Belhumeur v. Labor Relations Commission
Decision Date | 04 April 2000 |
Citation | 735 NE 2d 860,432 Mass. 458 |
Parties | JAMES J. BELHUMEUR & others v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Present: MARSHALL, C.J., ABRAMS, GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, & COWIN, JJ.
Susan Lee Weissinger for Springfield Education Association.
Bruce N. Cameron, of Virginia, for James J. Belhumeur & others.
John B. Cochran for the defendant.
James J. Belhumeur and 118 other public school teachers throughout the Commonwealth1 (collectively, charging parties) filed multiple prohibited labor practice charges with the Labor Relations Commission (commission), challenging the amount of the agency fee2 demanded by their collective bargaining representative, the Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA)/National Education Association (NEA) and its local affiliates (collectively, unions), over five fiscal years, 1987-1992.3 After hearings on the MTA portion of the agency fee, the commission issued a decision concluding that the MTA had demanded an excessive agency fee. See Matter of Springfield Educ. Ass'n, Mass. Teachers Ass'n, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n & Belhumeur, 23 M.L.C. 233 (1997). Both the charging parties and the unions appealed. We granted their joint application for direct appellate review and now, with three modifications, remand the case to the commission for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
1. Factual background. Prior to the start of the hearings on the MTA portion of the service fee, the unions and the charging parties executed a partial settlement agreement. The agreement provided that, for the five contested fiscal years, the amount of the MTA portion of the agency fee would be determined by litigating a single representative year, 1990-1991. The settlement agreement also provided that the amount of the NEA portion of the agency fee would be based on a percentage of the MTA fee. The parties did not agree concerning the amount of the local fees. The commission subsequently ordered the hearings bifurcated.
The hearings on the MTA portion of the service fee began on February 8, 1993, before a hearing officer specially designated by the commission, and continued intermittently for fifty-three days, ending on December 14, 1994. Posthearing briefing concluded in July, 1995, after both parties had requested extensions of the briefing schedule. On March 21, 1996, the designated hearing officer issued a 240-page recommended decision containing extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The charging parties and the unions filed numerous objections to the recommended decision. On April 23, 1997, the commission issued a final decision and order expressly adopting the majority of the findings and conclusions in the recommended decision.
In its decision, the commission examined MTA's expenditures for the fiscal year 1990-1991 to determine those union expenditures that were "chargeable" to the nonmembers and those expenditures that were "not chargeable." The commission concluded that MTA had demanded $26.77 in excess service fees from each of the nonmembers.4
In reaching its conclusion, the commission formally adopted a framework for analyzing challenges to the amount of agency fees. The commission stated that once the amount of the agency service fee was challenged by a nonmember, the "union bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to persuade us that the fee reflects the fee-payer's proportionate share of the union's chargeable expenditures." The commission further stated that, in order to prove the amount of the agency fee:
2. Agency fee principles. It is well settled that "[p]ublic employees who are not union members may be required, as a condition of their employment, to pay an agency fee to their collective bargaining representative to support the costs of the bargaining process, contract administration, and grievance adjustment." Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 397 Mass. 498, 501 (1986), citing School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 72-73 (1982), and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 225-226 (1977). It is equally well settled that public employees have a right, based in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, to prevent the union from spending part of the agency fee to support ideological causes not germane to the union's duties as collective bargaining representative. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984); Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm'n, supra, quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., supra at 234. See also G. L. c. 150E, § 12.
Consistent with these principles, a union must implement certain procedures before it may validly demand payment of an agency fee. See Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306, 310 (1986). "[T]he constitutional requirements for the Union's collection of agency fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending." Id.5
If a nonmember objects to the amount of the agency fee on the basis that the fee includes expenditures for ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, the nonmember has an obligation affirmatively to raise that objection. See Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, supra at 306; School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, supra at 82. Once a nonmember has raised an objection, the union bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the accuracy of the agency fee. See Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, supra ( ); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, supra at 457 n.15; School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, supra.
On appeal, the charging parties argue that they were denied a reasonably prompt hearing on their challenge; that the commission used an improper formula to compute the agency fee; and that when a union conference or meeting combines chargeable and nonchargeable activities, the union should be required to submit evidence that each expense was exclusively incurred in furtherance of chargeable activity. Additionally, both the charging parties and the unions challenge several of the commission's conclusions regarding whether particular union expenditures were chargeable.
3. Issues on appeal. a. Level of review. As an initial matter, the charging parties contest the nature of review applicable to the commission's decision. The charging parties contend that, because the determination whether a particular union expenditure is chargeable is a constitutional determination, we are required to conduct a de novo review of the entire record. We disagree.
As we have stated numerous times, our review of a commission decision is governed by G. L. c. 30A, § 14. See Hogan v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 430 Mass. 611, 613 (2000); Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm'n, supra at 503. See also G. L. c. 150E, § 11 ( ). In accordance with the statute, we "give due weight to the experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge of the agency." G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). To the extent the commission's decision involves issues of law, however, we review the decision de novo. See G. L. c. 30A, §§ 14 (7) (a) () & (c) ("[b]ased upon an error of law"). The determination whether a particular union expenditure is chargeable involves both questions of law, which we review de novo, as well as questions of fact, which are for the commission in the first instance. See Harrison v. Massachusetts Soc'y of Professors/Faculty Staff Union/MTA/NEA, 405 Mass. 56, 59 (1989) ( ); Lyons v. Labor Relations Comm'n, supra at 501 ( ); School Comm. of Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, supra at 76 ( ). See also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 531-532 (1991) ( ). Cf. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, supra at 448-455.
b. Reasonably prompt hearing. The charging parties contend that, because there was a nearly eight-year interval between the time the original challenge to the amount of the agency fee was filed in 1989 and the issuance of the commission's final decision in 1997, the commission did not provide a reasonably prompt hearing as required by Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1 v. Hudson, supra at 310.6 Whether a hearing takes place in reasonably prompt manner will necessarily depend on the circumstances of the case, and, in the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the commission did provide a reasonably prompt...
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