Bellinger v. Bowser
| Decision Date | 30 September 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-2124 (TJK) |
| Parties | FRANCEL BELLINGER et al., Plaintiffs, v. MURIEL BOWSER et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiffs Francel Bellinger and Iola Anyan (the "Individual Plaintiffs"), and Plaintiffs SE-NE Friends of the Capitol View Library and Marshall Heights Civic Association (the "Associational Plaintiffs"), have filed the instant action against various District of Columbia ("District") public officials for their alleged failure to provide Capitol View Library, a public library located in a predominately African-American neighborhood, with the same renovation funding and services provided to other public libraries in predominately white neighborhoods. Defendants Muriel Bowser, Gregory McCarthy, and Richard Reyes-Gavilan (the "City Defendants") have filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF No. 45 ( ) at 1-2. The remaining Defendants, Vincent Gray, David Grosso, and Yvette Alexander (the "Council Defendants"), have filed a separate motion to dismiss. ECF No. 23. In response, Plaintiffs have moved to file a proposed second amended complaint and to conduct discovery. ECF Nos. 47, 66; see also ECF No. 47-2 ("PSAC"). The Court will grant Defendants' motions and dismiss the operative complaint for failure to state a claim. It will also deny Plaintiffs' motion to amend on the ground that the proposed amendments are futile, deny Plaintiffs' discovery motion as moot, and also deny Plaintiffs' request to file an untimely opposition, ECF No. 56, as moot. The reasons for doing so are set forth below.
Plaintiffs filed the instant action on November 6, 2017. ECF No. 1. That same day, they filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, ECF No. 4, which they later amended, ECF No. 19-1. The Council Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 29, 2017. ECF No. 23. On December 14, 2017, the Court held a hearing on the amended preliminary-injunction motion. The next day, the Court denied the motion. ECF No. 40; Bellinger v. Bowser, 288 F. Supp. 3d 71 (D.D.C. 2017). On January 12, 2018, the City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. City Defs.' MTD. On February 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint, ECF No. 47, and a motion to conduct discovery under Rule 56(d), ECF No. 66.
The Court discussed the factual background of this case in detail in its previous memorandum opinion and order denying Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive relief. See Bellinger, 288 F. Supp. 3d 71. The Court assumes the reader's familiarity with the background set forth in that opinion. The Court will discuss the particular factual allegations relevant to the instant motions below, keeping in mind that on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)—unlike the previous motion for injunctive relief—the Court "may consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [it] may take judicial notice." EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), "plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing jurisdiction." Knapp Med. Ctr. v. Hargan, 875 F.3d 1125, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2017). District courts "may in appropriate cases dispose of a motion todismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under [Rule] 12(b)(1) on the complaint standing alone." Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In such cases courts must, as when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "accept[] as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint." KiSKA Constr. Corp. v. WMATA, 321 F.3d 1151, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The Court may also rely, "where necessary," on "undisputed facts evidenced in the record." Id. at 1157 n.7.
"A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint; it does not require a court to 'assess the truth of what is asserted or determine whether a plaintiff has any evidence to back up what is in the complaint.'" Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). "In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must construe the complaint 'in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'" Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). "But the Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the complaint, nor must the court accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations." Id. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must have 'facial plausibility,' meaning it must 'plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), if a party may no longer amend his pleading as of right, then he "may amend [his] pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave," and "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires."Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, "[c]ourts may deny a motion to amend a complaint as futile . . . if the proposed claim would not survive a motion to dismiss." Williams v. Lew, 819 F.3d 466, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2016) () (quoting James Madison Ltd. ex rel. Hecht v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions will be granted, and Plaintiffs' motions will be denied.
As an initial matter, the Court will consider Plaintiffs' request that it accept an untimely opposition to the City Defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs initially filed an opposition that largely failed to address the substantive issues the City Defendants had raised. See ECF No. 48 (opposition); ECF No. 65-1 ("corrected" opposition). The City Defendants argued that the Court should treat their arguments for dismissal as conceded. ECF No. 53. Plaintiffs then sought leave to file a new opposition responsive to the City Defendants' arguments. ECF No. 56 (motion); ECF No. 57 ( ). The City Defendants oppose granting leave to file the supplemental opposition. ECF No. 61.
The Court will assume, for purposes of its analysis, that Plaintiffs' supplemental opposition was timely filed, and will consider the arguments included in it. Ultimately, however, these arguments do not save Plaintiffs' claims, rendering the motion for leave to file irrelevant. Therefore, the Court need not decide the merits of Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a supplemental opposition, and will deny the motion as moot.
The City Defendants have raised three challenges to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1): that (1) the Associational Plaintiffs lack standing; (2) the political question doctrine bars Plaintiffs' claims; and (3) Count I of the Amended Complaint is not ripe. See City Defs.' MTD at 13-16. The Court will discuss each in turn.
First, the Court concludes that it need not resolve the City Defendants' challenge to the Associational Plaintiffs' standing. See id. at 13. Courts are generally required to address jurisdictional issues (such as standing) before reaching the merits. But that rule is relaxed where a challenge to standing takes aim at some, but not all, plaintiffs. "If constitutional standing 'can be shown for at least one plaintiff, [courts] need not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs to raise that claim.'" Carpenters Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). The City Defendants do not challenge the Individual Plaintiffs' standing. And as will be explained below, none of the Plaintiffs states a claim, so the Court need not consider an argument that some Plaintiffs lack standing.
Second, the political question doctrine is inapplicable because Plaintiffs' claims are levied against District of Columbia—as opposed to federal—officials. The City Defendants argue that funding appropriations are "the product of the District's annual budget process" and are thus an inherently political issue. See City Defs.' MTD at 13-15. But the political question doctrine limits federal courts' ability to decide issues committed to other branches of the federal government: it applies to "those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch." Bin Ali Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 245 (D.C. Cir.)(emphases added) (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 480 (2017). That is, "it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political question.'" Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The District government is not a "coordinate branch[] of the Federal Government." Id. In fact, while the District of Columbia is in a strict sense a creature of the federal government, and is not a state, it is treated for most purposes as "'an independent political entity,' not a part of the federal...
To continue reading
Request your trial