Berjano v. Palm Beach Cnty.
| Decision Date | 10 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 9:17-CV-81122-ROSENBERG/REINHART |
| Parties | MANI BERJANO, Plaintiff, v. PALM BEACH COUNTY, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Southern District of Florida |
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's joint Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 50]. The motion has been fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
Plaintiff is a male Cuban-American employee of Defendant. DE 1 at 2. In 2015, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination (see Attachment 1 to this Order) with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Defendant. Id. Plaintiff alleged that he had not received a promotion because his employer had discriminated against him. Id. More specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he had supported female coworkers in their own charges of discrimination and that, as a result of that support, he had not been promoted. See DE 1-3. In 2016, Plaintiff filed a second charge with the EEOC. DE 1 at 2. In that charge, Plaintiff alleged that he had experienced retaliation for filing his first charge. Id. After the EEOC closed its investigation, Plaintiff filed the instant suit.
Plaintiff has brought the following claims: Sex/Gender Hostile Work Environment (Count I), Sex/Gender Retaliation (Count II), Race/Color Hostile Work Environment (Count III), Race/Color Retaliation (Count IV), National Origin Hostile Work Environment (Count V), National Origin Retaliation (Count VI), and National Origin Discrimination (Count VII).
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The existence of a factual dispute is not by itself sufficient grounds to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, "the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A dispute is genuine if "a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party." Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). A fact is material if "it would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). The Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, upon discovering a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court must deny summary judgment. See id.
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Once themoving party satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 327 F. App'x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Instead, "[t]he non-moving party must make a sufficient showing on each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Accordingly, the non-moving party must produce evidence, going beyond the pleadings, to show that a reasonable jury could find in favor of that party. See Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343.
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment as to each of Plaintiff's claims. The Court expounds upon three of the primary categories of Defendant's arguments. First, the Court addresses whether some of Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law due to untimeliness and due to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Second, the Court addresses the sufficiency of Plaintiff's evidence of retaliation and discrimination with respect to Defendant's decision not to promote Plaintiff. Third, the Court addresses the sufficiency of Plaintiff's evidence as to other grounds of discrimination alleged by Plaintiff.
As a preliminary matter, many of Plaintiff's allegations are precluded from the Court's consideration. Plaintiff filed2 his first EEOC charge on February 11, 2015, alleging that he had been retaliated against by Defendant for "expressing concerns to upper management about [hissupervisor's] discriminatory practices towards some of his employees, including [Plaintiff]; and for supporting another [female] employee's complaint of gender discrimination." DE 39 at 3; DE 49-3 at 1. Because Plaintiff filed his first charge in February of 2015, Plaintiff is barred from alleging discrete acts of discrimination that occurred prior to April 17, 2014. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. In his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff references facts that occurred prior to April 17, 2014, to substantiate his claims. Plaintiff's claims before this Court that are premised on untimely allegations are barred.3 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002) () (emphasis added).
Plaintiff also relies in his Response (and in his Complaint) on a claim that was not raised before the EEOC prior to his initiation of this lawsuit—a claim for hostile work environment based on gender, race, and national origin. Plaintiff's first EEOC charge did not raise any hostile work environment claim—that charge is silent on the issue of a hostile work environment. DE 49-3. Later, Plaintiff filed a second EEOC charge, alleging that Plaintiff was denied a promotion because of retaliation for filing his first EEOC charge. DE 49-6. Plaintiff's second EEOC charge also did not raise any hostile work environment claim. Although Plaintiff does make use of the word "hostile" in his second EEOC charge and does reference, in a general sense, a hostile work environment, Plaintiff did not make a claim that he experienced, as a male, a workplace environment that was hostile to males. Similarly, Plaintiff did not make a claim that he experienced a hostile work environment because of his race or national origin.Instead, both of Plaintiff's EEOC charges allege that females experienced a workplace environment hostile to females.
In contrast to when the word "hostile" or "hostility" is used to describe generally retaliatory conduct, the legal term of art and the claim for a "hostile work environment" is only cognizable when such a claim is premised upon a protected characteristic. Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). General hostility that one incurs as a result of statutorily-protected activity (such as filing an EEOC charge of discrimination) does not equate to a claim for hostile work environment; instead it equates to a claim for retaliation. Cf. Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 725 (1978) (). Plaintiff has provided no authority for the proposition that a male may bring any claim for a work environment that is hostile to females, and the Court is aware of none.4 See id. Nor is there anything in the EEOC charges or court record5 to suggest that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment because of his race or national origin.
While it is true that a plaintiff may litigate any claim that is "reasonably related" to the charges in an EEOC filing, Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1989), courts have held that a claim for discrimination and a claim for hostile work environment are distinct fromone another. See Blalock v. Dale Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 1999). Each claim is distinct because each requires different elements of proof. Id. Here, a claim that Plaintiff (as a male) was being discriminated against via a work environment hostile to females would be very distinct from a claim that Plaintiff was subjected to retaliation for filing an EEOC charge, and courts routinely refuse to permit plaintiffs to bring hostile work environment claims when the EEOC charge is limited to allegations of retaliation or disparate treatment. Id; see also Ryans v. Whatley, No. 1:11-CV-46, 2012 WL 3260412, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 8, 2012); Randle v. Dynamic Sec., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-0902, 2017 WL 4572289, at *5 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 13, 2017); Drisin v. FIU, No. 16-CV-24939 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2018).6 Finally, an EEOC charge filed by an attorney is not liberally construed in favor of a determination that a claim was brought before the agency, Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 546 (6th Cir. 1991), and Plaintiff was represented by an attorney before the EEOC. See DE 54-1 at 2.
Plaintiff's EEOC charges were targeted towards the proposition that he was not granted a promotion because of disparate treatment and because of retaliation. In Plaintiff's own words, the reason he was discriminated against was because he had expressed concerns about his manager's discriminatory practices and because he had supported another employee's charge of gender discrimination. DE 49-3. The Court cannot conclude that, based upon Plaintiff's EEOC charges, the EEOC would have investigated a hostile work environment claim as to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot bring a hostile work environment claim because he hasnot exhausted his administrative remedies for that claim and for the reasons articulated above.7 Summary judgment is entered in Defendant's favor as to Plaintiff's claims for hostile work environment: Count I,...
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