BENEVOLENT AND PROTECT. ORDER OF ELKS v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 23 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:93-CV-407.,1:93-CV-407. |
| Citation | 863 F. Supp. 529 |
| Parties | The BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE ORDER OF ELKS OF the UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Nanette REYNOLDS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
James M. Cameron, Jr., Richard J. Landau, Dykema, Gossett, Spencer, Goodnow & Trigg, Ann Arbor, MI, for plaintiff.
Robert L. Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ron D. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Div., Detroit, MI, for defendants.
Plaintiff, The Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the United States of America ("the BPO Elks"), brings this action to challenge the constitutionality of Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("MELCRA"), 1976 Mich.Pub.Act 453 Public Act 70 of 1992 ("Act. 70") ("MELCRA as amended"), Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. §§ 37.2101 et seq. (West 1993 Supplement). Pending before the Court is defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff is a tax-exempt fraternal organization whose members are chartered lodges throughout the United States. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself, its 73 Michigan lodges, and the approximately 50,000 members of those lodges. The plaintiff's governing statutes provide that an applicant for membership must be a male citizen of the United States who is not less than 21 years of age, believes in God, of good character, not affiliated with the Communist Party, and does not advocate the forceful overthrow of the government. Defendant Nanette Reynolds is the director of Michigan's Department of Civil Rights ("MDCR").
Plaintiff essentially contends that MELCRA as amended by Act 70 violates its rights to intimate and expressive association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by prohibiting its gender-based membership requirements and precluding its use of the private club exemption.
Plaintiff pleads three counts. In Count I, plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that MELCRA as amended and as applied to its members violates the rights of its members to voluntarily and exclusively associate to advance their fraternal purposes and that its members are entitled to protection from state interference with their freedom of intimate and expressive association. In Count II, plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that MELCRA as amended is facially unconstitutional because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that lodges are places of public accommodation and not entitled to the First Amendment's freedom of association and, thereby, precludes the constitutionally required case-by-case analysis of an organization's objective characteristics in determining whether it is a private club. Plaintiff also seeks a declaration that MELCRA as amended is overbroad and will inhibit third parties from practicing their constitutionally protected rights of association. In Count III, plaintiff alleges that the MDCR unreasonably and unconstitutionally interfered with its members' freedom to intimate and expressive association in violation of Title 42 United States Code Section 1983 by threatening to enforce MELCRA and thereby encourage other parties, believing themselves to be aggrieved by plaintiff's policies, to file suit.
Defendant moves for summary judgment and asserts that MELCRA as amended and properly interpreted does not infringe upon plaintiff's associational rights because it continues to recognize the right of private club members to intimate and expressive association, preserves the private club exemption, and as amended only addresses equal access to facilities of private clubs and not membership. Defendant also contends that the state has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimination in access to places of public accommodation and public service and that this interest justifies the minimal impact that Act 70 may have on plaintiff's associational rights. Finally, defendant argues that Act 70 is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
Article 3 of MELCRA defines civil rights and prohibits discriminatory practices in the area of public accommodation based on religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status. Prior to Act 70, MELCRA did not apply to private clubs that were "not in fact open to the public." MELCRA, Section 303. Some private clubs adopted rules restricting the times when spouses, typically wives, and children of members could use certain club facilities, generally the golf course. The Michigan Legislature adopted Act 70 to eliminate certain of these exclusionary and restrictive practices of private clubs.
Section 301(a) as amended by Act 70 defines the term, a "place of public accommodation," as "a business, or an educational, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, health, or transportation facility, or institution of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." The term also includes the facilities of a country club, a golf club, a yacht club, an athletic club, a sports club, or a dining club in the definition of a "place of public accommodation."
The original and unamended Section 302 of MELCRA applies to "places of public accommodation" and "public service" that are not private clubs. Section 302 prohibits a person from denying anyone the "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public service because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status."
Section 302a, which was added to MELCRA by Act 70, explicitly applies to private clubs that are defined as places of public accommodation as newly defined in Section 301(a) of MELCRA. Section 302a(2) requires equal access to club facilities for all adults entitled to use club facilities under a membership. Section 302a(2) also requires that a membership which permits use of club facilities during restricted periods must permit all adults using the membership such use. Section 302a(3) requires equal access for all adult members in all membership categories at all times to a club's food and beverage facilities or services.
Act 70 also added two other provisions to MELCRA to which plaintiff objects. First, Section 302a(2) provides: "All classes of membership shall be available without regard to race, color, gender, religion, marital status, or national origin." Plaintiff contends that it now may not exclude women as members because of their gender and that this violates its constitutional rights of intimate and expressive association based on its historic fraternal purpose, practice, and character. Second, the last sentence of Section 301(a) now provides: "This section shall not apply to a private club that is otherwise defined as a place of public accommodation in this article." Plaintiff argues that Section 303 precludes it from using them private club exemption, because it is a dining club defined as a "place of public accommodation" under Section 301(a). Plaintiff argues that this violates the constitutionally required case-bycase adjudication of private club status as recognized by the Supreme Court and its constitutional rights of association.
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1988). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the inquiry is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether the evidence is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989).
Courts reasonably interpret statutes to effectuate the intent of legislatures. People v. Hawkins, 181 Mich.App. 393, 448 N.W.2d 858 (1989); Department of Social Services v. Brewer, 180 Mich.App. 82, 446 N.W.2d 593 (1989). Courts examine the plain and specific language of a statute to determine legislative intent. Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 376, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992); Hawkins, 181 Mich.App. at 396, 448 N.W.2d 858; Frasier v. Model Coverall Service, Inc., 182 Mich.App. 741, 744, 453 N.W.2d 301 (1990). However, if a literal and plain reading of a statute would be absurd or clearly inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, a court should depart from a literal construction. Reisman v. Regents of Wayne State University, 188 Mich. App. 526, 536, 470 N.W.2d 678 (1991); Oberlin v. Wolverine Gas & Oil Co., 181 Mich. App. 506, 511, 450 N.W.2d 68 (1989). Court must apply terms as expressly defined in a statute. Harder v. Harder, 176 Mich.App. 589, 591, 440 N.W.2d 53 (1989). Terms that are not so defined must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Mich.Comp.Laws § 8.3; People v. Tracy, 186 Mich.App. 171, 176, 463 N.W.2d 457 (1990). Courts presume that every word has some meaning which they should effect, avoiding constructions that render any part of a statute surplusage. Judicial construction is proper where reasonable minds can differ on the meaning. Melia v. Appeal Board of Michigan Employment Sec. Comm, 346 Mich. 544, 562, 78 N.W.2d 273 (1956); Brewer, 180 Mich.App. at 84, 446 N.W.2d 593; In re Estate of Harris, 151 Mich.App. 780, 391 N.W.2d 487 (1986). Courts should read statutes in context and reconcile apparent inconsistencies. People v. Downey, 183 Mich.App. 405, 409, 454 N.W.2d 235, appeal denied, 436 Mich. 871 (1990); Attorney Gen. v. Ankersen, 148 Mich.App. 524, 385...
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