Bell County v. Hines

• Decision Date: 04 February 1920
• Docket Number: (No. 6196.)
• Parties: BELL COUNTY v. HINES, Director General of Railroads.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 556

219 S.W. 556

BELL COUNTY v. HINES, Director General of Railroads.

(No. 6196.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

February 4, 1920.

Rehearing Denied March 17, 1920.

Appeal from District Court, Bell County; F. M. Spann, Judge.

Action by Bell County against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Lewis H. Jones and M. B. Blair, both of Belton, and C. M. Cureton and W. P. Dumas, both of Austin, for appellant.

Terry, Cavin & Mills, of Galveston, C. C. Huff and A. H. McKnight, both of Dallas, and Lee, Lomax, Wren & Smith, of Ft. Worth, for appellee.

Findings of Fact.

JENKINS, J.

An election, regular in all respects, was held in Bell county, to determine whether or not it should issue certain bonds, for the purpose of taking over the roads in certain road districts in that county, and take up and discharge the bonds theretofore issued, and to further construct and maintain additional roads in said county. The requisite number of votes was cast in favor of issuing said bonds; the result thereof was legally declared; the bonds were issued in the manner required by law; and thereafter the commissioners' court levied a tax of 55 cents on the $100 on all property subject to taxation in Bell county, to pay the interest on said bonds, and provide the sinking fund for same.

The action as above set out was in pursuance of chapter 2, title 18, of the Revised Statutes of this state, and of the act of April 5, 1917 (chapter 203; articles 637a to 637f, inclusive, 1918 Supplement to Revised Statutes), under the provisions of article 3, § 52, of the Constitution of this state.

Appellee paid said tax on its physical property situated in Bell county, but refused to pay the same on its rolling stock and intangible assets, as provided in articles 7414 to 7426, 7524, 7525, R. S.

This suit was brought by Bell county to enforce the collection of such tax. The case was submitted to the court without a jury, and the court, after hearing the pleadings and the evidence, found as a conclusion of law that:

"Under section 52, article 3 of the Constitution, and under chapter 2, title 18, of the Revised Statutes, as amended by chapter 203 of the Acts of the Thirty-Fifth Legislature, regular session, the commissioners' court of Bell county had no authority or power to levy the tax of 55 cents on the $100 on the intangible assets and rolling stock of defendant, and the part thereof apportioned to Bell county."

Judgment was accordingly rendered for the defendant, the appellee herein.

Opinion.

The issue of fact determinative of the law of this case is whether the bonds issued by Bell county were issued in its capacity as a county, or as a special road district, the boundaries of which happen to coincide with the boundaries of the county.

The legal deduction, as we will hereinafter show, is that if the bonds were issued by Bell county as a county, and not by a special road district, known by the name of Bell county, the rolling stock and intangible assets of appellee, as apportioned to Bell county for the purpose of taxation, are subject to taxation, for the purpose of paying the interest on the bonds so issued and providing for a sinking fund for the same; otherwise they are not.

The provision of the Constitution, art. 3, § 52, as amended in 1904, under which the bonds were issued, reads as follows:

"Under legislative provision, any county, any political subdivision of a county, any number of adjoining counties, or any political subdivision of the state, or any defined district now or hereafter to be described within the state of Texas * * * upon a vote of a two-thirds majority of the resident property taxpayers voting thereon, who are qualified electors of such district or territory to be affected thereby, in addition to all other debts, may issue bonds, or otherwise lend its credit in any amount not to exceed one-fourth of the assessed valuation of real property of such district or territory, * * * and levy and collect such taxes to pay the interest thereon and provide a sinking fund for the redemption thereof, as the Legislature may authorize, and in such manner as it may authorize the same, for the following purposes, to wit:

"* * * The construction, maintenance, and operation of graveled or paved roads or turn-pikes, or in aid thereof."

"Defined districts," as that term is used in the Constitution, means a defined area in a county, and less than the county, other than a political subdivision of such county. In addition to "defined districts," the amendment to the Constitution above set out authorized any political subdivision of a county, any number of adjoining counties, or any political subdivision of the state to issue bonds, upon the vote of the qualified taxpaying voters of the territory to be affected, for public road purposes, and to levy a tax upon the property of such territory to take care of such bonds.

We agree with appellee that such territory may properly be called a road-taxing district, whether the same be less than a county or more than a county, but not so as to a county. Our reason for this distinction is that the subdivisions mentioned, other than counties, were unknown as taxing units until created by statutes of comparatively recent date; but counties, as taxing units for county purposes, have existed from the foundation of this government. Counties had the right to levy taxes within the limits prescribed by the Constitution, for county purposes, prior to the amendment of the Constitution, as hereinbefore set out. Construction and maintenance of public roads within a county are county purposes. Prior to the adoption of said amendment, counties, political subdivisions, and defined road districts were limited as to the total amount of taxes which they could levy to 30 cents on the $100. This limit was removed, and road districts were permitted to be formed so as to comprise more territory than a single county. The limitation as to the amount of taxes that could be levied for road purposes was removed, not only as to road districts, but also as to counties. The constitutional amendment would have been the same, in so far as it affects counties, if it had made no reference to road districts, but had read:

"Under...