Robbins v. Superior Court

• Citation: 38 Cal.3d 199,695 P.2d 695,211 Cal.Rptr. 398
• Decision Date: 04 March 1985
• Docket Number: S.F. 24599
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 695 P.2d 695 Arthur ROBBINS et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Sacramento County, Respondent; COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 398

211 Cal.Rptr. 398

38 Cal.3d 199, 695 P.2d 695

Arthur ROBBINS et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Sacramento County, Respondent COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Real Parties in Interest.

S.F. 24599.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

March 4, 1985.

Melinda R. Bird, Western Center on Law & Poverty, Los Angeles, Katherine Meiss, Eugene T. Morigucni, Northern California Legal Services, Sacramento, for petitioners.

J. Steven Burris, Deputy County Counsel, Sacramento, for real parties in interest.

BIRD, Chief Justice.

Does a county violate Welfare and Institutions Code section 17000 et seq. or the California Constitution when it requires its residents who are single, employable and eligible for general assistance benefits to live in a county facility in lieu of cash benefits?

I.

Petitioners (plaintiffs) are 20 single, employable residents of the County of Sacramento (County) who are eligible for general assistance benefits, ¹ the California Coalition of Welfare Rights Organizations, and the Depression Survival Action Committee. Real parties in interest (defendants) are the County, the County board of supervisors and its members, and the County department of social welfare and its director.

This lawsuit challenges the County's general assistance program which precludes eligible residents who are single and employable from receiving cash grants. Instead, the program offers them "in-kind" benefits--food and shelter at a County-run facility.

Pursuant to its statutory duty, ² the County established a general assistance program for its indigent residents. Until 1982, all eligible County residents received benefits in the form of cash grants, regardless of their marital status or employability.

In August of that year, the County board of supervisors (Board) passed a resolution ³ which enabled the department of social welfare to replace cash grants with "in-kind" benefits for single and employable applicants. ⁴ Effective October 1, 1982, such applicants were given the choice of either residing in the County's Bannon Street emergency shelter or foregoing benefits. ⁵

Although the parties disagree about the living conditions at the Bannon Street facility, ⁶ the basic facts are not in dispute.

The Bannon Street facility houses up to 67 men and women. These residents sleep in dormitories with shared toilet facilities. ⁷ The dormitories are open, with no private rooms, alcoves or dividing walls.

Residents may not enter the facility or the women's dormitory without staff permission. There are scheduled thirty-minute meal periods three times a day and alcoholic beverages are prohibited. Telephone use is limited to a pay phone in the lobby. A "bedcheck" is conducted each night at 9 p.m., and each resident is required to be present at that time. ⁸ No one may leave the facility after bedcheck. ⁹

The original complaint challenging the County's "in-kind" benefits policy was filed in December 1982. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 2, 1983, in which they sought a preliminary injunction. Defendants filed a general demurrer. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs now seek a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter an order granting the request for a preliminary injunction. ¹⁰

Mandamus is issued "to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins...." (Code Civ.Proc., § 1085.) Although mandamus does not generally lie to control the exercise of judicial discretion, the writ will issue "where, under the facts, that discretion can be exercised in only one way." (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 851, 92 Cal.Rptr. 179, 479 P.2d 379; Hurtado v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 574, 579, 114 Cal.Rptr. 106, 522 P.2d 666.) If, on the basis of undisputed facts, it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to issue the preliminary injunction, a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of the injunction is appropriate. (See State Farm etc. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 428, 432, 304 P.2d 13 ["[m]andate lies to control judicial discretion when that discretion has been abused" ]; see, e.g., Pacific Indem. Co. v. Superior Court (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 63, 72, 54 Cal.Rptr. 470 [in which the Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate to compel issuance of the preliminary injunction after the trial court abused its discretion in denying the injunction].)

Mandamus is appropriate "where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law." (Code Civ.Proc., § 1086.) Although the denial of a preliminary injunction is an appealable order (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (f); Brydon v. Hermosa Beach (1928) 93 Cal.App. 615, 620, 270 P. 255), this court necessarily determined that appeal was not an adequate remedy when it issued the alternative writ (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937, 945, 92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669, cert. den., 401 U.S. 1012, 91 S.Ct. 1266, 28 L.Ed.2d 549; County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845, 59 Cal.Rptr. 609, 428 P.2d 593).

II.

The issue before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

Although the trial court has broad discretionary powers to grant or deny a request for a preliminary injunction, it has "no discretion to act capriciously." (Gosney v. State of California (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 921, 924, 89 Cal.Rptr. 390.) It must exercise its discretion "in favor of the party most likely to be injured." (Ibid.; Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers etc. Union (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 499, 510, 199 P.2d 400.) If the denial of an injunction would result in great harm to the plaintiff, and the defendants would suffer little harm if it were granted, then it is an abuse of discretion to fail to grant the preliminary injunction. (Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers etc. Union, supra, 88 Cal.App.2d at p. 510, 199 P.2d 400; Ellis v. American Federation of Labor (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 440, 446, 120 P.2d 79; see also Isert v. Riecks (1925) 195 Cal. 569, 576, 234 P. 371; Gosney, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d at p. 924, 89 Cal.Rptr. 390.)

The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69-70, 196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889; U.S. Hertz, Inc. v. Niobrara Farms (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 68, 79, 116 Cal.Rptr. 44.) " '[By] balancing the respective equities of the parties, [the court] concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.' " (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 528, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 439 P.2d 889; accord IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 70, 196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121.)

There is basic agreement as to the following facts: 1) the Bannon Street facility has a maximum occupancy of 67 residents; and 2) the County provides general assistance benefits to over 4,000 of its residents. ¹¹ It would appear that less than 2 percent of the general assistance program would be affected by the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. Therefore, the potential harm to the program is apparently far less substantial than defendants claim.

However, defendants argue that an order to remove general assistance recipients from the Bannon Street facility would adversely affect both the performance of the County's contract with the Volunteers of America, which operates the facility, and the interests of the Bannon Street residents, who would be forced to find shelter and food elsewhere.

Since plaintiffs do not ask for the closure of the facility, it is unclear why the granting of an injunction would have such extreme consequences. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to "prevent Sacramento County from requiring some of its indigent residents to live in a poorhouse and to require Sacramento County to provide all persons eligible for general assistance with its cash grant aid if they so desire." (Emphasis added.) Thus, plaintiffs are not seeking to close the Bannon Street facility, but merely to make residence a voluntary alternative to cash grants. Defendants fail to show how this injunctive relief would impair the performance of the County's contract or harm the current residents of the facility.

In contrast to the minimal and speculative harms defendants allege, plaintiffs claim that they will suffer substantial and immediate harm by the continued operation of the "in-kind" benefits policy. Absent injunctive relief, plaintiffs will be left with the painful choice either to give up their privacy and their control over fundamental aspects of their lives or to endure the hardship of subsisting without income or general assistance benefits. Either "alternative" will cause plaintiffs great harm.

The decision to live in the regimented Bannon Street facility requires many personal sacrifices. Even if the court were to overlook the psychological impact and physical danger that plaintiffs allege accompany residence at the facility, the loss of control over a wide range of personal decisions cannot be ignored. Residents of the facility no longer decide when or with whom they eat, dress, bathe, and sleep. They have no control over what and when they eat. They are not allowed to decide when and where they will have visitors. ¹² In short, the residents forego the privacy other citizens enjoy.

In addition, uprooting a person from familiar surroundings and placing him in the facility may cause other, more...