Bennick v. Boeing Co.
| Decision Date | 08 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. CV-13-S-1154-NE |
| Parties | MARK E. BENNICK, Plaintiff, v. THE BOEING COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Plaintiff, Mark E. Bennick, proceeding pro se, alleges that defendant, The Boeing Company, terminated his employment on May 21, 2007 on the basis of his disability.1 Plaintiff asserts claims for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. ("ADA"), and for breach of his employment agreement.2
Plaintiff commenced this action in the Circuit Court of Madison County, Alabama.3 Defendant removed the action to the Northern District of Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(c) and 1367(a), because plaintiff's ADA claim arises under the laws of the United States, and his breach of contract claim is so related tohis ADA claim that they form part of the same case or controversy.4
This matter is before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).5 Upon consideration, this court will grant the motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to move to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That rule must be read together with Rule 8(a), which requires that apleading contain only a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While that pleading standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 544 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does demand "more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." [Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S.] at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id., at 557 (brackets omitted).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration supplied).
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration supplied).
Plaintiff worked for defendant as an airplane and missile program engineer for twenty-six years, and suffered from complex partial epileptic seizures during the final seven years of his employment.6 Although plaintiff was capable of performing the duties of his position, he could not hold a driver's license as a result of his disability.7 Thus, when plaintiff's job required him to travel, he was escorted by a co-worker.8
Plaintiff was hired in 1980 to work at defendant's location in Seattle, Washington.9 Over the course of his employment with defendant, plaintiff transferred to a factory in another city on three occasions: first from Seattle to Cheyenne, Wyoming, then from Cheyenne to Ogden, Utah, and finally from Ogden to Huntsville, Alabama.10 This action concerns the latter transfer.
Plaintiff accepted a position at defendant's location in Huntsville in August of 2005.11 Under the terms of his employment contract, defendant agreed to purchase his residence in Ogden, pay the cost of his relocation to Huntsville, and leave his base salary unchanged.12 Upon review, plaintiff's "Relocation Assignment Letter" neither states that his employment is "at will," nor specifies a fixed term of employment.13
When defendant offered plaintiff the position, its employees in Ogden and Huntsville were aware that he suffered from complex partial epileptic seizures.14 Plaintiff informed the Human Resources Department in Huntsville that he recoveredfrom such seizures "within minutes," and that "paramedics need not be notified."15 Even so, paramedics were called during his seizures on several occasions.16
After having several complex partial epileptic seizures, plaintiff contends that he received a call from a Human Resources representative who informed him that he was a "hindrance," and that "a means to have [him] terminated would be found."17 On May 21, 2007 (less than 24 months after plaintiff transferred to Huntsville),18 defendant terminated plaintiff's employment.19
This is plaintiff's fourth lawsuit against defendant arising from his termination in 2007. Plaintiff commenced the action styled Bennick v. The Boeing Company, Case No. CV-09-S-335-NE, on February 20, 2009.20 He brought claims for "wrongful termination," "unethical business conduct," and "violation of civil rights" following his termination for testing positive during an alcohol screening administered by defendant.21
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in Case No. CV-09-S-335-NE on March 11, 2009.22 This time, he brought claims for breach of contract, discrimination, and harassment based on his termination.23 This court granted defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), after finding that plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.24
The following year, plaintiff commenced two additional lawsuits against defendant, both challenging his termination: i.e., Bennick v. The Boeing Company, Case No. CV-10-S-551-NE; and Bennick v. The Boeing Company and Grace Thompson, Case No. CV-10-S-2090-NE. This court dismissed both cases on res judicata grounds.
When dismissing the second suit commenced by plaintiff, CV-10-S-551-NE, this court held that "plaintiff's termination from defendant and defendant's communication with plaintiff's subsequent employer, Teledyne Brown Engineering, regarding his alleged substance-abuse problems operate as the factual bases for both actions."25 When dismissing the third suit commenced by plaintiff, CV-10-S-2090-NE, this court held that, "while plaintiff's claim may be differentlycharacterized in this action, the ineluctable truth is that its factual predicates are identical to those underlying the two claims against Boeing are self-evidently barred by res judicata and must be dismissed."26
On December 1, 2011, plaintiff filed in his first case a pleading entitled "Motion to Dismiss decisions imposed in this action and civil actions 5:10-cv-551-CLS [sic] and 5:10-cv-2090-CLS [sic]," which requested the dismissal of all three of his cases against defendant.27 One could conclude that plaintiff sought to dismiss his own cases — which, of course, had already been dismissed — to avoid the effects of res judicata. This court denied the motion to dismiss on December 6, 2011, and plaintiff appealed.28 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss on January 2, 2013.29
The claims in plaintiff's present complaint — the fourth case he has commenced against defendant — like the claims in his second and third cases, are barred by the doctrine of res judicata because they arise from the same factual predicate as his prior three cases. A claim is precluded by prior litigation if (1) there is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with them, are identical inboth cases; and (4) the same cause of action is involved in both cases. Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999).
"Two cases are the same 'claim' or 'cause of action' 'if a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate as a former action.'" Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1240 (); see also O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., 200 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000) ().
In his present, fourth case against defendant, plaintiff's claims are again based on the termination of his employment. Thus, an observation from this court's opinion granting defendant's motion to dismiss in plaintiff's second case applies equally to this case: "Although plaintiff...
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