Bensen v. State
| Decision Date | 07 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | 60463,Nos. 60459,60462,60460,60461,60464 and 60465,s. 60459 |
| Citation | 389 N.Y.S.2d 760,88 Misc.2d 1035 |
| Parties | Bruce BENSEN, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Harry CARTER, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. George J. SOLDNER, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Gregory HOSTASH, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Richard PATTON, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. William MURRAY, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. John PITFIDO, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Court of Claims |
In each of the above-entitled claims, the State has moved for an order of dismissal on the sole ground of untimely filing. Since said motions were heard jointly and the determinative issues are common to each application, this opinion is dispositive of all seven motions.
The subject claims arise from a mass arrest of the respective claimants on August 14, 1974. On the following day, after all claimants were formally booked, the criminal charges were dismissed and each claimant was thereupon released from custody. 1 Identical notices of intention were filed in behalf of each claimant, the latest being November 6, 1974, and similarly identical claims (except as to damages) were thereafter filed August 10, 1976. The allegations of each claim generally spell out causes of action for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution and negligence.
In urging dismissal of those causes of action sounding in false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, 2 the legal argument advanced by defendant's counsel revolves around the comparable time limitations pertaining to claims against the State of New York and identical actions between private citizens. Specifically, the defendant argues that if the aforesaid actions were between citizens, a one year statute of limitations would be applicable therefor (CPLR 215(3)), and since the claims here were filed beyond said statutory period they are time-barred. In support thereof, defendant's counsel cites section 19 of article 3 of the New York State Constitution and subdivision 2 of Court of Claims Act section 12. Insofar as relevant, the language in both sections is substantially similar and provides that no claim against the State shall be allowed, nor will any judgment be awarded on any claim which 'as between citizens of the state, would be barred by lapse of time.'
The question thus presented is whether claims against the State of New York admittedly filed within the time requirements governing such claims (Court of Claims Act, § 10(3)) are time-barred because of the constitutional and statutory proscriptions cited above.
At the outset, the Court notes that its own research and that of counsel (both of whom submitted helpful memoranda) failed to uncover any authority directly in point. Apparently the application of the said constitutional and statutory prohibition to the ordinary filing requirements of this Court is a case of first impression. Although similar claims similarly filed have been found timely, it would appear that the instant constitutional issue was not raised or discussed. (See e.g., Marsala v. State, 41 A.D.2d 878, 343 N.Y.S.2d 149.)
The State's attorney phrases his argument in terms of reading section 10, subdivision 3 of the Court of Claims Act Together with section 12, subdivision 2 thereof, to the end that subdivision 3 not be deemed unconstitutional. However, we believe the practical effect of defendant's position, if correct, is that the two subject subdivisions are inconsistent and, moreover, said subdivision 3 is unconstitutional vis-a-vis article 3, section 19 of the Constitution. 3 The burden is thus on defendant to demonstrate such unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt (see Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 218, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581, 149 N.E.2d 869, 870) and the claimants at bar are aided by the presumption of statutory constitutionality. (See McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 150.) This presumption is strengthened by the fact the constitutionality and validity of said subdivision 3 has never been challenged on the instant grounds. (See Id., § 150, p. 318.) Further, the general rules of statutory construction require that all parts of a statutory enactment be harmonized, if at all possible (see Id., § 98), and that particular provisions be construed to avoid hardship or injustice, and unconstitutionality. (See Id., §§ 146 & 150(c).) In this regard it is well settled that if any state of facts, either known or which could reasonably be assumed, justify the provision, it must be upheld. (Defiance Milk Prods. Co. v. Du Mond, 309 N.Y. 537, 541, 132 N.E.2d 829; U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234.) Finally, a court of first instance, such as the Court of Claims, should be extremely circumspect in striking down legislative enactments for unconstitutionality and should do so only when the unconstitutionality is patent (see Id., § 150(a), p. 312) and only as a last resort (see Wiggins v. Town of Somers, supra; Defiance Milk Products v. Du Mond, supra).
With these considerations in mind, we believe a reasonable interpretation of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions, and their purposes, does not require us to find this Court's filing requirements unconstitutional.
The purpose of the cited constitutional prohibition is to fix a maximum, an outside limit, on the time in which claims against the State may be brought. (See Homer Eng. Co. v. State, 12 N.Y.2d 508, 510, 240 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974, 191 N.E.2d 455, 456; Oswego & Syracuse R.R. Co. v. State, 226 N.Y. 351, 361, 124 N.E. 8, 11.) Through the legislature, the State may set time limitations on claims against it which are shorter than the normal statutes of limitations (see Oswego & Syracuse R.R. Co. v. State, supra, 361, 362, 724 N.E. 12), but the prohibition alluded to here prevents the State from subjecting itself to less favorable time limits than are applied between citizens (see Homer Eng. Co. v. State, supra, 12 N.Y.2d 510, 240 N.Y.S.2d 974, 191 N.E.2d 456, Oswego & Syracuse R.R. Co. v. State, supra, 226 N.Y.2d 361, 124 N.E. 11). We think a realistic appraisal of the practical effects of this Court's filing requirements, taking into account the differences between actions in this Court and normal civil actions in the Supreme Court, reveals that the State is not subject to less favorable time limitations.
Generally, in the Supreme Court, a civil action is deemed interposed and the statute of limitations is stopped when a summons is served. (CPLR 203(a), (b).) Since a notice of intention contains all that is required in a summons and more (cf., CPLR 305 & Court of Claims Act, § 11), we believe it reasonable to analogize the two when weighing analogous time limitations. Although a notice of intention does not technically commence an action in this Court (see Petzold v. State, 202 Misc. 255, 256, 114 N.Y.S.2d 572), there can be no doubt that it apprises the defendant of potential claims in a much more meaningful and substantial manner than a summons does in a Supreme Court action. Additionally, since a notice must state the nature of the claim (something not required in a summons--see CPLR 305(b)), it circumscribes the causes of action and, in some cases, the damages (see e.g., 59--304 Realty Co. v. State, 48 A.D.2d 974, 975, 369 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836) which may be subsequently claimed. A summons does not necessarily do this. In fact, in the proper case a notice of intention may be treated as a claim. (See State v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 43 A.D.2d 988, 989, 352 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67; Barski v. State, 43 A.D.2d 767, 350 N.Y.S.2d 762; McCabe v. State, 58 Misc.2d 823, 827, 296 N.Y.S.2d 840, 844.) Consequently, we perceive no reason why a notice of intention may not have the ancillary purpose (in addition to its primary one of giving the State notice) of providing appropriate compliance with the above-cited constitutional prohibition. Considering the differences in the procedures and forums, we do not think it contrary to the spirit and purpose of said prohibition to deem a notice of intention sufficiently comparable to a summons to find that the filing of such notice affords the State a more, not less, favorable time limitation than that applicable between citizens.
It is proper for the legislature to define what act constitutes accrual of a claim against the State for the purposes of determining when the equivalent statute of limitations as between citizens starts (see Matter of Dee v. State Tax Comm., 257 App.Div. 531, 535, 13 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722, affd. 282 N.Y. 617, 25 N.E.2d 394; see also, Homer Eng. Co. v. State, supra, 511). In this context, we are of the view that it is also proper for the legislature to determine what act is sufficient to stop the equivalent statute of limitations (see Matter of Dee v. State Tax Comm., supra, 535). Of course such legislative action is subject to judicial scrutiny, at least insofar as constitutional restrictions are concerned. However, where there is no intention to circumvent such restrictions, and the legislative acts reasonably construed do not have that effect, the Courts should respect the legislative determinations.
In promulgating the Court of Claims Act, there is a presumption the legislature was aware of the constitutional restriction imposed by section 19 of article 3 of the Constitution (see Davis v. State, App.Div., 388 N.Y.S.2d 143, 3rd Dept., 1976) and such awareness is clearly shown by the inclusion of such restriction in Court of Claims Act section 12, subdivision 2. Further, the legislature recently amended Court of Claims Act section 10, subdivision 5 to libealize this Court's discretion in...
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...decision is almost on all fours with the situation at bar; and, that it supports the State's position. "However, in * * * Bensen v. State of New York, 88 Misc 2d 1035 , which is also almost on all fours with the situation at bar, Judge Rossetti, in a well reasoned opinion, held opposite to ......
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Budgar v. State, 60343
..."Notice of Intention" is tantamount to the filing of a "Notice of Claim" for the purpose of tolling the statute. (Bensen v. State of New York, 88 Misc.2d 1035, 389 N.Y.S.2d 760.) The court must conclude that the filing of the "Notice of Intention" was sufficient to toll the statute of limit......
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...posed by the State herein. Two lower courts have addressed the issue, however, and reached opposite conclusions (Bensen v. State of New York, 88 Misc.2d 1035, 389 N.Y.S.2d 760 [claim held timely so long as filed within two years prescribed by Court of Claims Act, § 10, subd. 3]; Kilbourne v......
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...It also differs from a claim in that it need not set forth a valid cause of action or legal theory for recovery (Bensen v. State of New York, 88 Misc.2d 1035, 389 N.Y.S.2d 760). A notice of intention will be sufficient if it provides the State with fair and timely notice of those facts nece......