Belchak v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co.

• Citation: 119 Conn. 630,179 A. 95
• Parties: BELCHAK v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.
• Decision Date: 03 April 1935
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

179 A. 95

119 Conn. 630

BELCHAK v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 3, 1935

As Amended on Denial of Reargument June 7, 1935.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Earnest C. Simpson Judge.

Action by Carrie Belchak, administratrix of the estate of Michael Belchak, against the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. A general verdict was returned for plaintiff and a special verdict was returned on an interrogatory. The court, on defendant's motion, entered judgment for the defendant on the verdict, and plaintiff appealed.

Error judgment set aside, and case remanded with direction.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY JJ.

J. J O'Connell, of Derby, and William H. Kingston, of Ansonia, for appellant.

John H. Gardner, Jr., of New Haven, and Edward R. Brumley, of New York City, for appellee.

MALTBIE, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages resulting from the death of her intestate, who was killed as he was driving his automobile over a railroad crossing after dark, when it was struck by a freight car being pushed along the track by an engine of the defendant. The jury rendered a general verdict for the plaintiff, but in connection with it returned an interrogatory submitted to them, with their answer, as follows: " Was Defendant's employee, Thomas Quinn, on the crossing swinging a white lantern while Plaintiff's intestate, Michael Belchak, was approaching said crossing? A. Yes." The defendant made a motion in which, in the first paragraph, it asked the court to set the general verdict aside and, in the second paragraph, that, in view of the jury's answer to the interrogatory, the court enter judgment in its favor, on the ground that the answer established contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff's intestate. The trial court granted the second paragraph of the motion and entered judgment accordingly.

Since the decision in Freedman v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 81 Conn. 601, 612, 71 A. 901, 15 Ann.Cas. 464, the practice of submitting interrogatories to be answered by the jury and returned in connection with the general verdict has been recognized as a proper incident of jury trials in this state. The purpose of these interrogatories has been stated in that and subsequent cases to be to limit or explain the general verdict, to ascertain upon what grounds it rests, to afford a means of testing it, and to aid in proceedings for subsequent review. Bernier v. Woodstock Agricultural Society, 88 Conn. 558, 562, 92 A. 160; Longstean v. Owen McCaffrey's Sons, 95 Conn. 486, 499, 111 A. 788; Canfield Rubber Co. v.Leary & Co., 99 Conn. 40, 54, 121 A. 283. Thus interrogatories may serve to show upon which of two or more causes of action or defenses stated in a single count the jury have based their verdict. Aaronson v. New Haven, 94 Conn. 690, 697, 110 A. 872, 12 A.L.R. 328; Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 63, 118 A. 467; Ford v. Dubiskie & Co., Inc., 105 Conn. 572, 582, 136 A. 560. In O'Brien v. Connecticut Co., 97 Conn. 419, 422, 117 A. 498, 499, the jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff which the defendant moved to set aside; it appeared from answers to interrogatories submitted to them that the injuries were not caused by the negligent conduct of the defendant alleged in the complaint; and we said: " The verdict returned by the jury demonstrated conclusively that, in spite of the instruction of the court, they had made a mistake in the application of legal principles. Hence it was necessary to set aside their verdict." So in Martin v. Stamford Gas & Electric Co., 118 Conn. 319, 321, 172 A. 218, in reviewing the action of a trial court in setting aside a verdict, we based our decision in part upon the answers given by the jury to certain interrogatories which had been submitted to them. These decisions, being made upon motions to set verdicts aside, are not necessarily conclusive that under our law a judgment based upon the answers to interrogatories submitted to the jury might not under proper circumstances be entered in favor of a party against whom a general verdict has been rendered.

Such procedure has been quite generally adopted elsewhere. 64 C.J. 1177. In most states there are controlling statutes; Clementson, Special Verdicts, Appendix; but the practice has been recognized as existing at common law, Victor-American Fuel Co. v. Peccarich (C. C. A.) 209 F. 568; Walker v. New Mexico & Southern Pacific R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 17 S.Ct. 421, 41 L.Ed. 837; Richardson v. Weare, 62 N.H. 80; Hogle v. Clark, 46 Vt. 418, 424. The field in which this procedure operates, even where it is recognized, is narrow. To justify the entry of a judgment contrary to a general verdict upon the basis of answers to interrogatories, those answers must be such in themselves as conclusively to show that as matter of law judgment could only be rendered for the party against whom the general verdict was found; they must negative every reasonable hypothesis as to the situation provable under the issues made by the pleadings; and in determining that, the court may consider only the issues framed by the pleadings, the general verdict, and the interrogatories, with the answers made to them, without resort to the evidence offered at the trial. Devine v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 250 Ill. 203, 206, 95 N.E. 174; Jeffersonville Mfg. Co. v. Holden, 180 Ind. 301, 307, 102 N.E. 21; State ex rel. Myles v. American Surety Co., 99 W.Va. 123, 128, 127 S.E. 919; 27 R.C.L. 880, 881; 64 C.J. 1179, 1182. Under our practice, this would necessarily be so because we have no method by which the evidence offered at the trial could be brought upon the record to review the entry of such a judgment, and of necessity an appeal would lie from that judgment only for error apparent upon the face of the record. Practice Book 1934, § 336.

Where an automobile is struck by a train while being driven over a railroad crossing at night, the fact that an employee of the railroad...