Benefiel v. Boulton

• Decision Date: 12 May 2015
• Docket Number: 111,178.
• Citation: 2015 OK 32,350 P.3d 138
• Parties: Alan BENEFIEL, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Jewel BOULTON and Christa Benefiel, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

350 P.3d 138

2015 OK 32

Alan BENEFIEL, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Jewel BOULTON and Christa Benefiel, Defendants–Appellants.

111,178.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

May 12, 2015.

Robert J. Bartz, Joe M. Fears, David M. vonHartitzsch, Barber & Bartz, Tulsa, OK, for Jewel Boulton, Defendant–Appellant.

Jerry L. Colclazier, Colclazier & Associates, Seminole, OK, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

GURICH, J.

Facts & Procedural History

¶ 1 Alan Benefiel (“Plaintiff”) and Christa Benefiel were divorced by a consent decree entered on May 13, 2005. Consistent with the terms of the parties' divorce decree, Plaintiff executed a quit claim deed, transferring title in the former marital residence to Christa Benefiel. In exchange for relinquishing his ownership interest in the property, the decree required Christa Benefiel to pay Plaintiff $25,000.00 as alimony in lieu of property division. Payments were structured incrementally over a period of four years; $10,000 was due by June 13, 2005, and $5,000 was payable on January 31 for years 2006, 2007, and 2008. As security for the property division judgment, Plaintiff was awarded a lien encumbering the residence. The lien was to remain in effect until all payments were completed. Further, the decree contained a clause which vested Plaintiff with the right to immediate title and possession of the property should Christa Benefiel fail to timely remit any of the annual installments.

¶ 2 Prior to paying the final installment, Christa Benefiel sold the subject real property to a third-party, Jewel Boulton (“Boulton”), for the sum of $73,000.00. Boulton paid $17,000.00 as a down payment and financed the remainder of the purchase price. The divorce decree had not been filed with the Seminole County Clerk; however, it was made a part of the abstract of title. Despite its inclusion in the abstract, a title opinion issued prior to closing failed to identify the divorce judgment as a potential cloud or defect.

¶ 3 Christa Benefiel failed to make the final property division installment due on January 31, 2008. Plaintiff filed suit against both Boulton and Christa Benefiel on November 17, 2008. His petition asserted several claims, including demands to quiet title and to allow foreclosure of the lien. In her Answer, Boulton maintained that Plaintiff had no right, title, or interest in the house and that his lien from the divorce decree was ineffective and void. Both Boulton and Plaintiff sought summary judgment. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment requested that title to the property be quieted in his name, relying on the reversionary clause contained in Plaintiff's divorce decree. Boulton likewise maintained she was entitled to have title to the property quieted in her name, free and clear of any claim by the Plaintiff. On March 24, 2010, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, finding (1) the divorce decree created a valid “mortgage lien” against the property; (2) Christa Benefiel defaulted on the property division obligation; and (3) in accordance with the divorce decree, Christa Benefiel's default resulted in the automatic reversion of title to Plaintiff.

¶ 4 Boulton initiated an appeal of the trial court judgment, and on March 31, 2011, COCA reversed the ruling and remanded the matter for further proceedings (Boulton I ). The opinion in Boulton I made several findings which are relevant to the present appellate proceeding. First, COCA determined that Plaintiff's judgment lien was properly perfected.¹ Specifically, COCA found that notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to file the divorce decree with the Seminole County Clerk, inclusion of the judgment in the abstract of title provided Boulton with actual notice of the lien. Therefore, Boulton purchased the residence subject to a valid preexisting encumbrance. Second, COCA noted the judgment lien was “analogous to a real estate mortgage lien which secures a specific parcel of real property for the payment of a sum of money.”² Finally, the COCA opinion reversed summary judgment, finding the reversionary provision in the divorce decree was void because it deprived Boulton of the right to redeem the property.³ On October 17, 2011, we granted certiorari for the limited purpose of vacating an appeal-related attorney fee award to Boulton issued by COCA. We issued an order which postponed a final ruling on attorney fees and directed the parties to submit their applications in the trial court once a prevailing party could be determined.⁴

¶ 5 On remand Plaintiff again sought summary judgment, this time asserting his right to foreclose the lien. Plaintiff maintained he was entitled to a monetary judgment against Boulton based on the unsatisfied judgment lien. On December 2, 2011, Boulton filed a response, with her only contention being that Plaintiff was not entitled to an in personam judgment. The following day, American Eagle Title Insurance, on behalf of Boulton, deposited $5,000.00 with the Seminole County Court Clerk in furtherance of her efforts to redeem the property. However, the payment did not include an amount representing interest on the unpaid judgment lien amount. Plaintiff filed a reply, arguing that although compliance with the redemption statute would prevent judicial sale of the property, Boulton's delay in discharging the lien, coupled with Plaintiff's success in the resulting litigation, rendered him the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees and costs.

¶ 6 At a hearing on April 4, 2012, the trial judge entered partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff allowing foreclosure of the judgment lien. The trial court additionally found that Boulton had a continued right to redeem the property pursuant to 42 O.S. §§ 18 and 20. At the time of the trial court's April 2012 pronouncement, Boulton had only paid the original lien amount of $5,000.00, without tendering an amount for interest.

¶ 7 Unable to reach a consensus on the contents of a journal entry memorializing the April 4 ruling, Boulton filed a motion to settle on June 7, 2012, which acknowledged:

However, counsel for Plaintiff refused to accept tender of the $5,000.00 as redemption of the Property. Instead, Plaintiff's counsel argued that redemption required payment of the $5,000.00, plus interest, attorney's fees and costs.

Ms. Boulton is in the process of tendering an additional sum of money to the Court Clerk to cover interest on the $5,000.00 from the date of non-payment.⁵

On June 22, 2012, American Eagle Title Insurance deposited a second check with the Seminole County Court Clerk representing accumulated interest. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to settle, pointing out his perceived deficiencies in Boulton's proposed journal entry. On September 27, 2012, the trial court entered a Court Minute adopting Plaintiff's suggested Journal Entry of Judgment.⁶ Boulton commenced a second appeal, and the matter was assigned to COCA (Boulton II ).

¶ 8 Initially, COCA issued an opinion affirming the district court judgment in favor of Plaintiff. However, Boulton filed a petition for rehearing, and on May 30, 2013, COCA issued a substitute opinion reversing the trial court's judgment. Relying on our holding in Smith v. Robinson, 1979 OK 57, 594 P.2d 364, COCA found that Boulton's payment of the $5,000.00 judgment lien amount with interest was sufficient to “redeem the real property from Alan's lien and to discharge the lien.” COCA remanded the case and directed the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Boulton. In addition, COCA concluded Boulton had successfully defended the foreclosure action, and therefore, was entitled to recover trial and appeal-related attorney fees.

¶ 9 We granted certiorari to reconcile COCA's decision with our holding in Smith. Finding the two cases are factually and legally distinguishable, we vacate the COCA opinion, reinstate the trial court's April 2012 judgment as modified, and remand for further proceedings in the trial court.

Standard of Review

¶ 10 This appeal stems from a grant of summary judgment, which calls for de novo review. Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶ 2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. Under the de novo standard, this Court is afforded “plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to examine the issues presented.” Harmon v. Cradduck, 2012 OK 80, ¶ 10, 286 P.3d 643, 648. When examining an order sustaining summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the record reveals disputed material facts. Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Co., L.L.C., 2013 OK 48, ¶ 11, 306 P.3d 544, 548. Even when basic facts are undisputed, motions for summary judgment should be denied, if from the evidence, reasonable persons might reach different inferences or conclusions. Id. “All facts and inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary adjudication.” Id.

Analysis

¶ 11 We are presented with two primary legal questions in this appeal. Initially, we must determine whether Boulton's post-suit tender of $5,000.00, with interest, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 42 O.S. § 20. Plaintiff argues that the redemption statute requires payment of not only principal and interest, but also attorney fees and costs as “damages” under 42 O.S. § 20. Second, we must consider whether COCA's determination that Boulton's post-litigation remittance in furtherance of redemption clothed her with prevailing party status for purposes of awarding attorney fees and costs.

UnderSmith v. Robinson, Boulton's Effort to Redeem Her Property in the Foreclosure Action Was Complete Upon Payment of Both the Principal Lien Amount and Accumulated Interest.

¶ 12 Two statutes are initially implicated in this action. Title 42 O.S. § 18 provides that “[e]very person having an interest in property subject to a lien, has a right to redeem it from the lien, at any time after the claim is due, and before his right of redemption is foreclosed.” To redeem a lien, a party must follow the requirements of 42 O.S. § 20, which provides, “[r]edemption from a lien is made...