Bevill, In re
| Decision Date | 08 July 1968 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 11009 |
| Citation | 68 Cal.2d 854,442 P.2d 679,69 Cal.Rptr. 599 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 442 P.2d 679 In re Guy Earl BEVILL on Habeas Corpus. |
Guy Earl Bevill, in pro. per.
Gerald Z. Marer, San Francisco, under appointment by Supreme Court, and Long & Levit, San Francisco, for petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., Albert W. Harris, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward P. O'Brien and Derald E. Granberg, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.
Petitioner Guy Earl Bevill, confined in the California State Prison at San Quentin for an indeterminate period as a mentally disordered sex offender, filed in propria persona a petition for habeas corpus attacking the validity of his imprisonment on the ground that he was convicted under an unconstitutional statute. We issued an order to show cause and appointed counsel. We have concluded that the writ must be granted and the prisoner ordered discharged from custody.
On September 17, 1961, in Glendale, California, petitioner was arrested for engaging in an act of masturbation in the presence of two children. He was charged with a violation of section 650 1/2 of the Penal Code, 1 pled not guilty, and waived jury trial. The court found him guilty, adjourned the criminal proceedings without imposing sentence, and certified him to the superior court for hearing and examination to determine whether he was a mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of former section 5500 (now 6300) 2 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. At a hearing on November 20, 1961, the superior court found petitioner to be a mentally disordered sex offender and ordered him sent to the Atascadero State Hospital for a period of observation not to exceed 90 days. On February 7, 1962, the superintendent of the hospital advised the court that petitioner was a mentally disordered sex offender, could benefit from treatment in a state hospital, and should be committed to the Department of Mental Hygiene for placement in Atascadero State Hospital for an indeterminate period. By ex parte order of February 13, the superior court committed petitioner to the Department of Mental Hygiene. Petitioner neither moved for a new trial nor appealed from the order of commitment.
After two years, petitioner was returned to the committing court. The superintendent of the hospital reported that petitioner would not benefit from further treatment but remained a danger to society, and recommended that he be recommitted to the Department of Mental Hygiene and sent to the California Institution for Men at Chino for an indeterminate period. Petitioner did not appeal from the order of recommitment. On June 10, 1966, he was transferred to the state prison at San Quentin.
The previously unexplored question presented by this petition is whether a person confined as a mentally disordered sex offender may challenge the validity of his criminal conviction on habeas Conviction of a crime is prerequisite to commitment as a mentally disordered sex offender. (In re Stoneham, 232 Cal.App.2d 337, 340--341, 42 Cal.Rptr. 741.) But proceedings for commitment are civil in nature and are collateral to the criminal proceedings. (Gross v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.2d 816, 820, 270 P.2d 1025.) A person committed as a mentally disordered sex offender is not confined for the criminal offense but because of his status as a mentally disordered sex offender. (People v. Rancier, 240 Cal.App.2d 579, 584--585, 49 Cal.Rptr. 876; In re Keddy, 105 Cal.App.2d 215, 217, 233 P.2d 159.) The confinement is pursuant to a law the primary purpose of which is protection of society. (People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336, 346, 246 P.2d 913; People v. Levy, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 468, 311 P.2d 897.) While a person is under such commitment, the criminal case against him is suspended. When the proceedings relating to commitment as a mentally disordered sex offender have run their course, the criminal case may be resumed and sentence imposed. (People v. De La Roi, 185 Cal.App.2d 469, 472, 8 Cal.Rptr. 260.) Habeas corpus is appropriate to challenge the validity of a person's commitment or continued confinement as a mentally disordered sex offender. (People v. Harvath, 251 A.C.A. 911, 912, 60 Cal.Rptr. 15; In re Stoneham, supra, 232 Cal.App.2d 337, 42 Cal.Rptr. 741.) And appeal will lie from an order denying a new trial despite the fact that neither judgment nor sentence have been entered because of the pendency of commitment proceedings. (Thurmond v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 17, 23, 314 P.2d 6; People v. Moody, 216 Cal.App.2d 250, 251, 30 Cal.Rptr. 785.)
In brief, because petitioner's confinement is pursuant to an independent judicial determination had in civil proceedings collateral to his criminal conviction, there arises the question whether issues relating to his conviction are presently cognizable on habeas corpus or whether they must await petitioner's return to the criminal court and his sentencing on the conviction. If, as we have concluded, the validity of a commitment as a mentally disordered sex offender is affected by the validity of the prerequisite criminal conviction, then issues pertaining to the conviction insofar as they test the legality of present confinement are clearly cognizable on habeas corpus. But even if the conviction and subsequent commitment were of discrete efficacy, the conviction could be attacked on habeas corpus although though a release from custody could not be thereby accomplished. 3
The question whether a person committed as a mentally disordered sex offender is entitled to release because of the invalidity of his conviction has been answered in the negative by one federal court. In Wilson v. Blabon (9th Cir. 1967) 370 F.2d 997, the petitioner sought habeas corpus to obtain discharge from his commitment on the ground that his misdemeanor conviction was invalid. The court held that a constitutionally invalid conviction is a sufficient conviction for purposes of commitment, relying on Thurmond v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal.2d 17, 314 P.2d 6, and In re Morehead, 107 Cal.App.2d 346, 237 P.2d 335. Neither case dealt with whether the commitment would be invalidated if the conviction were invalidated. Accordingly, we decline to follow Wilson.
In a number of states sexual psychopathy proceedings may be instituted against a person who has been merely charged with a crime. 4 This situation pertained in California prior to 1949 when section 5501 (6302) of the Welfare and Institutions Code provided that proceedings for commitment could be commenced 'when any person is charged with a crime, either before or after adjudication of the charge.' (Stats.1939, ch. 447, § 1, p. 1783.) In 1949 the statute was recast to allow commitment 'after adjudication of the charge' (Stats.1949, ch. 1325, § 1, p. 2311), in 1950 to allow commitment 'when a person is convicted of a criminal offense' (Stats. Ist. Ex.Sess. 1950, ch. 7, § 1, p. 439), and in 1951 to allow commitment 'when a person is convicted of any criminal offense' (Stats.1951, ch. 1759, § 1, p. 4186). The Legislature, by requiring a conviction prior to commitment, intended to create a more solid safeguard to liberty. An invalid conviction does not fulfill that legislative goal.
The mentally disordered sex offender is not legally insane (In re Keddy, supra, 105 Cal.App.2d 215, 218, 233 P.2d 159); he is not even necessarily a 'sex offender' because the crime of which he is convicted need not be a sex offense (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5501 (6302)); he is 'any person who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is Predisposed to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health and safety of others.' (Welf. § Inst. Code, § 5500 (6300) (emphasis added).) Many individuals who satisfy the definition of 'mentally disordered sex offender' would be subject to civil commitment to a mental institution under other provisions of the law, 5 but is is not clear that all would be. The primary purpose of quarantining mentally disordered sex offenders is protection of the public, and the Legislature has ordained that that group of persons from whom the public must be protected is to be identified by, inter alia, the fact of conviction for the perpetration of a criminal act. (See People v. Levy, supra, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 463--467, 311 P.2d 897.) The mentally disordered sex offender faces the imposition of substantial legal disabilities; 6 unlike other mental patients, he faces the imposition of special criminal sanctions other than for his conviction; 7 and should the rehabilitative ideal fail of fruition, he faces life imprisonment in a penal institution. Imposition of these conditions on the innocent as well as the guilty does not serve to protect the public. Important in this regard is the fact that persons sentenced to death and persons ineligible for probation are exempted from the operation of the statute. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5500.5 (6301).) If the convictions are valid society will be protected under the sentences imposed; if the convictions are invalid the statute provides no basis to commit even those accused of the most socially dangerous conduct. (Cf. People v. McCracken, supra, 39 Cal.2d 336, 346, 246 P.2d 913.)
The structure of the statute itself manifests the integral and continuing relation foreseen to exist between commitment and conviction. The criminal proceedings are 'adjourned' when commitment proceedings commence. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5501 (6302).) If the subject is immediately determined not to be a mentally disordered sex offender, criminal proceedings are resumed. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5511.7 (6315).) If the subject is tentatively determined to be a mentally disordered sex offender, he is committed for 90 days and then returned to court. Upon his return, he is either finally committed or sentenced. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5512 (6316).) If he is committed, the...
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