Bennett v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp

• Decision Date: 02 October 1923
• Docket Number: No. 17906.,17906.
• Parties: BENNETT v. GENERAL ACCIDENT, FIRE & LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION; Limited.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

255 S.W. 1076

213 Mo. App. 421

BENNETT v. GENERAL ACCIDENT, FIRE & LIFE ASSURANCE CORPORATION; Limited.

No. 17906.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

October 2, 1923.

Rehearing Denied. November 2, 1923.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Victor H. Falkenhainer, Judge.

Action by Frederick D. Bennett, by Harris N. Bennett, his guardian, against the General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, Limited. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Lee Hagerman and Abbott, Fauntleroy, Cullen & Edwards, all of St. Louis, for appellant.

M. U. Hayden and Anderson, Gilbert & Wolfort, all of St. Louis, for respondent.

SUTTON, C.

Plaintiff sues upon a policy of insurance issued on the 26th day of April, 1915, to plaintiff, Frederick D. Bennett, insuring him against bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through accidental means.

The injuries for which plaintiff sues were sustained on September 25, 1916, and were caused by the inhalation of illuminating gas alleged to have occurred accidentally. After his injury, the insured was adjudged to be a person of unsound mind, and Harry N. Bennett was appointed as his guardian and duly qualified as such.

Defendant by its answer specially pleads the provision of the policy expressly excluding from the coverage of the policy any injuries resulting from an attempt by the insured to commit suicide, and that the injuries complained of resulted from the intentional act of the insured in deliberately and knowingly inhaling illuminating gas in an attempt to commit suicide.

Defendant further pleads that during the month of July, 1916, the insured conceived the idea of cheating and defrauding defendant and other insurance companies, and pursuant thereto applied for and obtained from the Equitable Life Insurance Company of Iowa two policies of insurance on his life for the sum of $5,000 each and applied for and obtained from the Missouri State Life Insurance Company two policies of insurance on his life for the sum of $5,000 each; that at that time there was in force upon the life of the insured insurance in various companies in excess of $100,000; that at the time the said additional life insurance was taken out the insured contemplated taking his own life; that thereafter the insured attempted to take his own life by means of the voluntary inhalation of illuminating gas; and that his injuries for which this suit is brought resulted from such attempt.

It will be observed that it is not alleged that the policy in suit was taken out by the insured in contemplation of suicide, but that, on the contrary, it is alleged that the idea of suicide was first conceived by the insured in July, 1916, more than a year after the policy in suit was issued, so that the answer, stripped of its verbiage, really amounts to nothing more than a plea that the insured's injuries resulted from his own intentional act in attempting to take his own life; and this was the only issue submitted to the jury by the instructions.

The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for defendant, and the plaintiff appeals.

Upon the trial the court admitted in evidence over the objections of the plaintiff the pleadings and judgments in the case of Equitable Life Insurance Company v. Fred D. Bennett and the case of Missouri State Life Insurance Company v. Fred D. Bennett, instituted and prosecuted to final judgments in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis in 1917. The purpose of these suits was to cancel policies of insurance upon the life of Fred D. Bennett issued by said insurance companies. The petitions in those cases alleged that the policies sought to be canceled were taken out for the purpose of defrauding the insurance companies of the sums of money mentioned in said policies of insurance; that at the time the policies were taken out, the insured contemplated committing suicide; and that thereafter in September, 1916, the insured attempted to take his own life by asphyxiation. The petitions also alleged that the insured in his application for the policies falsely represented that no life insurance company had ever examined him upon application for insurance without issuing a policy, and tendered the insured the premiums paid by him on the policies. The insured answered by his guardian, denying generally the allegations of the petition. In both cases the court upon the trials of said cases gave judgments in favor of the insurance companies, against the insured, canceling the policies issued by the companies, and gave judgments in favor of the insured, against the companies, for the premiums paid by him on the policies. The companies paid the amounts adjudged against them, and the insured through his guardian accepted the payments and acknowledged satisfaction of the judgments.

Upon the admission of these judgments and pleadings, the plaintiff predicates reversibel error. Defendant justifies the admission of the records on the grounds that, though the defendant was not a party to these suits, the plaintiff, being a party thereto, is conclusively estopped to reopen an issue of fact adjudicated in these cases, or that if the judgments do not amount to a conclusive estoppel or bar, they are at least competent evidence in this case upon the issue of fact involved. The defendant proceeds upon the assumption that in rendering said judgments the court necessarily found and determined that the insured took out the policies involved in said cases in contemplation of suicide and afterwards attempted suicide, thus adjudicating an issue of fact determinative of this suit, and for the nonce we will proceed upon the same assumption.

The rule is fundamental that a matter once adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction may be invoked as an estoppel in any collateral suit when the same parties or their privies allege anything contradictory to it. The suit, however, must be between the same parties as those in the former suit, or their privies. It will pot suffice that the party against whom an issue of fact was decided in the former suit is a party to the suit on trial and seeks to contradict the fact adjudged against him in the former suit. The judgment must conclude both parties or it will conclude neither. Estoppels must be reciprocal and bind both parties; they operate only on parties and privies and can be used neither by nor against strangers. He that shall not be concluded by the judgment shall not conclude another by it. No person can bind another by any adjudication who was not himself exposed to the peril of being bound in a like manner had the judgment resulted the other way. Nobody can take benefit by a verdict that had not been prejudiced by it had it gone contrary. So read the authorities. State ex rel. Subway Co. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. loc. cit. 567, 46 S. W. 981, 42 L. R. A. 113; Henry v. Woods, 77 Mo. loc. cit. 280; Bell v. Hoagland, 15 Mo. loc. cit. 364; Simmons v. Chestnut-Gibbons Grocery Co. (Okl.) 173 Pac. loc. cit. 219; Jones v. Adler, 183 Ala. 435, 62 South. loc. cit. 779; Winston v. Starke, 12 Grat. (Va.) loc. cit. 319; Cecil v. Cecil, 19 Md. loc. cit. 78, 81 Am. Dec. 626; 21 Corpus Juris, 1067; 23 Cyc. 1238; 15 R. C. L. § 432, p. 956; Chadima v. Kovar, 168 Iowa. loc. cit. 388, 150 N. W. 691; Davis v. Wood, 1 Wheat. 6, 4 L. Ed. 22.

In view of the authorities, it is manifest that the judgments introduced in evidence upon the trial of this cause do not amount to a conclusive estoppel as between the plaintiff and defendant in this cause as to an issue of fact adjudicated by such judgments, and it is but a corollary to this conclusion that...