Benson v. Shuler Drilling Co., Inc.
Decision Date | 28 February 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-822,93-822 |
Citation | 871 S.W.2d 552,316 Ark. 101 |
Parties | Kenneth BENSON and Louann Benson, Appellants, v. SHULER DRILLING COMPANY, INC., Appellee. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Denver L. Thornton, Robert L. Depper, Jr., El Dorado, for appellants.
Stephen A. Matthews, Ruth Ann Wisener, Pine Bluff, for appellee.
This lawsuit arose when a saltwater tank owned by Shuler Drilling Company ("Shuler"), which was being serviced by Mr. Kenneth Benson, an employee of Arkansas Service Company, exploded, injuring him. Mr. Benson and his wife sued Shuler claiming that the explosion was the result of Shuler's negligence. A crucial factual question at trial was whether Mr. Benson was on the catwalk on the side of the tank or on the ground near the tank when the explosion occurred. The jury found in favor of Shuler. We reverse and remand.
For their first allegation of error, the Bensons contend that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant their motion in limine as to certain sections of Dr. Callaway's deposition relating to his medical records. Dr. Callaway was Mr. Benson's orthopedic surgeon whose deposition was admitted into evidence in lieu of his live testimony.
Of primary concern is Dr. Callaway's written discharge summary, which provides in pertinent part: "The patient is a 22 year old white male in an oil tank explosion, fell from the cat walk around the oil tank down to the ground."
When asked who had informed him that Mr. Benson had fallen from the catwalk, Dr. Callaway spoke in contradictory terms: On the other hand he stated:
In addition, it is unclear from the record when Dr. Callaway was informed that Mr. Benson had fallen from the catwalk. The written history, taken in the emergency room, reflects that Dr. Callaway was not informed at the time of Mr. Benson's admission that he had allegedly fallen from a catwalk: "(Emphasis added.) In his deposition, Dr. Callaway explained that he had taken a history from him "as best he could at that time with his injuries and all."
Dr. Callaway acknowledged that it is helpful for him to learn of the cause of a patient's injuries immediately and stated:
In the extent in this case or in many cases, it was in the emergency room, that the nature of the injury and the mechanism of injury is sometimes important in assessing the severity of the injury. A high velocity crush injury is going to be much more severe even though the x-rays and appearances may be very similar to a low velocity injury in the emergency room.
Yet, Dr. Callaway did not indicate that he had relied upon the information that Mr. Benson had fallen from the catwalk in making his diagnosis or prescribing treatment. Judging from the doctor's testimony and his case history report, it is readily apparent that Dr. Callaway did not have this information upon Mr. Benson's admission nor did he utilize it in making his diagnosis and prescribing treatment.
Because of Dr. Callaway's uncertainty as to who made the statements or when they were made, Mr. Benson filed a motion in limine prior to trial, seeking to exclude portions of testimony contained in Dr. Callaway's deposition, namely matters relating to Mr. Benson's cause of injury. The trial court examined his testimony on a line-by-line basis, excluding certain portions but admitting the information relating to his discharge summary which attributed his injury to a fall from the catwalk. We have stated that motions in limine are to enlighten the court and advise counsel of the specific nature of the anticipated evidence so that the court may intelligently act on such motions. Smith v. Walt Bennett Ford, Inc., 314 Ark. 591, 864 S.W.2d 817 (1993); Schichtl v. Slack, 293 Ark. 281, 737 S.W.2d 628 (1987). Motions in limine are not ordinarily used to extinguish an entire claim or defense. Rather, they are usually used to prohibit the mentioning of some specific matter, such as an inflammatory piece of evidence, until the admissibility of that matter has been determined out of the hearing of the jury. Schichtl, supra (citing Lewis v. Buena Vista Mutual Ins. Ass'n, 183 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1971)).
It follows, then, that one who offers evidence has the burden of showing its admissibility. See Arkansas State Highway Comm. v. Roberts, 246 Ark. 1216, 441 S.W.2d 808 (1969). When a party asks for a motion in limine to exclude evidence because it is hearsay, the burden is on the "offering party to prove the admissibility of the evidence." See Robin L. Lafferty, Comment, Motion in Limine, 29 Ark.L.Rev. 215, 226 (1975) (citing Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Finney, 346 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.Civ.App.1961)). This burden was not met in this case.
Since the introduction of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge, we must determine whether or not he abused his discretion in allowing the discharge summary in evidence before we reverse his findings, and in the absence of abuse of that discretion, we will not reverse. See Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 375, 720 S.W.2d 282 (1986). See Robinson v. State, 314 Ark. 243, 861 S.W.2d 548 (1993); Gipson v. Garrison, 308 Ark. 344, 824 S.W.2d 829 (1992).
In support of their argument that the trial court abused its discretion and committed error in admitting the discharge summary, the Bensons cite A.R.E. Rule 803(4):
Hearsay exceptions--Availability of declarant immaterial.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain or sensation or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
The Bensons contend that because Dr. Callaway could not say with any certainty when or from whom he had acquired the information that Mr. Benson had fallen from the catwalk and because he could not have relied upon this information "for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment," Shuler has not met its burden of proof.
Granted, where an injured party has described how his injury occurred, the basis for this hearsay exception is his strong motivation to be truthful in giving statements for diagnosis and treatment. Carton v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 303 Ark. 568, 798 S.W.2d 674 (1990). Moreover, it has been suggested that, under these circumstances, a fact reliable enough to serve as the basis for diagnosis is also reliable enough to escape hearsay proscription. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir.1980). Thus, the trustworthiness of statements made to a physician and offered at trial under the exception may be tested by determining whether the information provided is of a type reasonably relied upon by a physician in diagnosis and treatment, and by determining whether the patient's motive is consistent with this rule's purpose. Id. However, when, as here, the declarant is unknown, the reliability of the statement is highly suspect.
Although we have not addressed this precise issue before, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals faced a similar situation in Stull v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 906 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir.1990). In Stull, there was a factual dispute as to how the seventeen-year-old appellee hurt himself on a riding lawnmower--the question was whether he jumped off the mower or got his foot trapped in the mower. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's decision to exclude a hospital record that stated that the accident occurred when Stull jumped off the lawn mower, explaining:
The medical records exception to the hearsay rule assumes that a person making a statement for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment will likely tell the truth to a medical person and that the statement is therefore inherently reliable. Hence, to fall within the exception, the statement must be obtained from the person seeking treatment, or in some instances from someone with a special relationship to the person seeking treatment, such as a parent.
Here the word "apparently" in the hospital record indicates that the statement about jumping off the mower may not have been made by Stull; it may instead represent conjecture on the part of the person filling out the record. Fuqua introduced no evidence rebutting this possibility. In fact, Dr. Wolf, the treating physician, testified that he did not know from whom the statement was obtained. In the absence of any evidence attributing the statement to Stull, the district court acted well within its discretion in excluding the hospital record.
Although not binding, the holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is persuasive and in applying its rationale to the case at bar, we see that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Dr. Callaway's statements from the discharge summary into evidence, for Dr. Callaway...
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