Besl Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission
Decision Date | 18 February 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 75-669,75-669 |
Citation | 341 N.E.2d 835,45 Ohio St.2d 146 |
Parties | , 74 O.O.2d 262 BESL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION of Ohio, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
Where the language of a certificate of public convenience and necessity is ambiguous, the Public Utilities Commission, when interpreting such certificate, may properly consider its history. (Stony's Trucking Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 32 Ohio St.2d 139, 290 N.E.2d 565, approved and followed.)
Appellant, Besl Corporation, is the holder of a certificate of public convenience and necessity, No. 6672-I, which authorizes the transportation of property:
'* * * from and to any point within the state of Ohio, RESTRICTED to the transportation of those articles which by reason of their size or weight require the use of specialized equipment to load, unload, and/or transport.'
Certificate No. 6672-I was originally issued in 1940 to W. P. Townsend and authorized the transportation of property from and to any point within Ohio, restricted to:
'* * * the transportation of extra heavy or special property not transportable in regular equipment but requiring special loading or unloading or hauling equipment.'
In 1955, the certificate was transferred to Specialized Transport, Inc., which, thereafter, began transporting liquid commodities and cement in tank vehicles. In 1957, a complaint was filed by E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., alleging that Specialized Transport was exceeding the scope of its operating authority under the certificate. In its opinion and order of December 31, 1959, the commission found that certificate No. 6672-I was originally issued in 1940 to allow the transportation of such commodities as heavy equipment, shovels, draglines, boilers and other items carried in 'low boy' or 'carry-all' equipment. It concluded that the transportation of liquids and cement in tank trucks was not authorized, and that the certificate should be reissued. On June 3, 1960, the certificate was reissued to Specialized Transport containing the language now found in appellant's certificate.
In December 1961, appellant acquired the certificate in its present form and, at various times during the next ten years, transported iron and steel articles, auto gear frames, and aluminum ingots. On September 15, 1972, the commission issued a citation entry finding Besl in violation of R.C. 4921.07 in that its certificate did not authorize transportation of the above items and, further, that Besl violated Section 7.07 of the commission's rules and regulations by leasing equipment for which the owners thereof had no certificate of liability insurance on file with the commission.
On April 14, 1975, the commission issued its opinion and order which found that the history and circumstances surrounding the issuance of certificate No. 6672-I indicated that the transportation of the articles in question was not authorized under the certificate and that Section 7.07 had been violated. The commission ordered appellant to cease and desist from the transportation of iron and steel articles, auto gear frames, and aluminum ingots and to suspend its operations under the certificate for five days.
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as a matter of right.
Muldoon, Pemberton & Ferris and James W. Muldoon, Columbus, for appellant.
William J. Brown, Atty. Gen., Charles S. Rawlings and Ronald E. Prater, Columbus, for appellee.
The central issue presented is whether the commission erred by considering the history of appellant's certificate in determining if the transportation of iron and steel articles, automobile gear frames and aluminum ingots was authorized thereunder.
This court was presented with a similar situation in Stony's Trucking Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 139, 290 N.E.2d 565. There, in finding that a certificate did not permit the hauling of certain iron and steel articles, the commission examined the history of the certificate. 1 In responding to appellant's contention that the commission should not have examined that history, but instead must make a determination solely from the language of the certificate, the Stony's court stated, at page 142, 290 N.E.2d at 567:
'* * * the failure of appellant's argument lies primarily with the language used in Certificate No. 784-I. Far from being plain and unambiguous, the language in the certificate is so broad and vague as to require reference outside the instrument in order to comprehend its meaning. The phrase 'extra-heavy or special property requiring special loading equipment' cannot possibly be defined from examination of the certificate alone. Definition can only be achieved through examination of the factors leading to the granting of the certificate by the Public Utilities Commission.
Thereupon, the court announced in its syllabus that '(w)here the language of a certificate of public convenience and necessity is ambiguous, the Public Utilities Commission when interpreting such certificate may properly consider its history.'
In the case at bar, the phrase 'articles which by reason of their size and weight require the use of specialized equipment to load, unload, and/or...
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