Bell v. Wolff, 73-1898.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1898.,73-1898.
• Citation: 496 F.2d 1252
• Parties: Albert R. BELL, Appellant, v. Charles WOLFF, Jr., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

496 F.2d 1252 (1974)

Albert R. BELL, Appellant, v. Charles WOLFF, Jr., Appellee.

No. 73-1898.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted April 18, 1974.

Decided May 17, 1974.

Terrence J. Ferguson, Legal Aid Society of Omaha, Robert V. Broom, R. Ladd Lonnquist, Omaha, Neb., Robert S. Catz, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Mel Kammerlohr, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lincoln, Neb., for appellee.

Before HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges, and TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.^*

TALBOT SMITH, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Albert R. Bell appeals from the denial by the court below, after trial to the court, of an award of damages in his civil rights action¹ against Charles Wolff, Jr., Warden of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex. The plaintiff's principal complaint, which was sustained by the district court, was that he had been subjected to involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment when, as a pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Penal Complex, he was compelled by the Warden to work without compensation. Damages were not awarded for this and other violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights, however, because of the court's finding that the Warden had acted in good faith throughout.

Two principal issues are urged to us on appeal, first that the trial court erred in finding that the Warden acted in good faith and within the scope of his authority as Warden² and, second, that the trial court erred in its allocation of the burden of proof as to good faith. We will consider these issues seriatim. It is pertinent to note at the outset that the measure, scope, and application of an asserted immunity under § 1983, arising, as it does, under a federally created cause of action, cannot be restricted or enlarged by state laws concerning official privilege or immunity. As was held by Judge (now Justice) Stewart in Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1958)

The extent of the defendants\' insulation from liability under the Civil Rights Act cannot properly be determined by reference to the local rule in Michigan. Surely each state cannot be left to decide for itself which of its officials are completely immune from liability for depriving a citizen of rights granted by the Federal Constitution. The question must be decided as a matter of general law.³

Plaintiff Bell was admitted to the Penal Complex on April 7, 1972 pursuant to a court order obtained by Douglas County, Nebraska officials who had been holding him in the county jail pending his extradition to Oklahoma. The order states as a reason for the transfer that the plaintiff posed a security risk to the local jail. At the time of Bell's admission defendant had been Warden for less than nine months; prison policies were undergoing re-evaluation and many were in a state of transition. The Complex received few prisoners in plaintiff's classification⁴ and no special facilities were available for them. The ordinary procedure was to place "Safekeepers" in "administrative segregation": they would be locked up in a wing of the prison called the "Adjustment Center" and not allowed to mingle with the general population or participate in the programs (including work) available to the convicts.⁵ Warden Wolff interviewed plaintiff upon his admission to the Complex. He was then aware that Bell was an unconvicted "safekeeper"; he also had read the "Confidential Report for Transporting Officer," a document prepared by Warden Terry of the Douglas County Jail, which indicated that plaintiff was a troublemaker and a "show off." Part of the purpose of the interview was to determine whether plaintiff's reputation as a troublemaker was justified. As noted, the Warden was reevaluating the procedures and policies of the institution and was concerned as to whether it was "necessary to confine a 22 year old man to administrative segregation as a safekeeper." Accordingly, he offered to permit the plaintiff to take the course normally followed by convicted inmates, that is, assignment to the "Reception and Diagnostic Center" for evaluation and ultimate assignment for work in the general population. Bell was told, however, that he probably would not be paid for his work. Plaintiff accepted the offer and was sent to the reception center where he remained for about a month without incident.

His evaluation complete, Bell was brought before the Initial Classification Committee, chaired by the Warden, to be informed of his "live-in location and work assignment." Again told that he would not be paid for his work, plaintiff became belligerent and had to be physically removed to confinement. He was placed in punitive segregation for this outburst, and there remained for two weeks. Before the classification committee a second time, on May 23, 1972 he signed a document "requesting the authorities of this institution to let me do some kind of work while at this institution, in order that I will not have to remain confined all day long," and agreed to work without pay. He was assigned to the general population and worked satisfactorily without pay in one of the institution's furniture shops until July 11, 1972. On this day he was placed in punitive segregation for refusal to obey a work order and there remained until shortly before his release from the Penal Complex on July 30, 1972.

The Warden explained his refusal to pay safekeepers as based on a lack of money budgeted for that purpose and on "the general policy ... that since the individual was not a felon, was not entitled to good time or statutory time credits, would not be entitled to be paid for work, and of course, for many years they were not working. They were merely held in a safekeeping status, and were not released from that status while they were there. It is only through these last few years that we have even tried at something a little more toward the area of programming on a safekeeper." In other words, he was trying something new and wasn't quite sure he had the authority or the funds to pay Bell;⁶ he conceived of the plan as a progressive step, available to safekeepers on a volunteer basis, to relieve them of the rigors of being "confined all day long" in administrative segregation.

The trial court found, however, that plaintiff was not a true volunteer. In a conclusion unchallenged by defendant, it was held that plaintiff had been subjected to involuntary servitude because his signing of the request to work form did not possess sufficient voluntariness to make it constitutionally acceptable. The alternative presented to Bell was to be confined in administrative segregation under conditions which, the court found, violated his constitutional...