Bell v. Vpsi, Inc.
| Decision Date | 05 October 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-04-352-CV.,2-04-352-CV. |
| Citation | 205 S.W.3d 706 |
| Parties | Linda C. BELL, Appellant, v. VPSI, INC. and Fort Worth Transportation Authority, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Culp & Dyer, LLP and Marc S. Culp, Denton, for Appellant.
Fletcher & Springer, LLP, Lance E. Caughfield and Brenda Neel Hight, Dallas, and Mark G. Creighton, Fort Worth, for Appellees.
Panel A: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and McCOY, JJ.
Appellant Linda C. Bell sued Appellees VPSI, Inc. and the Fort Worth Transportation Authority ("Transportation Authority"), asserting vicarious liability for alleged injuries she suffered in a vehicular accident while a passenger in a van driven by her husband, Homer Bell. She appeals from a summary judgment in favor of VPSI and the Transportation Authority and from the denial of her own motion for partial summary judgment, all on the issue of vicarious liability. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The Transportation Authority, also known as the "T," is a regional political subdivision of the State that provides public transportation services in and around Tarrant County. VPSI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Budget Group, Inc., a general-use car rental business. VPSI is a for-profit corporation, the business of which is providing and operating commuter vanpool programs. In conjunction with local transportation authorities, VPSI operates vanpool transportation programs in over forty urban areas across the United States.
The Transportation Authority's Rideshare Department began a vanpool program in Tarrant County in 1974 with six city-owned vans. In 1984, the Transportation Authority decided to use VPSI as a provider of vehicles and maintenance for its vanpool program. In cooperation with VPSI, the vanpool program grew to 125 vans by 1995. The program served a number of corporate employers in Tarrant County, including Lockheed, Bell Helicopter, and Burlington Northern.
In 1998, anticipating continued increase in vanpools with federal funding, the Transportation Authority contracted directly with VPSI to lease a fleet of 9-, 12-, and 15-passenger Dodge vans from VPSI for the vanpool program, and to provide management, maintenance, and insurance. The stated purposes of the vanpool program were to reduce the number of single occupancy vehicles on the road by encouraging vanpools as a viable alternative, thus reducing air pollution to meet federal environmental directives, to provide cost-effective transportation services to commuters not in a traditional bus service area, to offer a selection of vehicle sizes in order to allow smaller groups of commuters to take advantage of vanpooling as an option to driving alone; and to assist in general in providing regional transportation to commuters originating or terminating in Tarrant County.
Under the vanpool program, drivers, passengers, and their employers are solicited by the Transportation Authority and VPSI to participate in the vanpool program for commutes between their places of employment and homes. Passenger groups are formed by the Transportation Authority based upon origin and destination points; passengers pay a monthly charge to the Transportation Authority for commutes to and from work. Volunteer drivers who want to be a part of a vanpool agree to transport passengers to and from their employment in vans provided by VPSI. Each driver is assigned a van and agrees to drive and maintain the van, including scheduled and unscheduled maintenance at VPSI's cost, recruit additional passengers to keep the vanpool at optimal occupancy, and collect the vanpool passenger charges. Drivers receive coupon books to present to approved maintenance dealerships, service vendors, and repair facilities, with charges billed directly to VPSI. In exchange, the drivers receive daily commutes to and from their employment without charge and are also allowed personal use of the assigned vans on evenings and weekends for up to 250 miles per month. The Transportation Authority bills the driver for fuel consumed during the 250 personal-usage miles.
The relationship between VPSI, the Transportation Authority, and the driver is governed by a contract called the "Three-Party Volunteer Driver Agreement." The three-party agreement specifies that an Authorized Driver must have a valid driver's license; have at least five years' licensed driving experience; be at least twenty-five years of age; and be approved, in writing, by VPSI to operate vehicles provided by VPSI. The agreement further provides that the Authorized Driver
Linda Bell's husband, Homer Bell, was regularly employed by Lockheed in Fort Worth. In March 1999, Homer entered into a three-party volunteer driver agreement with the Transportation Authority and VPSI to be an Authorized Driver under the vanpool program for daily commutes of employees to Lockheed.
On a rainy Saturday in December 1999, Homer drove the van he had been assigned, with Linda as a passenger, some twenty-eight miles from their home in Forestburg to Decatur. From Forestburg, they traveled down the Alvord highway, turned onto Highway 287, and continued on that highway into Decatur. After stopping for about thirty minutes to service and change the van's oil at the Kwik Lube in Decatur, Homer and Linda shopped at the local Wal-Mart for about an hour, lunched at Taco Bell for approximately another half hour, and then returned to the Wal-Mart parking lot where they waited nearly another hour for their daughter to deliver their two grandchildren to them for an overnight stay.
After picking up their grandchildren, Homer and Linda left Decatur and proceeded thirteen to fifteen miles up a different road to see a display of a lighted Santa Claus figure loading his reindeer into an eighteen-wheeler. From the Wal-Mart, they drove up FM 51 to Highway 455, where they made a short detour at Slidell to see the display. After stopping to see Santa, they started driving back to Forestburg. They were on Farm Road 455 headed toward the Alvord highway, which would have taken them back to Forestburg, when the van hydroplaned on the wet roadway and crashed into a tree. Linda alleged that she sustained injuries in the accident.
Linda sued Homer, VPSI, and the Transportation Authority, alleging that Homer's negligence, in exceeding a safe speed under the wet road conditions, proximately caused her injuries, and that VPSI and the Transportation Authority were vicariously liable for Homer's negligence under the doctrines of respondeat superior, retained contractual control, and joint enterprise. VPSI and the Transportation Authority filed traditional motions for summary judgment on Linda's vicarious liability allegations, arguing that Homer was an independent contractor and that no agency, employment, or joint enterprise relationship existed between them and Homer; that VPSI and the Transportation Authority had no right or authority to control Homer at the time of the accident; and that the acts of Homer for which Plaintiff sought to impose liability were outside the course and scope of any authority or employment at the time of the accident. The Transportation Authority also moved for summary judgment on the ground that, as a governmental unit, it retained sovereign immunity as to liability for any negligence of Homer as a volunteer vanpool driver and independent contractor, and that Linda failed to comply with the notice requirement of the Texas Tort Claims Act.
Linda filed a response and a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the same issues and amended her petition to include direct allegations of negligence against VPSI and the Transportation Authority, alleging failure to train Homer in safe driving practices. The trial court granted VPSI's and the Transportation Authority's motions for summary judgment and denied Linda's. The trial court later granted another summary judgment in favor of VPSI on Linda's direct negligence claim. Linda nonsuited her claims against Homer and her remaining claims against the Transportation Authority. Linda appeals only from the summary judgments on her vicarious liability claims and the denial of her own partial summary judgment motion. She does not contest the direct negligence summary judgment.
In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant met the summary judgment burden by establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.2002); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). The burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are resolved against the movant. Sw. Elec. Power Co., 73 S.W.3d at 215.
When reviewing a summary judgment, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005). Evidence that favors the movant's position will not be considered unless it is uncontroverted. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1965).
The summary judgment will be affirmed only if the record establishes that the movant has conclusively proved all essential elements of the movant's cause of action or defense as a matter of law. Clear Creek Basin, 589 S.W.2d at 678. When, as here, the trial court does not specify the grounds upon which a summary judgment was granted, we...
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