Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital at Eloise

• Decision Date: 31 May 1974
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 36384.
• Citation: 384 F. Supp. 1085
• Parties: Annette BELL, By her next friend, Dianne Rubin, Individually and on behalf of all persons alleged to be mentally ill who are similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WAYNE COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL AT ELOISE et al., Defendants. Gloria A. DALIMONTE, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated who are or who are about to be involuntarily committed or detained in state public institutions through civil commitments as persons alleged to be mentally ill without findings that they are dangerous to themselves or others, Plaintiff, v. The PROBATE COURT FOR the COUNTY OF CHIPPEWA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

384 F. Supp. 1085

Annette BELL, By her next friend, Dianne Rubin, Individually and on behalf of all persons alleged to be mentally ill who are similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WAYNE COUNTY GENERAL HOSPITAL AT ELOISE et al., Defendants.

Gloria A. DALIMONTE, Individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated who are or who are about to be involuntarily committed or detained in state public institutions through civil commitments as persons alleged to be mentally ill without findings that they are dangerous to themselves or others, Plaintiff, v. The PROBATE COURT FOR the COUNTY OF CHIPPEWA et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 36384.

United States District Court, E. D. Michigan, S. D.

May 31, 1974.

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Alan W. Houseman, Gabe Kaimowitz, Michigan Legal Services, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff Bell.

William S. Easton, Upper Peninsula Legal Services, Marquette, Mich., for plaintiff Dalimonte.

Milton I. Firestone, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for defendant Attorney Gen., State of Michigan.

George H. Cross, Corp. Counsel, Detroit, Mich., for defendant Wayne County.

William H. Dance, Detroit, Mich., for Mich. Psychiatric Society (Intervening).

John C. Frakes, Jr., Matheny, Schureman, Frakes & Glass, Detroit, Mich., for doctors in Bell case (defendants.)

Before McCREE, Circuit Judge, FOX, Chief District Judge, and FEIKENS, District Judge.

OPINION

FOX, Chief District Judge.

The plaintiffs in these consolidated actions seek summary judgment declaring unconstitutional and enjoining the operation of M.C.L.A. §§ 330.21 and 330.54 (M.S.A. §§ 14.811 and 14.844),¹ provisions which set forth the standards and procedures for the adjudication, involuntary civil commitment and treatment of persons alleged to be mentally ill.

These cases were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, providing redress for the deprivation under color of state law, of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the land to all citizens and others within the jurisdiction of the United States. Jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4). The power to grant declaratory and further relief arises from 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. With due regard for the substantial constitutional issues raised as grounds for enjoining these state statutes, the three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284.

Plaintiffs contend that certain procedures and standards which M.C.L.A. §§ 330.21 and 330.54 provide for the extended involuntary commitment and treatment of persons alleged to be mentally ill violate due process of law, and that to commit and treat such persons as permitted by these provisions amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs attack the validity of each provision on its face and not as applied to them in particular.

While the history of each plaintiff's exposure to the Michigan civil commitment process is not at issue here,² we may note that both Annette Bell and Gloria Dalimonte have experienced the rigors of that system on repeated occasions. Although neither plaintiff has ever been finally adjudicated mentally ill they have been held for extended periods of time under temporary orders. Throughout the proceedings by which they initially were confined, neither was informed of a right to counsel or to jury, although each eventually obtained free legal services without assistance from the detaining legal and medical authorities. Neither was told of the factual allegations upon which her commitment was based. Hearings were held at which plaintiffs were not present. During periods of confinement each plaintiff has been subjected to treatment against her will, plaintiff Bell to chemo or drug therapy, plaintiff Dalimonte to electroshock therapy. The nature of proceedings which lead to such instances of confinement, the forms of involuntary treatment allowed to be administered to persons so confined and the definition of "mental illness" which serves as a standard for commitment are subject of the present controversy.

I. The Civil Commitment Process.

The Michigan civil commitment scheme provides for three distinct forms of involuntary commitment. The first, which we may designate emergency detention, comprehends several alternative procedures set forth in M.C.L.A. § 330.19 (M.S.A. § 14.809). These procedures function before commencement of formal commitment proceedings under M.C.L.A. § 330.21. In general they allow immediate apprehension and detention for periods of either 5 days or 48 hours, applying standards which require the presence of an element of danger to self or to others.³ In no manner do plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of these provisions.

The second form we shall term temporary commitment. This form comprehends two provisions of M.C.L.A. § 330.21 which operate after commitment proceedings have been initiated but before a final adjudication of mental illness. Each allows detention for a period as long as 120 days; they may be invoked consecutively, producing a period of detention totalling 240 days without final adjudication. These provisions are central targets of attack.

The third form of commitment is indefinite commitment ordered after a final determination of mental illness, M. C.L.A. § 330.21. Plaintiffs do not challenge this ultimate phase of the process. However, since the commitment process is constructed as a single, all-embracing scheme, many of the procedural facets they attack are common to proceedings for both temporary and indefinite commitment, and the standard of commitment for mental illness informs, at bottom, determinations made in all phases of the process.

The relevant portions of M.C.L.A. §§ 330.21 and 330.54 are reproduced in the appendix.

II. Procedural Due Process: General Issues.

A. Initiation of the Process: Notice to Respondents.

Under M.C.L.A. § 330.21, the commitment process is initiated by a petition filed in probate court praying for an order of commitment, alleging that the individual sought to be committed is mentally ill and stating the facts upon which the allegation of mental illness is based. The petition may be filed by a family member, a guardian, certain local public officers, or any other person approved by the probate judge. When it receives such a petition, the court must schedule a date for the commitment hearing and appoint two physicians to examine the respondent and to file their report with the court at or before the hearing. Regarding notice to the respondent, the statute provides:

"Notice of such petition and of the time and place of hearing thereon shall be served personally, at least 24 hours before the hearing, upon the person alleged to be so mentally diseased. . . ." M.C.L.A. § 330.21. (Emphasis supplied.)

The statute at no point directs that the respondent be served the petition itself, or a copy thereof. Not having received the petition, the respondent remains unaware of the factual bases upon which his mental illness is alleged until the hearing is in progress.

In the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Supreme Court addressed the requirements of due process in the context of delinquency proceedings which, although denominated "civil," held the prospect of incarceration in a state institution for juveniles adjudged delinquent. The Court held that, to comply with the mandate of due process, notice to the child and his parents must inform them of the specific allegations to be raised at hearing and must be given at the earliest practicable time, in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation. 387 U.S. at 33, 87 S.Ct. 1428. The Court drew no distinction between juvenile delinquency and adult criminal proceedings in respect of the demands of due process, recognizing that the potential loss of freedom is common to both. The principle of Gault applies equally to the civil commitment process. The fundamental right to liberty is at stake in a civil commitment hearing no less than in a criminal trial or juvenile proceeding. Due process requires the same adequate and timely notice in all such proceedings. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.Supp 1078, 1092 (E.D.Wis.1972);⁴ see also, Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). In Michigan a respondent's failure to counter the allegations lodged against him portends, at best, confinement which may continue 60 days.⁵ Where his failure is the product of notice received on the eve of hearing and devoid of the issues he must confront, due process of law has been breached.

Defendants would have us interpret the Michigan notice provision as to require service of the petition itself. Were it feasible to construe the statute in this manner we would do so and avoid a finding of invalidity. But by no means of reasonable construction could we read the phrase "notice of such petition and of the time and place of hearing shall be served" as if written "such petition and notice of time and place of hearing shall be served." Michigan law tells us: "All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language." M.C.L.A. § 8.3a (M.S.A. § 2.212(1)). The notice provision as enacted imports, in addition to notice of the time and place of hearing, only notice that a petition has been filed.

We find M.C.L.A. § 330.21 violative of due process of law insofar as it fails to require notice including the petition itself to be served sufficiently in advance of hearing to permit preparation.

B. Right to Counsel.

Just as adequate notice is fundamental to the validity of the civil commitment process, so is the right to counsel of paramount importance. In Gault, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that a juvenile accused in delinquency proceedings "needs the assistance of counsel to cope with the problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity...