Berkeley v. Alameda County Bd. of Supervisors
| Decision Date | 26 July 1974 |
| Parties | Richard BERKELEY and Myra Wolch, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. ALAMEDA COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, a public body, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 32992. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Valencia, Kathy Sue Krohn, Berkeley Neighborhood Legal Services, Berkeley, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Richard J. Moore, County Counsel, Kelvin H. Booty, Jr., Deputy County Counsel, County of Alameda, Oakland, for defendants and respondents.
Appellants Richard Berkeley and Myra Wolch appeal from an order denying their petition for writ of mandate and dismissing their complaint for declaratory relief.
Petitioners Richard Berkeley and Myra Wolch were recipients of general assitance in Alameda County. During the months of February through May of 1972, petitioners Berkeley and Wolch shared a house in Berkeley with a non-recipient, Ms. Noel King. In May 1972 petitioners Berkeley and Wolch moved into housing separate from Ms. King.
During the period of February through May 1972, Alameda County computed petitioners' general assistance grants on the basis of a household of three. Each petitioner thus received only one-third of the maximum grant for three persons.
Appellants in this action, sought to stop respondents from computing the grants of unrelated general assistance recipients residing in a common household in the same manner as a family group, and to require respondents to base any reductions in the level of general assistance grants to unrelated
recipients residing together on a showing of reduced need. The Declaratory Relief Action Should Not Have Been Resolved By A Dismissal Of The Complaint
Without stating any reasons, the trial court below denied appellants' petition for a writ of mandate and dismissed their complaint for declaratory relief. It is clear that a trial court cannot decide the merits of a plaintiff's case in a declaratory action suit by dismissal (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed 1971) Pleading, § 730, pp. 2350--2351; Sullivan v. San Francisco Art. Assn., 101 Cal.App.2d 449, 455, 225 P.2d 993), if the plaintiff plead an actual controversy.
Respondents did not demur to appellants' cause of action, nor did they move for dismissal. In their answer, respondents admitted that an actual controversy existed between petitioners and respondents.
A reading of the trial court's order of October 31, 1972, makes clear that the decision was on the merits. The trial court stated as follows: 'The above-entitled matter having regularly come on for hearing before this Court on October 17, 1972, . . . and the Court having considered the pleadings on file in the within action, and the arguments of counsel, and the matter having been submitted for decision, and good cause appearing therefor . . .'
It is clear from the above that the court intended a decision on the merits. A reversal by this court, so that the trial court could change its order of dismissal to a decision for respondents, would be an idle act. (Cf. Haley v. L.A. County Flood Control Dist., 172 Cal.App.2d 285, 293, 342 P.2d 476.)
In Essick v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 614, 624, 213 P.2d 492, the court held that the trial court had erred in dismissing a declaratory relief complaint. Instead of reversing it, the court modified the judgment so as to declare that plaintiff was entitled to no relief. Where it is determined that plaintiffs, in a declaratory relief action, are not entitled to a declaration in their favor, the trial court should enter a judgment expressly embodying such determination and not enter a judgment of dismissal. (Supra, at p. 624,
213 P.2d 492.) The Ordinance In Question Did Not Deny Appellants And Others Similarly Situated Due Process Of Law
This action concerns the welfare program commonly referred to as general assistance. The general assistance program is funded solely by county money, and is governed by rules and regulations adopted by the board of supervisors. (Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal.App.3d 771, 95 Cal.Rptr. 61.) The statutory guidelines are contained in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 17000 and 17001. Section 17000 states that: 'Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such persons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private institutions.'
Section 17001 provides: 'The board of supervisors of each county, or the agency authorized by county charter, shall adopt standards of aid and care for the indigent and dependent poor of the county or city and county. . . .'
On December 21, 1971, the Board of Supervisors of Alameda County adopted Ordinance No. 71--109. The relevant portions of the ordinance are set forth in Article 13, which provides as follows 'Article 13.
'AID PAYMENTS
'Section 9--25.0. Payment of Aid. When eligibility has been established, general assistance may be issued in cash on a continuous basis according to established procedure.
'Sec. 9--25.1. Utilization of Grant: Protective and Vendor Payments. Each recipient has a right to manage his own affairs and to decide what use of his money, including the aid payment, will best meet his needs. When a recipient fails to plan and control the expenditures of the General Assistance payments in ways which provide for and protect the well-being of the recipient and/or his family, a protective payment or vendor payment shall be made.
'. . .the
'Sec. 9--25.3. Grants Rounded: Dollars and Cents. Aid payments shall be rounded to the nearer dollar, with amounts of 50 cents or more rounded to the next higher dollar.
'Sec. 9--25.4. Maximum Grant Schedule. The simplified standard for a flat grant payment is determined by adding the verified rent payment, including utilities, or the maximum rent allowed, to the fixed amount for food, clothing, transportation and incidentals. The maximum grant schedule is:
'. . . 2
Appellants attack respondents' system of determining need and computing grants on the basis of households or family groups. Ordinance section 9--25.4 sets out the maximum grant schedule for housekeeping and non-housekeeping persons. The amount of the grant varies with the household size. Section 9--25.7 concerns unrelated persons in the household, and provides that they shall have their grant determined as if they were a family group.
Respondents point out, when dealing with a multi-person household, the main impact of the family group treatment is on the allowance for rent. Instead of doubling the payment for rent, there is only a slight increase. The allowance for 'basic needs' (food, clothing, transportation and incidentals) for a household of two is nearly double over the...
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