In the Matter Murry, 06-99-00058-CV

• Decision Date: 07 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 06-99-00058-CV,06-99-00058-CV
• Citation: 15 S.W.3d 202
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000) IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF DON QUINDAL MURRAY AND LULA MAE (MURRAY) BUTAUD
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 202

15 S.W.3d 202 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000)

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF DON QUINDAL MURRAY AND LULA MAE (MURRAY) BUTAUD

No. 06-99-00058-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas Texarkana.

Submitted Feb. 8, 2000.

Decided March 7, 2000.

On Appeal from the 1-A Judicial District Court Jasper County, Texas Trial Court No. 20254

Before Cornelius, C.J., Grant and Ross, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Opinion by Chief Justice Cornelius.

Don Quindal Murray appeals from a divorce decree awarding certain real property to his former wife, Lula Mae Butaud. Murray contends that he and Butaud were co-owners of the property, and that the trial court erred in characterizing the property as Butaud's separate property.

Murray and Butaud were married on August 31, 1996. Several months before their marriage, in March of 1996, they acquired two contiguous fifteen-acre tracts of land. One fifteen-acre tract was vacant (the "vacant land"), and the other fifteen-acre tract had a house on it in which the couple subsequently resided (the "Pineview property").¹ Butaud paid the entire purchase price of the vacant land with her separate property funds, and the deed to that parcel named Butaud as the sole grantee. Murray has not claimed an ownership interest in the vacant land.

Murray does claim an undivided one-half interest in the Pineview property. The Pineview property was acquired before Murray and Butaud married. The warranty deed for the Pineview property listed both Butaud and Murray as grantees,² but Butaud testified that she only allowed Murray's name to be on the deed as a conciliatory measure to put the marriage on good footing. Butaud paid $500.00 in earnest money and made a $23,497.09 down payment for the Pineview property with her separate property funds. Both Murray and Butaud signed the purchase money note for the remaining $33,900.00.³ Over the next two years, both Butaud and Murray made payments on the note with their separate and community property funds.

On June 12, 1998, Murray filed for divorce. The case was tried in the district court without a jury, and the trial court took the property division issues under advisement at that time. The court requested the parties to submit summation letters setting out what they each contended to be a fair and equitable division of the property. Murray recommended that the court award the Pineview property to Butaud, with an offsetting judgment of $38,877.43 in his favor. On February 9, 1999, the trial court rendered a final decree of divorce declaring, among other things, that the Pineview property was solely Butaud's separate property. Murray filed a motion for new trial contesting this finding, and the motion was denied.

Neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law from the trial court. In that situation, the judgment must be affirmed if it can be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984). All findings necessary to support the trial court's judgment will be implied, if the findings are supported by the evidence. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990); Lemons v. EMW Mfg. Co., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex. 1988). We will consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and will disregard that which is opposed to it. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d at 109 (citing Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 149 Tex. 507, 235 S.W.2d 609, 613 (1950)).

In his sole point of error, Murray contends that he and Butaud were co-owners of the Pineview property and, therefore, the trial court erred in characterizing it as solely Butaud's separate property.

Under the inception of title doctrine, the character of property as separate or community depends on whether the parties were married at the time the ownership right originated. Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 224 S.W.2d 471 (1949). All property that a spouse owned or claimed before marriage is that spouse's separate property. Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 15; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.001 (Vernon 1998). Although trial courts have broad discretion in the division of the marital community property, that discretion does not extend to separate property. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. 1977). The trial court may not divest a party of his separate property by a divorce decree. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d at 142.

Nevertheless, property possessed by either spouse on dissolution of the marriage is presumed to be community property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003 (Vernon 1998). To overcome this presumption, a party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the disputed property is separate property. Id.

All the evidence reflects that the Pineview property was purchased before the parties married. Consequently, there is clear and convincing evidence that the Pineview property is separate. Murray and Butaud do not dispute that the property is separate property. The issue is who owns the separate property.

Relying on the inception of title doctrine, Butaud argues that she is the sole owner of the property, because the title originated when she paid the earnest money with her separate property funds. Butaud's argument is misguided. The inception of title doctrine determines the character of property as either separate or community. Strong v. Garrett, 224 S.W.2d 471. Courts must look beyond the inception of title doctrine to determine ownership. The evidence here conclusively establishes that the Pineview property is separate property because title originated before marriage. Thus, the ownership is determined pursuant to general property law.

Under general property law principles, a deed is prima facie evidence of the grantee's ownership. Zieben v. Krakower, 346 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Freeman v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 317 S.W.2d 563, 569 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Where a deed names more than one grantee and the interest of each grantee is not stated, a rebuttable presumption arises that each of the grantees is vested with title to an equal undivided interest in the property. Zephyr v. Zephyr, 679 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wooley v. West, 391 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, writ ref'd...