Bell v. Hegewald, 47169-0
| Citation | 628 P.2d 1305,95 Wn.2d 686 |
| Decision Date | 04 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 47169-0,47169-0 |
| Parties | Jack T. BELL and Margaret Junge, Petitioners, v. Rudy HEGEWALD and Jane Doe Hegewald, his wife, Respondents, and The Louisiana Pacific Corporation, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Landerholm, Memovich, Lansverk, Whitesides, Marsh, Wilkinson & Klossner, Duane Lansverk, Vancouver, for petitioners.
R. DeWitt Jones, Vancouver, for respondent Hegewald.
Eisenhower, Carlson, Newlands, Reha, Henriot & Quinn, James F. Henriot, Tacoma, for respondent Louisiana Pacific Corp.
Jack Bell, real estate broker, and Margaret Junge (now Sherman), real estate salesperson, commenced this action against Mr. and Mrs. Rudy Hegewald for breach of oral contract to pay a sales commission, and against Louisiana Pacific Corporation for breach of its promise to protect their commission. At the close of plaintiffs' case, Hegewald moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that, because the oral agreement involved the sale of real property, it was brought within the statute of frauds. The trial court denied the motion.
The jury awarded Bell and Junge $197,186.04 against both Hegewald and Louisiana Pacific Corporation, plus $77,732.07 in interest against Hegewald. The trial court denied defense motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. Defendants appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, remanding for a new trial as to Hegewald and the entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the claim against Louisiana Pacific. We reverse the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court will sustain findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Wicklund, 93 Wash.2d 497, 610 P.2d 903 (1980). "Substantial evidence is evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise." Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wash.2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978).
Where there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, including a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we have said that challenge
admits the truth of the opponent's evidence and all inferences which can reasonably be drawn therefrom, and requires that the evidence be interpreted most strongly against the moving party and in a light most favorable to the opponent. No element of discretion is involved. Such motions can be granted only when the court can say, as a matter of law, there is no substantial evidence to support the opponent's claim.
Powers v. Hastings, 93 Wash.2d 709, 713, 612 P.2d 371 (1980), quoting from Davis v. Early Constr. Co., 63 Wash.2d 252, 254-55, 386 P.2d 958 (1963). We further stated that in an action for damages as opposed to specific performance, the degree of evidence required is substantial evidence, rather than evidence which is "clear and unequivocal." Powers v. Hastings, supra, 93 Wash.2d at 714, 612 P.2d 371.
The evidence showed that in 1973 Junge worked as a salesperson for Bell, a real estate broker in Vancouver. Early in March of that year, Junge contacted Rudy Hegewald and inquired if he was interested in selling his sawmill complex. Junge knew at the time that Louisiana Pacific Corporation was engaged in an acquisition program and hoped to interest it in the sale. Hegewald stated that he would be interested in talking with a strong purchaser, and for her to arrange a meeting. According to Junge, she told Hegewald to be sure to include a 6 percent commission when figuring a price, but Hegewald testified contrarily that Junge had not told him she was a salesperson or that he would be responsible for the commission.
Junge subsequently arranged to have representatives of Louisiana Pacific tour Hegewald's sawmill complex. At the end of the tour Junge advised Hegewald privately to be sure to include a 6 percent commission when setting a price. Sometime after the tour of the plant, Junge called Hegewald in response to a request by Louisiana Pacific to ask Hegewald if he had determined a price. She again told Hegewald to include a 6 percent commission.
Neither Junge nor Bell attended the actual negotiations between Louisiana Pacific and Hegewald. Bell testified that Louisiana Pacific asked him not to attend because the negotiations were usually handled strictly between the seller and themselves. Consequently, Bell testified that he asked a representative of Louisiana Pacific to cover and protect their interest. The representative answered by stating that he would see that they were protected and bring it up during the negotiations. Both Bell and Junge testified that they were aware that Louisiana Pacific never paid commissions or finder's fees. Although there was some testimony that consideration was given to the sale of real estate, the ultimate transaction was the acquisition of all the common stock of Hegewald Timber Company by Louisiana Pacific Corporation.
A contract may be oral. Hankins v. American Pac. Sales Corp., 7 Wash.App. 316, 499 P.2d 214 (1972). A contract may be implied in fact with its existence depending on some act or conduct of the party sought to be charged. It may arise by inference or implication from circumstances which, according to the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men, show a mutual intention on the part of the parties to contract with each other. Ross v. Raymer, 32 Wash.2d 128, 201 P.2d 129 (1948).
On the question of whether Hegewald breached an oral contract, the trial court ruled:
Taking the statement most favorable to the point of view of the plaintiffs, which Mr. Jones agrees the court is required to do, there are three instances, according to the testimony of Mrs. Sherman, that a commission was mentioned by her....
There are cases in this state which indicate that, of course, oral agreements, if they have all the essential requisites of contracts satisfied, can be enforced. They can either be express or implied.... I don't think that I can, on the state of the evidence here, say that no possible claim against the Hegewald Timber interests or Mr. Hegewald for the sale of the Hegewald Timber Company has been shown.
On the question of whether Louisiana Pacific breached its promise to protect the commission, the trial court ruled:
The only thing that I can believe in my mind that would make this a jury question at all would be the fact that Louisiana Pacific has been, at least the testimony shows, has through its...
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