Best Buy Co., Inc. v. Barrera

• Decision Date: 30 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 13-05-00258-CV.,13-05-00258-CV.
• Citation: 214 S.W.3d 66
• Parties: BEST BUY CO., INC. and Best Buy Stores, L.P., Appellants, v. Velma V. BARRERA, Individually and On Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

214 S.W.3d 66

BEST BUY CO., INC. and Best Buy Stores, L.P., Appellants, v. Velma V. BARRERA, Individually and On Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Appellee.

No. 13-05-00258-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.

November 30, 2006.

Anne M. Lockner, Elliot S. Kaplan, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, Minneapolis, MN, Ben A. Donnell, Donnell & Abernethy, Clay E. Coalson, Donnell, Abernethy & Kieschnick, Corpus Christi, for Appellants.

Todd A. Lewis, Paul M. Weiss, Freed & Weiss, Chicago, IL, Bradley M. Lakin, Thomas L. Lakin, The Lakin Law Firm, Richard J. Burke, Jeffrey A.J. Millar, Wood River, IL, Jerry Guerra, Alberto R. Huerta, David Aaron Huerta, Luis A. Elizondo, The Huerta R. Huerta, Corpus Christi, Vic Feazell, Austin Tighe, Austin, for Appellee.

Before Justices HINOJOSA, YAÑEZ, and RODRIGUEZ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice HINOJOSA.

Appellants, Best Buy Co., Inc. and Best Buy Stores, L.P. (collectively "Best Buy"), bring this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order approving class certification in favor of appellee, Velma V. Barrera, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated. We affirm.

A. BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2003, Barrera purchased a radar detector from Best Buy for $199.99 plus tax. Printed on the back of the receipt was the following language: "A 15% restocking fee will be charged on returns or exchanges of any opened: notebook computer, camcorder, digital camera or radar detector, unless defective." The same notice was posted in the store. Two days later, Barrera decided to return the radar detector. Best Buy accepted the return; however, it charged Barrera the standard fifteen-percent restocking fee. The language appearing on the original receipt was also printed on the back of the receipt signed by Barrera at the time of the return. Best Buy subsequently returned to Barrera a check in the amount of $169.99.

Barrera brought a class-action suit against Best Buy on February 17, 2003, seeking return of the fifteen-percent restocking fee. She asserted causes of action for money had and received/unjust enrichment, or in the alternative, rescission. After a hearing, the trial court certified a class consisting of "All Texas residents who were charged a 15% 'Restocking Fee' when they returned or exchanged an opened notebook computer, camcorder, digital camera, or radar detector." Best Buy appeals the trial court's decision in six issues.

B. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of class certification orders under section 51.014(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon Supp.2006); Cent. Power & Light Co. v. City of San Juan, 962 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).

Class certification is governed by rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.¹ The decision to grant or deny class certification is within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse the trial court's decision unless an abuse of that discretion is evident from the record. Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 439 (Tex.2000); Gen. Motors v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Tex.1996); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex.1985); Nissan Motor Co. v. Fry, 27 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied). However, unlike typical abuse of discretion review, when reviewing the grant or denial of class certification, we do not indulge every presumption in favor of the trial court's ruling. Henry Schein v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 691 (Tex.2002) (citing Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435). While some of the trial court's determinations, such as those based on assessment of the credibility of witnesses, "must be given the benefit of the doubt," Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691, "actual, not presumed, conformance with [rule 42] remains . . . indispensable." Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435. There is no inherent right to proceed as a class action. Id. at 439; Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. v. Turner, 131 S.W.3d 576, 584 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Therefore, compliance with rule 42 must be demonstrated, Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d at 691; Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435, and we do not err in favor of certification. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 434-35; Turner, 131 S.W.3d at 585.

Rule 42 provides that:

all class actions must satisfy four threshold requirements: (1) numerosity ("the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable"); (2) commonality ("there are questions of law or fact common to the class"); (3) typicality ("the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class"); and (4) adequacy of representation ("the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class").

Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433 (quoting TEX.R. CIV. P. 42(a)). In addition, the class action must be maintainable under one of the categories outlined in subdivision (b). See id. (citing TEX.R. CIV. P. 42(b)). In this case, appellee asserts that the class action complies with subsection (b)(3), which requires that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." TEX.R. CIV. P. 42(b)(3).

Best Buy contends the trial court erred in certifying the class because (1) the predominance requirement is not met, (2) the trial court failed to perform the required "rigorous analysis," (3) the class action is not a superior method of adjudication, (4) the commonality requirement is not met, (5) Barrera's claims are not typical of those of her class, and (6) Barrera is not an adequate class representative.

C. PREDOMINANCE

The predominance requirement, see TEX.R. CIV. P. 42(b)(3), is one of the most stringent prerequisites to class certification and is intended to "[prevent] class action litigation when the sheer complexity and diversity of individual issues would overwhelm or confuse a jury or severely compromise a party's ability to present viable claims or defenses." Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433-34. In deciding whether common issues predominate, courts identify the substantive issues of the case that will control the outcome of the litigation, assess which issues will predominate, and determine if the predominating issues are those common to the class. Id. at 434. "The test for predominance is not whether common issues outnumber uncommon issues but . . . `whether common or individual issues will be the object of most of the efforts of the litigants.'" Id. (quoting Cent. Power & Light Co., 962 S.W.2d at 610). Ideally, a judgment in favor of the named plaintiffs should decisively settle the entire controversy, and all that should remain is for class members to file proof of their claims. Id. However, if after resolution of the common issues, individual issues remain that will be overwhelming or unmanageable for a single jury, then common issues do not predominate and proceeding as a class action is inappropriate. Id.

In its first issue, Best Buy asserts that Barrera has not met the predominance requirement because the claims asserted and the defenses raised by Best Buy require individualized determinations. Central to Best Buy's argument on this issue is the assertion that Barrera has made claims of unjust enrichment and rescission. However, contrary to this assertion, the primary cause of action presented by appellee's current petition is that of money had and received, not unjust enrichment.

The doctrine of unjust enrichment does not present an independent cause of action but rather "belongs to the measure of damages known as quasi-contract or restitution," the purpose of which is "to place an aggrieved plaintiff in the position he occupied prior to his dealings with the defendant." Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 925 S.W.2d 92, 96-97 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996), aff'd by Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., 966 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.1998); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Smith, 946 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no writ). Unjust enrichment "applies the principles of restitution to disputes which for one reason or another are not governed by a contract between the contending parties." Amoco Prod. Co., 946 S.W.2d at 164. When a defendant has been unjustly enriched by the receipt of benefits in a manner not governed by contract, such as circumstances involving fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage, the law implies a contractual obligation upon the defendant to restore the benefits to the plaintiff. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 925 S.W.2d at 97 (citing Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex.1992)); Barrett v. Ferrell, 550 S.W.2d 138, 143 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

An action for money had and received arises when a party obtains money which in equity and good conscience belongs to another. Amoco Prod. Co., 946 S.W.2d at 164 (citing Austin v. Duval, 735 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987 writ denied)); Staats v. Miller, 150 Tex. 581, 243 S.W.2d 686, 687 (1951); see also J.C. Penney Co. v. Pitts, 139 S.W.3d 455, 458 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. filed). Unlike unjust enrichment, an action for money had and received is not premised on wrongdoing, "but looks only to the justice of the case and inquires whether the defendant has received money which rightfully belongs to another." Amoco Prod. Co., 946 S.W.2d at 164. It is essentially an equitable doctrine applied to prevent unjust enrichment. See Pitts, 139 S.W.3d at 458 n. 4; Hunt v. Baldwin, 68 S.W.3d 117, 132 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Thus, while a claim for money had and received is conceptually related to the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the two claims are not synonymous. See Amoco Prod. Co., 946 S.W.2d at 164 (citing ...