Betyar v. Pierce
Decision Date | 15 November 1988 |
Docket Number | No. D006582,D006582 |
Citation | 205 Cal.App.3d 1250,252 Cal.Rptr. 907 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Bela Jeanrene BETYAR, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Del PIERCE, Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendant and Appellant. |
Richard L. Wehmeyer, Temecula, for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) revoked plaintiff Bela Betyar's driver's license for two years under the implied consent law (Veh.Code, § 13353) 1 because of his refusal or failure to complete a blood alcohol test when requested to do so by a peace officer. Betyar successfully petitioned the superior court for a peremptory writ of mandate directing the DMV to vacate its revocation. This appeal ensued.
The principal issue is whether a factual finding in the underlying criminal proceeding that Betyar "did take and complete a chemical test" following his drunk driving arrest collaterally estopped the DMV from later revoking his license. We conclude collateral estoppel does not apply where, as here, the parties' factual stipulation concerning the blood alcohol tests was not necessary to the judgment of conviction following Betyar's negotiated plea of guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and direct the court to vacate its judgment granting the peremptory writ of mandate and awarding Betyar attorney's fees and costs.
Betyar was arrested by Highway Patrol Officer Mark Nickelson for driving under the influence on July 14, 1986. Nickelson advised Betyar of the requirements of the implied consent law, including the fact his license would be revoked for two years if he had a similar conviction within the last five years. Betyar agreed to submit to a urine test. Unable to provide a second urine sample within the required test period, Betyar next agreed to take a breath test.
Officer Nickelson explained the procedures for administration of the breath test and that the samples had to be within 2% of each other. Betyar blew into the breath analyzer but failed to keep the yellow light on continuously, as required for a good sample. Nickelson testified he recorded three samples with readings of .26, .23 and .20. Betyar said he gave four breath samples for which readings of .29, .26, .23 and .20 were obtained. Because the samples were not within the spread required by law, Nickelson asked Betyar to give a fifth sample. Betyar refused. Officer Nickelson again advised Betyar of the requirements of the implied consent law, but Betyar continued to refuse to blow into the breath analyzer and refused to take a blood test. He was not offered another opportunity to complete the urine test.
Betyar was charged with driving while under the influence in violation of section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b). The charge was enhanced by an allegation he refused to submit to or complete a blood alcohol test pursuant to sections 23157 and 23159.
Betyar pleaded guilty to driving under the influence. As part of the negotiated plea the district attorney and defense counsel stipulated that the court make "a factual finding under a motion brought pursuant to PC 1538.5 that the defendant did take and complete a chemical test." The court then dismissed the enhancement allegation. The court granted Betyar probation.
Officer Nickelson submitted an "officer's statement" to the DMV pursuant to section 13353 and both he and Betyar testified at the subsequent formal hearing regarding license revocation. The DMV rejected Betyar's argument that it was collaterally estopped from making an adverse finding regarding his refusal to take a chemical test and revoked Betyar's license for two years. 2
In his petition for peremptory writ of mandate Betyar argued the revocation was invalid because he had not been properly advised of his testing obligations under section 13353, the DMV was bound by the prior judicial determination that he had completed a chemical test, and the DMV lacked statutory authority to revoke his license for two years. The question of whether Betyar was properly advised of the implied consent law is not an issue in this appeal.
Under the implied consent law, any person who drives a motor vehicle is deemed to have given his or her consent to chemical testing to determine the alcohol or drug content of the blood if lawfully arrested for driving under the influence or alcohol, drugs, or both. If a person refuses to submit to or fails to complete the required testing, the DMV must suspend or revoke that person's driving privilege. ( § 13353.) The DMV correctly asserts the court erred in ruling the DMV was collaterally estopped from finding Betyar had refused or failed to complete the blood alcohol testing.
Collateral estoppel precludes a party to an action from relitigating in a second proceeding matters litigated and determined in a prior proceeding. (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 477, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321.) Traditionally, courts have found collateral estoppel a bar to relitigation of an issue decided at an earlier hearing "if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding] is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous [proceeding] resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and if (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the prior [proceeding]." (People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal.3d 686, 691, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622.) The absence of any one of the foregoing precludes the application of collateral estoppel. The only requirement which has been fully satisfied here is that the previous proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits. While we are concerned with the question of privity (see conc. opn. of Woodworth, J.), we limit our discussion to the first requirement.
Initially we wish to stress that not only must the issue " 'necessarily decided at the previous [proceeding be] identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated,' " but that issue must have been actually litigated in the earlier proceeding. (People v. Sims, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 484, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321, citing People v. Taylor, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 691, 117 Cal.Rptr. 70, 527 P.2d 622.) An issue is actually litigated only when it is raised by the pleadings and factually resolved either by proof or failure of proof. (Ibid.) Here the issue of Betyar taking and completing a chemical test was not resolved in this manner in his criminal case. Accordingly, collateral estoppel is inapplicable. Other cases have held similarly.
The parties also disagree on the version of section 13353 in effect at the time of Betyar's arrest on July 14, 1986, and whether the DMV was required to revoke his license for one or two years. The confusion is created by a series of amendments to section 13353, one of which included a typographical error.
Effective January 1, 1985, the relevant portion of section 13353 provided:
"(b) If any person refuses the officer's request to submit to, or fails to complete, a chemical test or tests, upon receipt of the officer's sworn statement that the officer had reasonable cause to believe the person had been driving a motor vehicle in violation of Section 23152 or 23153 and that the person had refused to submit to, or did not complete, the test or tests after being requested by the officer, the department shall ... (2) suspend the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of one year if the person has previously been convicted of a violation of Section 23152, 23153, or 23103 as specified in Section 23103.5 within five years of the date of the refusal, ..." ( § 13353, subd. (b), as amended Stats.1984, ch. 326, § 1, [205 Cal.App.3d 1256] pp. 1589-1590; emphasis supplied.)
Section 13353 was amended twice during 1985, once by the Assembly and once by the Senate. Assembly Bill No. 331, the LaFollette-Katz Chemical Enhancement Act (Stats.1985, ch. 735, § 2, p. 447) renumbered and made other minor changes to the subsection at issue here, but left unchanged the existing provision for a one-year license suspension for drivers with previous...
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