Berneau v. Martino

Decision Date29 December 2009
Docket NumberNo. 20090134.,20090134.
Citation2009 UT 87,223 P.3d 1128
PartiesWilliam BERNEAU, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Cameron D. MARTINO aka David M. Cameron; and the Estate of Cameron D. Martino aka David M. Cameron, Defendants and Appellees.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Mark T. Flickinger, Brett R. Boulton, Provo, for plaintiff.

Todd Turnblom, Tajha L. Ferrara, Salt Lake City, for defendants.

INTRODUCTION

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

¶ 1 Appellant and Plaintiff, William Berneau, brought suit against putative Appellees and Defendants, Cameron D. Martino (Decedent) and the Estate of Cameron D. Martino, for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. Shortly after the accident, but before Mr. Berneau filed suit, Mr. Martino died due to causes unrelated to the accident. No probate of Mr. Martino's estate followed, and no personal representative was appointed. Unaware of the death, Mr. Berneau timely filed his suit near the end of the four-year statute of limitations period. The district court dismissed the complaint because no personal representative for the estate had been appointed within three years of Mr. Martino's death as required by Utah Code section 75-3-107.

¶ 2 In this case we are asked whether a plaintiff may directly sue a decedent under the liability insurance exception of Utah Code section 75-3-803(4)(b). We hold that a plaintiff cannot because the Utah Uniform Probate Code requires the appointment of a personal representative. However, we also hold that because of the exceptional circumstances presented and the otherwise unjust result, the equitable discovery rule applies to toll the three-year probate limitations period.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In reviewing a dismissal pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "we assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and we draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Whipple v. Am. Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1219 (Utah 1996).

¶ 4 On September 23, 2003, Mr. Berneau was injured in an automobile accident caused by Mr. Martino. On December 3, 2003, Mr. Martino passed away at age twenty-two due to causes unrelated to the accident. Mr. Berneau did not receive actual or constructive notice of the death. With no probate of Decedent's estate, and without Mr. Berneau's knowledge of the death, no personal representative was appointed within the three years following Mr. Martino's death.

¶ 5 In April 2004, counsel for Mr. Berneau informed Mr. Martino's insurer, State Farm Insurance (State Farm), of his client's intent to bring a claim for personal injuries. Counsel and State Farm engaged in ongoing written and verbal communications; neither was aware of Mr. Martino's death.

¶ 6 Still unaware of the death, Mr. Berneau timely filed his complaint against Mr. Martino on September 14, 2007, near the end of the four-year statute of limitations period prescribed by Utah Code section 78B-2-307. On October 4, 2007, State Farm learned of its insured's death; it subsequently informed Mr. Berneau of the death by letter dated February 4, 2008. Meanwhile, because Mr. Berneau failed to serve Mr. Martino within 120 days as required by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(i), the district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

¶ 7 Mr. Berneau refiled his complaint, this time naming Decedent's estate and Decedent as the defendants. Mr. Berneau did not attempt to appoint a personal representative for Decedent's estate. He did, however, file a motion for alternative service of process on State Farm's registered agent because service on Decedent was "impracticable and, in fact, impossible under the circumstances."

¶ 8 State Farm filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It argued that the complaint was time barred for failure to appoint a personal representative within the three-year period set by Utah Code section 75-3-107. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. Mr. Berneau appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2008).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 The dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted presents a question of law, which we review for correctness. Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County, 2005 UT 73, ¶ 12, 123 P.3d 437. Also, we review the interpretation and application of a statute for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 17, 104 P.3d 1242.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The issue presented on this appeal is whether, despite the failure to appoint a personal representative within the statutory three-year period after a decedent's death as required by Utah Code sections 75-3-104 and -107, a plaintiff can sue a decedent under the liability insurance exception of Utah Code section 75-3-803(4)(b). We consider first whether the plain language of the exception permits suit directly against a decedent. We hold that it does not, given the statutory scheme's requirement of a personal representative, and out of practical necessity. Nonetheless, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to foreclose an action for the sole recovery of liability insurance proceeds. We therefore address whether the equitable discovery rule should toll the three-year limitations period for appointment of a personal representative to permit such an action. We hold that under the limited circumstances present in this case, an equitable tolling of section 75-3-107 is appropriate.

I. THE LIABILITY INSURANCE EXCEPTION OF SECTION 75-3-803(4)(B) DOES NOT PERMIT SUIT AGAINST A DECEDENT

¶ 11 Mr. Berneau argues that the plain language of the liability exception of Utah Code section 75-3-803(4)(b) allows him to sue a dead person. We disagree. Instead, as advocated by counsel for Mr. Martino and his estate, a plain reading does not permit suit against a deceased, but rather should be interpreted in harmony with the statute in which it is found and the related provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

¶ 12 We look first to the plain language of the statutes to determine their meaning and to discern the intent of the legislature. Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, ¶ 7, 162 P.3d 1099; Gohler v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 562 (Utah 1996). We also examine "the purpose of the statute ... and its relation to other statutes." R & R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, ¶ 23, 199 P.3d 917. Provisions within a statute are interpreted "in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and related chapters." State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 667 (internal quotation marks omitted). "We do so because `[a] statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole.'" Sill, 2007 UT 45, ¶ 7, 162 P.3d 1099 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, ¶ 54, 63 P.3d 621). Moreover, we avoid an interpretation that would "embrace a result ... so absurd that it could not have been intended by the legislature." Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 UT 37, ¶ 28, 163 P.3d 615 (citations omitted).

¶ 13 Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Code is a nonclaim statute. It imposes a general time limitation on "[a]ll claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of the decedent." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803(1) (1993). Specifically, the statute limits the time for presentation of such claims to one year after a decedent's death or within a shorter time frame if actual or published notice is given. Id. An exception to this general limitation exists, however. Section 75-3-803(4) states:

"Nothing in this section affects or prevents ... (b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by liability insurance...."

Id. § 75-3-803(4).

¶ 14 Mr. Berneau argues that this liability insurance exception permits him to bring an action directly against Decedent. He focuses on the phrase, "liability of the decedent or the personal representative." Id. (emphasis added). He argues that a plain reading of this disjunctive language demonstrates the intent of the legislature to permit actions directly against a decedent. But such a reading would conflict with statutory construction, disregard the notion of personal jurisdiction, and result in practical difficulties.

¶ 15 Construing the exception in harmony with the other provisions of the section, the purpose of section 75-3-803 is to limit the time in which claims may be presented against a decedent's estate. See Trimble v. Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 939 P.2d 1379, 1380-81 (1997) (construing that an identical liability insurance exception "does not state that a plaintiff can directly sue a decedent, as opposed to his estate, to prove such liability").

¶ 16 The language upon which Mr. Berneau relies merely distinguishes between the separate liability of a decedent and a personal representative, who may of course be sued for wrongdoing. All claims against both must be pursued against the representative. The statutory scheme of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, specifically sections 75-3-104 and -107, clearly provides that all claims must be brought against the personal representative of a decedent's estate. Section 75-3-104 reads, "No proceeding to enforce a claim against the estate of a decedent or his successors may be revived or commenced before the appointment of a personal representative." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-104. As the Editorial Board Comment to section 75-3-104 notes, "Creditors of a decedent are interested persons who may seek the appointment of a personal representative" under section 75-3-301. Id. editorial bd. cmt. Pursuant to section 75-3-107, an...

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