Bell v. Heflin (In re M.H.)

• Decision Date: 10 November 2016
• Docket Number: No. 92620-4,92620-4
• Citation: 383 P.3d 1031,187 Wash.2d 1
• Parties: In the Matter of the Paternity of M.H. Stephanie Bell, Petitioner, v. Juan Sidran Heflin, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

187 Wash.2d 1

383 P.3d 1031

In the Matter of the Paternity of M.H.Stephanie Bell, Petitioner,

v.Juan Sidran Heflin, Respondent.

No. 92620-4

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Sept. 20, 2016

Filed: Nov. 10, 2016

Bruce Owen Danielson, Danielson Law Office, PS, 1001 4th Ave., Ste. 3200, Seattle, WA, 98154-1003, for Petitioner.

Helmut Kah, Helmut Kah, Attorney At Law, 17924 140th Ave. N.E., Ste. 204, Woodinville, WA, 98072-4315, for Respondent.

Lianne Schain Malloy, Attorney at Law, 7141 Cleanwater Lane S.W., P.O. Box 40124, Olympia, WA, 98504-0124, Peter B. Gonick, Washington Attorney General's Office, 1125 Washington Street, P.O. Box 40100, Olympia, WA, 98504-0100, for as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Department of Social and Health Services.

MADSEN, C.J.

¶1 The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) governs how Washington courts are to enforce child support orders issued by courts in other states. In this case, we must clarify under which of UIFSA's choice of law rules our state's nonclaim statutes fall. Relying on the comments to the model UIFSA and other states' interpretations of UIFSA, we hold that under UIFSA's choice of law provision, a statute authorizing wage withholding is a “remedy,” whereas a nonclaim statute is a “statute of limitation.” After comparing the two statutes of limitations applicable in this case, the 20-year Indiana statute of limitation controls because it is longer. Therefore, the trial court had the authority to enter the wage withholding order, and we reverse and remand this case for entry of judgment in Stephanie Bell's favor. Bell is awarded attorney fees and costs at trial and on appeal.

FACTS

¶2 Stephanie Bell and Juan Sidran Heflin are the parents of M.H. (born May 13, 1985). In 1994, Bell established paternity and obtained an order of child support from the Vigo Circuit Court in Indiana. The order mandated that Heflin pay $77 per week in child support, as well as $539 of back support. Bell and M.H. lived in Indiana at that time, but Heflin lived in Washington. On September 9, 2010, Bell registered the Indiana support order in King County, Washington for enforcement only. After various hearings, the King County Superior Court confirmed the Indiana support order, in the sum of $110,709.23, as a registered foreign child support obligation on February 24, 2011.¹ Clerk's Papers (CP) at 12-13. The parties then entered into a settlement agreement on December 7, 2011 where Heflin agreed to pay a sum of $120,000 in monthly payments of $2,000. After Heflin failed to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement, Bell filed the motion for wage withholding in King County Superior Court that is the subject of this appeal. After finding that Indiana law applied, the superior court issued the wage withholding order. CP at 66-69.

¶3 The Court of Appeals, Division One, reversed the wage withholding order in an unpublished opinion. In re Paternity of M.H., No. 72527–1–I, 2015 WL 5690575 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2015) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/725271.pdf. The Court of Appeals applied RCW 4.56.210(2), which states, “An underlying judgment or judgment lien ... for accrued child support shall continue in force for ten years after the eighteenth birthday of the youngest child.”² Ultimately, the court found that RCW 4.56.210(2) fell under the “procedures and remedies” section of the UIFSA choice of law statute, RCW 26.21A.515(3). Therefore, the law of Washington applied and the trial court lacked the authority to issue the wage withholding order because the time period in RCW 4.56.210(2) had passed and the judgment had thus expired. M.H., slip op. at 6.

¶4 Bell petitioned this court for review. The Washington State Department of Social and Health Services filed an amicus brief in support of Bell.

ANALYSIS

¶5 The issues here present questions under UIFSA, RCW 26.21A.515. Statutory construction is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Ammons, 136 Wash.2d 453, 456, 963 P.2d 812 (1998).

¶6 Our court has not had many opportunities to interpret UIFSA, which governs how Washington courts enforce child support orders issued by courts in other states. We did recount a brief history of UIFSA in In re Marriage of Schneider, 173 Wash.2d 353, 358–59, 268 P.3d 215 (2011), Prior to UIFSA, parties could have competing child support orders in different states, parents could avoid obligations by moving to states with more favorable laws, and the resulting litigation caused the system to be in a state of general “ ‘chaos.’ ” Id. at 358, 268 P.3d 215 (quoting UIFSA (2008), 9 pt. IB U.L.A. § 611 cmt. at 139-40 (Supp. 2011)). UIFSA established a “ ‘one-order’ ” system where one state would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a support order to help alleviate this chaos. Id. at 358–59, 268 P.3d 215 (quoting 9 pt. 1B U.L.A. § 611 cmt. at 139-40 (Supp. 2011)). To maintain this system, UIFSA includes various provisions relating to modifying and enforcing support orders from other states. Id. at 359, 268 P.3d 215.

¶7 The first issue in this case is which provision of the UIFSA choice of law statute applies. That statute states:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (4) of this section, the law of the issuing state or foreign country governs:

(a) The nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments under a registered support order;(b) The computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of interest on the arrearages under the support order; and

(c) The existence and satisfaction of other obligations under the support order.

(2) In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of this state or of the issuing state or foreign country, whichever is longer, applies,

(3) A responding tribunal of this state shall apply the procedures and remedies of this state to enforce current support and collect arrears and interest due on a support order of another state or foreign country registered in this state.

(4) After a tribunal of this or another state determines which is the controlling order and issues an order consolidating arrears, if any, a tribunal of this state shall prospectively apply the law of the state or foreign country issuing the controlling order, including its law on interest on arrears, on current and future support, and on consolidated arrears.

RCW 26.21A.515.

¶8 Heflin argues that RCW 4.56.210(2) —the nonclaim statute applied by the Court of Appeals—is a “remedy” under RCW 26.21A.515(3), thus Washington law should apply to bar the claim because the time for enforcement has expired. But RCW 4.56.210(2) does not fit well within the remedy section. UIFSA does not define “remedies,” but the comment to the model act refers to mechanisms such as “license suspension or revocation statutes” as examples of remedies. UIFSA (2008), 9 pt. 1B U.L.A. § 604(b) cmt. at 197 (Supp. 2016). Based on that comment, the wage withholding mechanism used in this case, for example, would be a “remedy” under RCW 26.21A.515(3). See RCW 26.18.070. The text of the chapter authorizing such wage withholding orders supports this view. In enacting the wage withholding remedy, the legislature found that there was an urgent need for vigorous enforcement of child support and that “more efficient statutory remedies need[ed] to be established to supplement and complement the remedies provided in chapters 26.09, 26.21A, 26.26, 74.20, and 74.20A RCW.” RCW 26.18.010 (emphasis added).³ The legislature also mandated that the “remedies provided in [the child support enforcement] chapter” be “liberally construed to assure that all dependent children are adequately supported.” RCW 26.18.030(1), (3) (emphasis added).

¶9 RCW 4.56.210(2), on the other hand, does not provide a procedural mechanism to enforce a child support order. Rather, it provides a durational limit on the general enforcement of an underlying judgment for child support. This distinction has been made by a court in at least one other state. In that case, the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that “remedy” under a different provision of UIFSA refers to the “procedural means of enforcing support orders,” rather than the enforcement itself. State ex rel. George v. Bray , 130 N.C.App. 552, 558, 503 S.E.2d 686 (1998). Further, the Bray court discusses a North Carolina durational limit statute for child support actions that is identical to RCW 4.56.210(2). Interestingly, the Bray court does not discuss the time limit in relation to “remedies” under UIFSA; rather, the court discusses the time limit only in its section on the applicable statute of limitation under UIFSA. This supports finding that Washington's identical statute is not a “remedy” and is therefore not governed by the remedies section of the UIFSA choice of law provision.

¶10 The other option, which Bell and amicus advocate for, is that RCW 4.56.210(2) is a “statute of limitation” under RCW 26.21A.515(2).⁴ Heflin argues that RCW 4.56.210 and RCW 6.17.020 are not statutes of limitation. This is generally a correct statement of Washington case law.

Hazel v. Van Beek , 135 Wash.2d 45, 60–61, 954 P.2d 1301 (1998) (describing RCW 6.17.020(1) as a jurisdictional time limit rather than a normal statute of limitations); Grub v. Fogle's Garage, Inc., 5 Wash.App. 840, 842, 491 P.2d 258 (1971) (stating RCW 4.56.210(1) is a statute creating a lien right for a definite length of time only, and not a statute of limitation, “ ‘because it does not exist outside of the period during which it is conferred’ ” (quoting Hutton v. State , 25 Wash.2d 402, 407, 171 P.2d 248 (1946) )). This court explained the distinction between the jurisdictional time bar found in nonclaim statutes like RCW 4.56.210 and statutes of limitation in Hutton. “A statute creating a lien right for a definite length of time only, is something that is in addition to the cause of action or substantive right in question and is not a statute of limitations, because it does not...