Beltrand v. Beltrand
| Decision Date | 08 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | A13-2150 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of: Pamela Kay Beltrand, petitioner, Respondent, v. Thomas Leo Beltrand, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
Reversed and remanded
Hennepin County District Court
Jade K. Johnson, David C. Gapen, Gapen, Larson & Johnson, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Becky L. Martin, Stefanie P. Wagner, Martin & Wagner, P.A., Rogers, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Schellhas, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges the district court's order that he pay $5,600 per month in permanent maintenance to respondent. We reverse and remand.
When the district court dissolved the parties' 29-year marriage, appellant Thomas Beltrand worked about 50 hours per week for Premier Manufacturing Inc., an S corporation, in which he was a one-third owner; respondent Pamela Beltrand worked part time for a school district, where she had worked for almost 20 years. The parties resolved most dissolution issues through stipulations, reserving for trial determinations of the parties' reasonable monthly expenses, the amount of Thomas's distributions from Premier, and the award of permanent spousal maintenance to Pamela. They stipulated that Thomas would pay permanent maintenance to Pamela. They also stipulated that Thomas's average gross annual "W2 income" was $87,357.79, or $7,279.82 per month, and $5,868.64 per month "after [deducting for] retirement, taxes, [and] health insurance"; that Thomas's income also included discretionary distributions from Premier; that Pamela's average gross annual "W2 income" was $25,775.01, or $2,147.92 per month, and $1,648.83 per month after deducting "for taxes and retirement"; and that Pamela would receive $338,873 in retirement accounts as part of the dissolution property division.
The district court found that Thomas's monthly net W-2 income was $5,868.64 and that his average monthly gross distribution from Premier, based on the years 2006through 2011, was $9,616.69. Thomas submitted a monthly budget of $10,922.88 and Pamela submitted a monthly budget of $8,197.14. Thomas asked the district court to award Pamela $1,750 as a base amount of monthly maintenance plus additional payments of 25% of after-tax distributions from Premier to be paid when he receives them. Pamela requested monthly maintenance of $7,200.
Following a trial before a referee, the district court awarded Pamela $5,600 per month in permanent spousal maintenance and denied Thomas's motion for amended findings and/or a new trial. This appeal follows.
Thomas argues that the court overestimated Pamela's need for maintenance, overestimated his ability to pay monthly maintenance, and abused its discretion by not ordering him to pay a base amount of monthly maintenance plus a percentage of his corporate distributions when he receives them.
"The district court's award of maintenance . . . will only be reversed on appeal if the court abused its [broad] discretion." Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009). The district court abuses its discretion by making "a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record," "by making findings unsupported by the evidence[,] or by improperly applying the law." Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted). We must sustain findings unless clearly erroneous and defer to the district court's opportunity to assess witness credibility. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988). Findings are clearly erroneous when, viewing the record in the light most favorable to them, they leave us with "'the definite and firmconviction that a mistake has been made.'" Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. App. 2000) (quoting Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn. 1999)) (other quotation omitted).
"The purpose of a maintenance award is to allow the recipient and the obligor to have a standard of living that approximates the marital standard of living, as closely as is equitable under the circumstances." Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 416 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted). "In essence, the district court balances the recipient's needs against the obligor's ability to pay." Maiers v. Maiers, 775 N.W.2d 666, 668 (Minn. App. 2009); accord Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 39-40 (Minn. 1982).
We first address Pamela's need for maintenance because "[a] spouse's ability to pay maintenance does not . . . obviate the statutory mandate that the other spouse's own independent financial resources must be considered." Lyon v. Lyon, 439 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Minn. 1989); see also Lee v. Lee, 749 N.W.2d 51, 60 n.2 (Minn. App. 2008) (), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 775 N.W.2d 631 (Minn. 2009).
The district court found that Pamela's reasonable monthly expenses are $5,412. Based on Pamela's stipulated W-2 gross income of $2,148 and a monthly maintenance award of $5,600, the court found that Pamela will have a $274 after-tax surplus. Citing Rask v. Rask, 445 N.W.2d 849, 854 (Minn. App. 1989); cf. Kampf v. Kampf, 732 N.W.2d630, 634 (Minn. App. 2007) (), review denied (Minn. Aug. 21, 2007), Thomas argues that Pamela's surplus will be greater because her reasonable monthly expenses are $500 less than the $5,412 found by the district court because Pamela did not incur some of her claimed expenses, such as $54 for window-and-gutter cleaning, $50 for a home security system, $10 for AAA service, and $30 for golf and cross-country skiing. Pamela testified that these expenses were part of her "budget going forward." The district court found that Pamela's testimony was credible. In light of the parties' marital standard of living, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err by finding that these expenses are reasonable.
Thomas argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that Pamela's reasonable monthly expenses include $100 for a cell phone because Pamela shares a phone plan with her father and adult daughter and should only be allocated one third of the cost as a reasonable monthly expense. But the court found that Pamela "testified credibly that this cost was for herself only; her father and her daughter are on her plan, however, she subtracted the cost for them."
Thomas also argues that the court clearly erred by finding that Pamela's reasonable monthly expenses include $109 for pet boarding. But the court did not make such a finding. The court allowed Pamela $250 per month for reasonable monthly pet expenses (including checkups, medications, food, beds, supplies, and boarding). This amount is less than Pamela's requested amount of $330. Thomas argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that Pamela's reasonable monthly expenses include $140 for counseling. But the court credited Pamela's testimony that, although sometimes sheattended counseling only twice per month, she was attending counseling four times per month and paying $35 per visit. Although we might have reached a different decision regarding the reasonableness of Pamela's expenses, we defer to the district court's exercise of its discretion and cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion on these facts.
Thomas also argues that the district court clearly erred by finding that Pamela has a $333 reasonable monthly expense for property taxes. We agree. The court based its finding on Pamela's testimony, and Pamela based her testimony on a percentage of an assumed value of the homestead rather than on the actual taxes assessed against the property. The parties' 2012 joint federal income tax return lists $2,973 as a deduction for real estate taxes paid, or $248 per month. The amount found by the court therefore exceeds the amount paid by $85. Pamela's reasonable monthly expenses must be reduced by $85 to arrive at a total of $5,341.
Thomas argues that the district court abused its discretion by not adding to Pamela's stipulated average net monthly W-2 income of $1,648.83 a monthly amount of interest that she could earn on the retirement accounts awarded to her. Thomas calculated that amount to be $17,000 annually at the rate of five percent on retirement accounts totaling $338,873. We reject Thomas's argument. "Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a) requires the courts to consider . . . income generated by liquid assets." Fink v. Fink, 366 N.W.2d 340, 342 (Minn. App. 1985) (emphasis added); see also Lyon, 439 N.W.2d at 22 n.1 (); Broms v. Broms, 353 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Minn. 1984) (similar); Rask, 445 N.W.2d at 853-54 (). But we have found no authority to support a proposition that courts must consider income that might be generated by illiquid retirement accounts. Cf. Bury v. Bury, 416 N.W.2d 133, 138 (Minn. App. 1987) (); Kroening v. Kroening, 390 N.W.2d 851, 855 (Minn. App. 1986) (); Fick v. Fick, 375 N.W.2d 870, 873 (Minn. App. 1985) (...
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