Vangsness v. Vangsness

• Decision Date: 21 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. C0-99-1551.,C0-99-1551.
• Citation: 607 N.W.2d 468
• Parties: In re the Marriage of Mamie Marie VANGSNESS, petitioner, Appellant, v. Michael Alan VANGSNESS, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

607 N.W.2d 468

In re the Marriage of Mamie Marie VANGSNESS, petitioner, Appellant, v. Michael Alan VANGSNESS, Respondent.

No. C0-99-1551.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

March 21, 2000.

Brenda Velde, Alexandria, for appellant.

Belvin Doebbert, Glenwood, for respondent.

Considered and decided by TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge, CRIPPEN, Judge, and FOLEY,¹ Judge.

OPINION

CRIPPEN, Judge.

Appellant Mamie Vangsness and respondent Michael Vangsness married and had three children. The 1998 judgment dissolving their marriage reserved issues, including custody. The order placing temporary custody of the children with appellant forbade the parties from criticizing each other or trying to influence the children's custodial preference. In May 1999, following a trial, the district court placed physical custody of the children with respondent. Appellant's post-trial motion alleged that she was entitled to a new trial because the evidence did not support the custody placement and because respondent committed misconduct by criticizing her to the children, influencing their custodial preference, and rehearsing the children's testimony. Appellant also sought a new trial based on her allegations that she had newly discovered evidence of respondent's alleged wrongdoing. She appeals the trial court decision denying most of her requests. Alternatively, she seeks an outright reversal of the trial court's placement of custody with respondent. Because the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous and address the relevant best-interests concerns, and because no other abuse of the trial court's broad discretion is demonstrated, we affirm.

FACTS

The parties were married in 1985 and have three children. In May 1996, appellant moved out of the family home. Shortly thereafter, appellant's boyfriend moved in with her and the children. In August 1996, the parties had a dispute in which respondent allegedly threatened appellant. The parties dispute the details of the incident.

In January 1997, respondent was laid off, appellant went back to school, and the parties agreed the children should live with respondent. In June 1997, the parties, the children, and the police were involved in another incident. The parties dispute the details, but as a result, the youngest child moved back in with appellant. In January 1998, the older two children moved back in with appellant. In March 1998, respondent moved in with his girlfriend.

Appellant petitioned to dissolve the marriage in May 1998, seeking physical custody of the children. Respondent also sought physical custody. The trial court dissolved the parties' marriage in August 1998 and reserved all other issues. A month later, the court placed temporary custody of the children with appellant and ordered a custody study. Also, respondent married his girlfriend. The custody study, completed in November, states that all three children told the evaluator that they wanted to live with respondent and recommends that placement of sole physical custody of the children be with him.

The custody trial started in February 1999 and ended in March 1999. During trial, the court conducted in-camera interviews of each of the children, then ages 12, 11, and 6; the older children said they wanted to live with respondent.

Appellant's post-trial motion, following the placement of custody in May 1999, was accompanied by an affidavit by the parties' oldest child. After a hearing, the trial court made only non-substantive alterations to the May order.

ISSUES

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not granting appellant a new trial because the evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact?

2. Aside from examining the sufficiency of evidence for the trial court's findings of fact, which adequately address statutory best-interests considerations, has appellant demonstrated an error of the trial court in its determination of the best interests of the children?

3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by not granting appellant a new trial for newly discovered evidence?

ANALYSIS

1. Findings on best-interests factors

On appeal from the denial of a motion for a new trial, only the matters raised in the motion can be reviewed. Estate of Spiess v. Schumm, 442 N.W.2d 179, 181 (Minn.App.1989); Iverson v. Iverson, 432 N.W.2d 492 (Minn.App.1988), review denied (Minn. July 27, 1989). Here, appellant's post-trial motion asserts that the trial court's findings of fact, including its ultimate finding on the children's best interests and its underlying findings on best-interests factors, are not supported by the record. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(g) (allowing new trial when decision is not supported by evidence). On the underlying findings, appellant asserts two categories of trial court error: (a) discounting evidence that respondent wrongfully engaged in influencing the custodial preferences of the children, compounded by the court's choice to give weight to these preferences, and (b) disregard of evidence bearing on the best-interests factors the trial court found to be neutral as between the parties. Appellant also asserts that respondent's influence of the children rose to a level of misconduct, constituting an alternative entitlement of appellant for a new trial. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(b) (allowing new trial for misconduct of prevailing party).

Generally, we must defer to the trial court's broad discretion in deciding whether to grant a new trial. See Maloney v. Ketter, 408 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn. App.1987)

(stating "[d]enial of a new trial based on grounds other than error of law is within the broad discretion of the trial court"), review denied (Minn. Sept. 18, 1987); see also Grorud v. Thomasson, 287 Minn. 531, 534, 177 N.W.2d 51, 53 (1970) (sufficiency of evidence); Reese v. Ross & Ross Auctioneers, Inc., 276 Minn. 67, 71, 149 N.W.2d 16, 19 (1967) (misconduct of prevailing party). This deference exists because the trial court "has the feel of the trial." Lamb v. Jordan, 333 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Minn.1983).

Appellant's new trial motion questioned whether the record supported the trial court's findings of fact, and we must uphold these findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. A finding is "clearly erroneous" if the reviewing court is "`left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" Fletcher v. St. Paul Pioneer Press, 589 N.W.2d 96, 101 (Minn.1999) (quoting Gjovik v. Strope, 401 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn.1987)). When determining whether findings are clearly erroneous, the appellate court views the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Lossing v. Lossing, 403 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Minn.App.1987); Rinker v. Rinker, 358 N.W.2d 165, 167 (Minn.App.1984). Also, appellate courts defer to trial court credibility determinations. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.1988). We also are mindful of the trial court's extensive commentary on the record in its response to appellant's request for different findings of fact.

Appellant's new trial motion also asserted the occurrence of misconduct by respondent. Where evidence is said to conflict with the trial court's ruling on this issue, "the broadest possible discretionary power [is vested] in the trial court." Grorud, 287 Minn. at 534, 177 N.W.2d at 53. The refusal to grant a new trial will be reversed only if misconduct is "so prejudicial that it would be unjust to allow the result to stand." Jack Frost, Inc. v. Engineered Bldg. Components Co., 304 N.W.2d 346, 352 (Minn.1981); see, generally, Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring that harmless error be ignored). The trial court is in a "much better position than the appellate court" to decide whether alleged misconduct caused prejudice. Reese, 276 Minn. at 71, 149 N.W.2d at 19 (quotation omitted).

Having reviewed each of appellant's allegations and having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying appellant's new-trial motion.

a. Preferences of children; alleged misconduct

The temporary order prohibited the parties from "complain[ing]" about each other in the children's presence and from trying to "influence" the children's custodial preferences. Appellant alleges that respondent committed misconduct by "downgrading" her, her family, and her fiancé in front of the children and that he tried to influence the children's custodial preference by promising that he would quit smoking and that the oldest child could decorate his own bedroom. To support her argument, appellant submitted the affidavit of the parties' oldest child.

The trial court rejected these allegations, finding that the oldest child's affidavit failed to identify "specific incidents" of downgrading and that respondent's post-trial affidavit addressed the incidents in question. The court then found that "[t]he alleged `downgrading' was not downgrading" but, "at most" was "a misunderstanding." Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, we cannot say that appellant showed these findings to be clearly erroneous. Moreover, the trial court also noted that even if respondent made "disparaging remarks, [appellant] has not shown that these few incidents prejudiced her to the extent she should be granted a new trial." Appellant did not show this finding to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion.

Appellant also alleges that respondent committed misconduct by violating the temporary order when he allegedly rehearsed the children's testimony with them. Respondent testified that he and his attorney discussed the proceeding with the children but denied that they rehearsed the children's testimony. Appellant raised this issue in the post-trial proceedings and the trial court's order denying her new-trial motion showed that the court was aware of respondent's testimony. It also stated that "[e]vidence that they were practicing testimony is lacking" and that respondent's...