Belkin v. Casino One Corp.
| Decision Date | 01 May 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:14CV00452 ERW,4:14CV00452 ERW |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
| Parties | AARON BELKIN, Plaintiff, v. CASINO ONE CORPORATION d/b/a Lumiere Place Casino & Hotel, et al., Defendants. |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Todd Barthelmass's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 7].
The Court accepts as true the following well-pleaded facts in Plaintiff Aaron Belkin's Complaint [ECF No. 20-1].1 Great Rivers Habitat Alliance v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 615 F.3d 958, 988 (8th Cir. 2010). On January 28, 2012, Belkin attempted to patronize Lumiere Casino, a gaming institution owned and operated by Defendant Casino One Corporation d/b/a Lumiere Place Casino & Hotel (Casino). At the time, Defendants Todd Barthelmass and Ricky Rorie, gaming agents employed by Defendant Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP), were stationed at Casino.
Upon entering Casino's premises, Casino personnel accused Belkin of being under 21 years of age and of presenting fake identification. Notwithstanding he was, in fact, over 21 yearsof age, and presented multiple forms of identification, Casino personnel detained him. During this detention, Casino personnel "became verbally abusive and aggressive towards [Belkin] and began to congregate in the area around [Belkin] in an aggressive and threatening manner." ECF No. 20-1 at ¶ 12. Belkin repeatedly asked Casino personnel to let him leave Casino premises, but, "through words and/or actions," Casino personnel prevented Belkin from doing so. ECF No. 20-1 at ¶ 13.
During Belkin's detention, Casino personnel summoned other individuals, including Barthelmass and Rorie. Barthelmass and Rorie continued to detain Belkin. They acted in an aggressive manner and subjected him to verbal abuse, including homosexual slurs. They continued to accuse Belkin of presenting fake identification and of being under 21 years of age, and they refused his requests to leave the premises. Barthelmass and Rorie "engaged in physical contact and excessive force with [Belkin], grabbing [Belkin's] arms, neck and head and forcefully throwing [Belkin] to the ground[.]" ECF No. 20-1 at ¶ 15. Belkin suffered physical and mental injuries, and required medical treatment.
Belkin subsequently brought the instant lawsuit, which was removed by Defendants from state court, against Casino, MSHP, Rorie, and Barthelmass. Against Barthelmass, the Complaint asserts claims of assault (Count I), battery (Count II), "battery/intent to induce apprehension" (Count III), false imprisonment (Count IV), excessive force (Count VI), and a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VII). Belkin seeks relief in the form of damages. Barthelmass now moves to dismiss Counts I, II, III, IV and VII as they apply against him.2
Under FRCP 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The notice pleading standard of FRCP 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to give "a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To meet this standard and to survive a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). This requirement of facial plausibility means the factual content of the plaintiff's allegations must "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Cole v. Homier Distrib. Co., 599 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts must assess the plausibility of a given claim with reference to the plaintiff's allegations as a whole, not in terms of the plausibility of each individual allegation. Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Polymer Grp., 592 F.3d 893, 896 n.4 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). This inquiry is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Court must grant all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2010).
Barthelmass argues the claims against him should be dismissed for three reasons. First, he contends the Complaint fails to allege facts with sufficient specificity to state any claim. Second, he maintains Count IV, Belkin's false imprisonment claim, must fail, because Barthelmass did not "instigate" the alleged confinement. Finally, Barthelmass contends the Court should dismiss Count VII, Belkin's § 1983 claim, because it is barred by the EleventhAmendment to the United States Constitution.
First, Barthelmass argues the Court should collectively dismiss all claims against him, because Belkin has failed to plead specific facts supporting any of his claims. Barthelmass maintains the Complaint asserts only generic accusations against him, which are merely consistent with liability, but do not make liability plausible.
The Court does not agree. The Complaint states Barthelmass accused Belkin of presenting fake identification and of being under 21 years of age. It further alleges Barthelmass used homosexual slurs against Belkin, and denied Belkin's repeated requests to leave the premises. Finally, the Complaint states Barthelmass "grabb[ed] [Belkin's] arms, neck and head and forcefully thr[ew] [Belkin] to the ground[.]" ECF No. 20-1 at ¶ 15. Based on these statements, the Court cannot conclude, as Barthelmass argues, the Complaint "fails to contain even a single allegation specific to the conduct of Defendant Barthelmass." ECF No. 8 at 3.
Even so, Barthelmass contends these allegations are insufficient, because the Complaint does not distinguish between the conduct of Barthelmass and other Defendants. Barthelmass fails to provide any authority for his contention that allegations of joint conduct constitute a basis for dismissal. Moreover, giving all reasonable inferences to Belkin, Lustgraaf, 619 F.3d at 872-73, and employing judicial experience and common sense, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, the Court finds entirely plausible the notion that Barthelmass and Rorie, two gaming agents employed by MSHP and summoned to address the altercation with Belkin, acted jointly.3 Therefore, the Court will not dismiss the Complaint merely because it alleges Barthelmass engaged in the same conduct as other Defendants.
Barthelmass argues the Court should dismiss Count IV, Belkin's false imprisonment claim, because the Complaint does not allege Barthelmass "instigated" the alleged confinement. This argument, however, misses the mark. In Missouri, "[f]alse imprisonment, also called false arrest, is the confinement, without legal justification, by the wrongdoer of the person wronged." Highfill v. Hale, 186 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). To state a claim of false imprisonment, the plaintiff need not allege the defendant "instigated" the confinement. Rather, "[a] person can be liable for false imprisonment if he encourages, causes, promotes, or instigates the arrest."4 Id. (emphasis added).
Viewed this way, the Complaint contains facts sufficient to support a claim of false imprisonment. While it does not state Barthelmass instigated Belkin's alleged confinement, it does state Barthelmass continued the confinement, by acting aggressively, verbally abusing Belkin with homosexual slurs, denying Belkin's repeated requests to leave through words and conduct, and ultimately "grabbing" his arms, neck, and head, and forcing him to the ground. See ECF No. 20-1 at ¶ 14. Therefore, the Court concludes Belkin has sufficiently alleged Barthelmass "aid[ed], abet[ted] or assist[ed] in an unlawful imprisonment[.]" Rustici, 673 S.W.2d at 768. Taking the allegations as a whole, Zoltek Corp., 592 F.3d at 896 n.4, Belkin has stated a plausible claim for false imprisonment, and the Court will not dismiss Count IV.
Finally, Barthelmass moves to dismiss Count VII, Belkin's § 1983 claim. Barthelmass argues Count VII is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because Belkin seeks damages against apublic official in his official capacity. Belkin responds the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in the instant case, because its protections have been waived.5
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits "by private parties seeking to impose liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury[.]" Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). "A state agency or official may invoke the State's Eleventh Amendment immunity if immunity will 'protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself.'" Hadley v. N. Ark. Cmty. Technical Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123 n.34 (1984)). In other words, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits "when State officials are sued for damages in their official capacity." Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Unless the pleadings unambiguously and expressly state the public official is being sued in his or her individual capacity, the Court must assume the defendant is named only in his or her official capacity. Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999).
The Court agrees Count VII should be dismissed. Because the Complaint fails to expressly and unambiguously state Barthelmass is a defendant in his individual capacity, the Court must assume he is named only in his official capacity. Chisom, 501 F.3d at 923. Additionally, Count VII seeks relief only in the form of damages, and the Eleventh Amendment therefore "pro...
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