Belkin v. Ray
Decision Date | 24 November 1943 |
Docket Number | No. 8132.,8132. |
Citation | 176 S.W.2d 162 |
Parties | BELKIN et al. v. RAY et al. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Collins, Jackson, Snodgrass & Blanks, of San Angelo, for plaintiff in error.
Upton, Upton & Baker, of San Angelo, for defendant in error Ray Hughes.
Hardeman & Wilson, of San Angelo, for defendant in error New Orleans Orphan Asylum.
J. W. Stovall, of San Angelo, for defendants in error Goldman minors.
Sedberry & Williams, of San Angelo, for defendant in error Goren.
Mrs. Fannie Belkin, residuary legatee in the will of Harry Marks, deceased, joined by her husband, filed this suit in the District Court of Tom Green County, Texas, against all the other legatees in such will, and against the two independent executors named therein, to construe the same and determine the rights of the parties thereunder. H. H. Ray, independent executor of the will of Ray Marks, deceased, wife of Harry Marks, filed intervention. We will not attempt to detail the pleadings. It is sufficient to say that they raise the questions of law which we will decide. Trial in the district court resulted in a judgment the effect of which will later appear in this opinion. Mrs. Belkin appealed from such judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals. That court affirmed the judgment of the district court. 171 S.W.2d 507. Mrs. Belkin, joined by her husband, brings error.
It appears that Harry Marks and Ray Marks were husband and wife. Both were deceased at the time of this trial in the district court. Both died testate, and their wills have been duly probated.
The will of Harry Marks, after providing for his just debts and funeral expenses, contains two specific bequest provisions. It then bequeaths all the residue of his estate to Mrs. Fannie Belkin, his sister.
We are first called upon to construe the two provisions just mentioned. They are Paragraphs III and IV of such will. Such paragraphs read as follows:
The district court entered a judgment construing Paragraphs III and IV of this will, respectively, as constituting a bequest of $500 to each of the fourteen parties and persons named in Paragraph III, and as constituting a bequest of $100 to each of the two persons named in Paragraph IV. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed such ruling. By proper points, Mrs. Belkin contends that Paragraph III in this will constitutes a bequest of $500 to the fourteen persons and parties named therein jointly, or as a class, and that Paragraph IV constitutes a bequest of $100 to the two persons named therein in the same way.
After a careful consideration of the question, we are convinced that whether Paragraphs III and IV of this will, respectively, bequeath the named sums of money to the persons or parties mentioned therein, as a class,—that is jointly,—or whether each person or party mentioned takes the amount of the sum named individually, must be determined by a reading of the entire will, and by viewing the same in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances. In re Smith, Ct. of Cl. of N. J., 94 N.J.Eq. 1, 118 A. 271; In re Hawgood's Estate, 37 S.D. 565, 154 N.W. 117. Paragraph III in this will is somewhat ambiguous and uncertain as regards the question here involved; and, in instances of ambiguity or uncertainty, it is proper to look to surrounding facts and circumstances to ascertain the testator's intent. 44 Tex.Jur. p. 349, § 184, and authorities there cited.
When we come to examine the surrounding facts and circumstances regarding Paragraph III of this will, we find that three of the beneficiaries named therein are charitable institutions, nine of the other eleven beneficiaries are steprelatives of the deceased, and two are nieces of the testator. Testator married a widow. He never had any children of his own. He therefore visited a part of his bounty on his stepchildren, and their descendants. He named one of his sisters as his residuary legatee in another paragraph in this will. In this paragraph he made two of his own nieces beneficiaries. To our minds, viewed in the light of the above circumstances, it would be giving this will an unreasonable construction to say that this testator intended to give these beneficiaries only the sum that would be produced by dividing $500 by 14. This would be construing it as bequeathing the paltry sum of $35.71-plus to each beneficiary. Finally, in regard to this matter, we note that in this bequest the will numbers each beneficiary, from 1 to 14, inclusive. To our minds this is a circumstance tending to show that $500 is given to each. We will again call attention to this matter when we construe Paragraph IV.
A reading of Paragraph IV of this will shows that it is a bequest of $100 to two persons. Neither of these persons bears any relationship to the testator. It is significant that this paragraph numbers or classifies the entire bequest as "1." This demonstrates to us that he intended to make a joint bequest of $100 to the two persons named in Paragraph IV.
From the above it is evident that we construe Paragraph III of this will as a bequest of $500 to each of the fourteen parties and persons named therein. It is also evident that we construe Paragraph IV as a bequest to the two persons named therein jointly,—that is, a bequest of $50 to each.
The will of Harry Marks, executed after the death of his wife, Ray Marks, contains the following provision:
As shown by the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals,
The will of Ray Marks contains the following provision: ...
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