Chadima v. Kovar

• Decision Date: 19 January 1915
• Docket Number: No. 29732.,29732.
• Citation: 168 Iowa 385,150 N.W. 691
• Parties: CHADIMA v. KOVAR.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

168 Iowa 385

150 N.W. 691

CHADIMA

v.KOVAR.

No. 29732.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 19, 1915.

Appeal from Superior Court of Cedar Rapids; C. B. Robbins, Judge.

Action at law to recover damages. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. The material facts are stated in the opinion. Reversed and remanded.Ranck & Messer, of Iowa City, and Jamison, Smyth & Hann, of Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Remley & Calkins, of Iowa City, for appellee.

WEAVER, J.

The plaintiff states that he was defendant in an action for slander brought against him by one Reverend Joseph Balcar in the district court of Johnson county, Iowa, and when the same came on for trial, and the jury had been duly impaneled to try the cause, and trial had proceeded for several days, the defendant herein wrongfully and maliciously tampered with two of the jurors in favor of said Balcar, and that, because of such wrongful acts on his part, the court discharged the jury and continued the case, thereby putting the plaintiff herein (defendant in the case mentioned) to great trouble and expense, when, but for such wrongful acts, the case would then have soon been disposed of and such loss and expense would have been avoided. In a second count of this petition the same matter is restated, and it is further alleged that, by reason of defendant's said wrong, plaintiff was put to a large additional cost, including attorneys' fees and personal expenses. The episode in the Balcar Case, out of which this claim has grown, occurred in February, 1911. Attached to the petition is a bill of particulars beginning with April 5, 1911, down to November, 1911, made up of charges for numerous trips to Iowa City and other places and expenses thereof, telephone bills, “correspondence made necessary” by several continuances, and attorneys' fees paid, making an aggregate of $206.50, all of which charges accrued after the case of Balcar v. Chadima had been continued. A further charge is made of $285 for the additional expenses mentioned in the second count of the petition, all arising before defendant's wrongful act, but made unavailing because of the interruption of the trial in that case. The answer, so far as it need here be considered, is a denial of the petition and all the claims therein made. The jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of $346.

[1] I. Many errors are assigned upon the admission and exclusion of evidence by the trial court. In nearly every instance, however, the assignment does not state or show what is the alleged error of which complaint is made, except by a mere reference to the abstract, thus making it necessary for this court to read the abstract to ascertain the nature and point of appellant's objection. It has often been held that such an assignment of error is insufficient, and that each assignment should be sufficient in itself to disclose the proposition which appellant desires to press upon this court's attention. Adhering to this rule, we shall pass the rulings on evidence without consideration, except in a single instance, which we shall discuss, because of its bearing upon the correctness of one of the trial court's instructions which is challenged by the appellant.

[2][3] The plaintiff was allowed, over defendant's objection, to show that, while the case of Balcar v. Chadima was being tried to a jury in the district court of Johnson county, the proceeding was interrupted by a complaint that the jury or some of its members had been approached by the defendant herein on behalf of Balcar, and because thereof the jury was discharged and the cause continued. Over like objections he was also permitted to introduce certified copies of proceedings in the district court, showing that an information had been filed therein, charging the defendant in this case with contempt because of his alleged interference with the jury, as above recited, and that, upon the hearing of the contempt proceedings, he had been found guilty and adjudged to pay a fine of $25, and that he had paid the fine. The competency and materiality of this testimony was contested at every available opportunity. The objection to the introduction of the district court record showing the contempt proceedings, the assessment of a fine, and its payment should have been sustained. There are few rules better settled than that a judgment is not evidence of the truth of any fact therein adjudicated, except as between the parties thereto and their privies. The plaintiff in this case was not a party to the contempt proceedings and had no interest therein other than was had by every citizen of the jurisdiction. As between him and this defendant, that judgment determined no question whatever; and this is true even though the judgment had been rendered upon a plea of guilty. Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa, 292, 25 N. W. 131, 27 N. E. 244;Crawford v. Bergen, 91 Iowa, 675, 60 N. W. 205;Corbley v. Wilson, 71 Ill. 209, 22 Am. Rep. 98;Clark v. Irvin, 9 Ohio, 131;Doyle v. Gore, 15 Mont. 212, 38 Pac. 939. If a judgment is admissible at all upon any question of fact involved therein, it is conclusive; and if, because of lack of identity of parties, it is not conclusive, it is then not even a circumstance which the jury may consider on that point. Bethlehem v. Watertown, 51 Conn. 494;State v. Bradnack, 69 Conn. 212, 37 Atl. 492, 43 L. R. A. 620. It follows that the fact of the contempt proceedings and of the judgment or finding entered therein were inadmissible, and the court erred in overruling the objection thereto.

For the reasons already stated, we shall not further consider the questions of evidence raised by counsel. We may say, however, that a general reading of the record indicates that plaintiff was allowed to roam so far afield in proof of his right to recover that it is at least very doubtful whether the damages claimed, or some of them, were not too remote to be recoverable. In view of the condition of the record and the probability that an observance of what we have to say in the next paragraph concerning the instructions given by the court will obviate these grounds of criticism when the issues are again tried, we think it unnecessary to be more specific.

[4] II. In the second paragraph of its charge the court told the jury that the fact that the case of Balcar v. Chadima was continued because of an attempt to influence the jury, and that defendant...