Bell v. Dufur
| Decision Date | 02 June 1909 |
| Parties | BELL v. DUFUR ET AL. (THREE CASES). |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Clarke County; H. M. Towner, Judge.
Actions in equity to set aside conveyances of real estate from William Bell, the deceased husband of the plaintiff, to each of three children by a former marriage, and subject the three parcels of land covered by said conveyances to her claim for dower therein; the allegation of ground for such relief being that said conveyances were made shortly before plaintiff's marriage to said William Bell, and without her knowledge, and in fraud of the rights which she was induced to believe she would acquire by such marriage. After a hearing upon the merits the court entered a decree in each case for the defendant, and the plaintiff in each case appeals. Affirmed.V. R. McGinnis, O. M. Slaymaker, and J. S. Banker, for appellant.
Maxwell & Maxwell, Temple & Temple, and W. B. Tallman, for appellees.
The plaintiff and William Bell were married on July 2, 1902, in Clarke county, after a courtship of not exceeding two months. William Bell was then 80 years of age, and for 2 years a widower, and plaintiff was a widow 47 years of age, with two minor children. At the date of the commencement of this courtship William Bell was the owner of about 300 acres of land in Clarke county of the value of about $15,000, which value had, at the time of the trial of the case in 1908, increased to about $25,000. On June 23, 1902, nine days before the marriage, William Bell conveyed this land in three parcels, by warranty deeds, to his three adult children by his former marriage, defendants in these actions, without other consideration than that of love and affection. Two of the deeds were at once recorded in Clarke county, but the third, to a grantee residing in Nebraska, was first forwarded to such grantee, and then returned for record, and recorded on the day of the wedding. Concurrently with the execution and delivery of these three deeds three instruments of lease were executed by the grantees in the deeds to the grantor for the same premises described in the deeds, granting to said William Bell the premises described for a period of 20 years, to terminate, however, on his death, should he die before the expiration of that time, with the agreement on his part that he pay all taxes thereon, and keep the fences and buildings in proper repair; he to have full control and use of said land and buildings to occupy or rent the same as he might deem best during the continuance of the lease. These instruments of lease were not recorded. William Bell died in March, 1907, and on the 20th day of July following these actions were brought, in which plaintiff asks to have the deeds declared fraudulent as against her, and to secure the setting apart to her of one-third in each of said tracts by way of dower.
There is little evidence directly tending to show intentional fraud on the part of William Bell in making these voluntary conveyances, or on the part of the grantees in accepting them, so far as the prospective rights of plaintiff were concerned. On the other hand, there is evidence, practically uncontroverted, of an understanding, existing between William Bell and his former wife prior to her death and these three children, that some such distribution of his property should be made; but, if without plaintiff's knowledge such conveyances were made pending a treaty of marriage between plaintiff and William Bell, they were no doubt constructively fraudulent as to her, and should be set aside, so far as they deprived her of the contingent dower interest in the property which she would have otherwise acquired by the marriage. Wallace v. Wallace, 137 Iowa, 169, 114 N. W. 913;Beechley v. Beechley, 134 Iowa, 75, 108 N. W. 762, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 955, 120 Am. St. Rep. 412. Nevertheless the burden is on the plaintiff to establish such fraud--that is, the want of knowledge on her part, and her reliance on the prospective rights in the property to be acquired by the marriage relied upon as an inducement thereto--and, as we view the evidence, the determination of this issue depends upon the proof of want of knowledge by plaintiff of the conveyances; it appearing without controversy that plaintiff knew that the property belonged to plaintiff when the courtship commenced, and that during its progress some reference was made by both parties to the nature and extent of the property of the prospective husband. Plaintiff, as a witness, testifies to the want of any knowledge whatever of the conveyances executed on the 23d of June preceding the wedding, and that during the courtship her prospective husband stated that he would have plenty of property, and that plaintiff would never have to work for the support of herself and minor children as she had previously done, and that he proposed to take her to see this property, which, however, he did not in fact do. She also testifies that on the day before the marriage she heard from Mrs....
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