Bell v. Bank of Abbeville

• Decision Date: 02 September 1947
• Docket Number: 15985.
• Citation: 44 S.E.2d 328,211 S.C. 167
• Parties: BELL v. BANK OF ABBEVILLE.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

44 S.E.2d 328

211 S.C. 167

BELL v. BANK OF ABBEVILLE.

No. 15985.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 2, 1947

J. M. Nickles and J. Moore Mars, both of Abbeville Blackwell, Sullivan & Wilson, of Laurens, and C. T Graydon, of Columbia, for appellant.

Nicholson & Nicholson, of Greenwood, and Ralph J. Syfan, of Abbeville, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This case is an action for slander. It has previously been before us on the pleadings (Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C. 490; 38 S.E.2d 641, 643) when we held that as against a demurrer interposed by the defendant the complaint stated a cause of action.

Following the disposition of the appeal relating to the demurrer, the case came up for trial before the court and a jury and resulted in a verdict for Twenty-five Thousand ($25,000) Dollars in favor of the plaintiff. From the rulings made in the course of the trial below and in the disposition by the trial judge of a motion for a new trial, this appeal was taken.

The issues as made by the pleadings are sufficiently set forth in our opinion in the above cited case. It is unnecessary to restate these issues further than to say that the plaintiff (respondent here) was a teller employed by the appellant bank; that the respondent and the cashier of the bank met at the bank at the invitation of the latter for a discussion of alleged complaints of irregularities made by customers of and persons connected with the bank; that after some discussion between the respondent and the cashier (the cashier being one of the directors of the bank), two other members of the Board of Directors were called into the meeting and that in their presence the statements made by the cashier to the respondent were repeated; and that subsequently, outside of the presence of the respondent substantially the same statements were repeated to the remaining two directors of the bank.

Appellant's answer, without specifically denying such of the allegations of the complaint as set forth the alleged slanderous remarks, alleges that the statements made on the occasions in question 'were made in complete good faith, with an interest to be upheld, on a proper occasion, and in a proper manner, to proper parties only, and with reference to business transactions in which all the parties present had a corresponding interest'; that the discussions were 'confidential and privileged and not intended to be disclosed or published in any manner, and that any and all statements which plaintiff complains of as having been made, if made at all, was in the discharge of a legal and moral duty'; and that by reason of these and other facts alleged, 'the Defendant specifically pleads the defense of qualified privilege * * * as a bar to recovery by the Plaintiff in this action.'

The answer further alleges that the cashier of the bank had received 'numerous reports and complaints * * * of the nature of those alleged in the complaint, as well as others, in business items of the bank handled by the plaintiff, P. E. Bell, in his official capacity as assistant cashier or teller that could not with common propriety be permitted to longer continue without calling them to the attention of the plaintiff, and that it was imperative that some action be taken by the bank through its officers and directors with regard thereto in the interest of good banking, and in order to be able to retain a satisfied clientele and maintain the high standing of the defendant bank as a banking institution, confidence in the integrity of its officers and employees and accuracy in handling of business items being one of the most valuable assets of any banking corporation.'

The record in the cause is voluminous. It is not improper to say that it is unduly so. Counsel on both sides, with the interposition of very few objections, went far afield in the presentation of the plaintiff's case and of the defense. Many pages of the record are devoted to such matters as the suggested inadequacy of the number and compensation of the employees of the appellant bank; to supervisory actions of one of the officers of the bank, which appeared to have been distasteful to the respondent and to some of the other employees; to the propriety of some practices of the bank as to which the respondent had no responsibility or duty; to the personal characteristics of the respondent and of the cashier; and to the financial success that had been achieved by one of the officers of the bank. None of these matters have any bearing upon the important legal questions that are present in this case.

And although no objections were interposed or motions made on the subject, the result of the trial suggests that the matters above referred to, together with inflammatory statements and irrelevant and disparaging remarks incorporated in questions asked and comments made by plaintiff's counsel in the course of the trial might have had something to do with the verdict.

We think that the fundamental error of the court was in refusing appellant's motions for a nonsuit and for a direction of verdict.

The primary question in this case is whether the circumstances under which the alleged slanderous statements were made are such that, assuming the statements to be legally slanderous, the occasion was privileged. If it was, we have already held that the cause of action is not maintainable unless the privilege was abused as a means to defame the respondent. Bell v. Bank, supra. The privilege of which we speak is of course the qualified privilege which attaches to communications between an employer and an employee when the occasion is a bona fide inquiry by the employer into the alleged misconduct of the employee. As we said in our opinion in the earlier appeal in this case:

'On the face of the amended complaint, the alleged defamatory statements appear to have been made upon a privileged occasion. But whether or not the privilege was exceeded is an issue to be met upon the trial of the case, in which the burden will be upon the plaintiff to show express or actual malice. This question cannot be decided upon a demurrer to the complaint. The defendant cannot get the benefit of the defense of qualified privilege without setting it up as an affirmative defense.' And we further said in such opinion:

'Ordinarily, proof of a defamatory publication, charging another with the commission of a crime, makes out a prima facie case of malice in the author. But a privileged communication is an exception to the rule. In such case the presumption of malice is rebutted. The effect is to cast upon the plaintiff the necessity of showing malice in fact--that is, that the defendant was actuated by ill will in what he did and said, with the design to causelessly and wantonly injury the plaintiff. This actual malice, resting as it must upon the slanderous matter itself, and the surrounding circumstances tending to prove fact and motive, is a question to be determined by the jury. * * *'

And of course when we said that the questions whether the case was one of actual malice, and whether the surrounding circumstances tended to prove fact and motive, were questions for the jury, we said so in the light of the well-settled principles stated in the case of Hunsucker v. State Highway Department, 182 S.C. 441, 189 S.E. 652, 656, as follows:

'If it be said that there was a scintilla of evidence adduced by the plaintiff in chief sufficient to send the case to the jury, which is not admitted, we apply another rule which is stated by this court in National Bank [of Honea Path] v. Thomas J. Barrett, Jr., & Co., 173 S.C. 1, 174 S.E. 581, 582 in these words:

"If it be conceded that there may be deduced by a process of unusual finesse of reasoning that there is a scientilla of evidence, * * * nevertheless there is another rule, more founded upon common sense and reason, to the effect that when only one reasonable inference, not just one inference, but one reasonable inference, can be deduced from the evidence, it becomes a question of law for the court, and not a question of fact for the jury.'

'This rule has been several times affirmed by the court.

'In Turner v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 260, 180 S.E. 55, this court said quoting syllabus 3: 'Scintilla of evidence on which case should be sent to jury must be real, material, pertinent, and relevant evidence, and not speculative and theoretical deductions.''

In proceeding to a consideration of the testimony, the question before us may be stated to be: Assuming the statements in question to be slanderous in character, were they uttered in good faith in the pursuit of the business of the bank by and to persons who had a right to hear and consider such statements, at a time and place...