the purpose and breadth of the direct initiative power:
The broad purpose of the direct initiative is the encouragement of participatory democracy. By [ Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 ] the people, as sovereign, have retaken unto themselves legislative power, and that constitutional provision must be liberally construed to facilitate, rather than to handicap, the people's exercise of their sovereign power to legislate. Section 18 cannot be said merely to permit the direct initiative of legislation upon certain conditions. Rather, it reserves to the people the right to legislate by direct initiative if the constitutional conditions are satisfied.
Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec'y of State , 2020 ME 109, ¶ 15, 237 A.3d 882 (alterations and quotation marks omitted); see League of Women Voters , 683 A.2d at 771 ; see also Opinion of the Justices , 275 A.2d 800, 803 (Me. 1971).
[¶9] We begin with some historical context for this case. Effective in 1909, the Maine...
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