People v. Rancier

• Decision Date: 04 March 1966
• Citation: 240 Cal.App.2d 579,49 Cal.Rptr. 876
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard RANCIER, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 11243.

Page 876

49 Cal.Rptr. 876

240 Cal.App.2d 579

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Richard RANCIER, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 11243.

District Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

March 4, 1966.

James T. Ford, Sacramento, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., by Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael Buzzell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sacramento, for respondent.

REGAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the superior court committing appellant to the Department of Mental Hygiene as a mentally disordered sex offender and directing his place of commitment to be the Reception and Guidance Center, California Medical Facility, Vacaville, California.

In compliance with section 5512 of the Welfare and Institutions Code ¹, appellant was ordered confined until no longer a danger to the health and safety of others. He was delivered to Vacaville as ordered and subsequently transferred to the California Men's Colony, East Facility at Los Padres, in accordance with section 5518 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. ² Appellant attacks the constitutionality of the code sections under which he stands committed, alleging the confinement is cruel and unusual, penal in nature, and violative of the due process clause of the California Constitution. Appellant further contends that the provisions of the statute relating to recommitment are vague and uncertain, and that the enforcement of these provisions are perforce, arbitrary, and unreasonable.

We have concluded appellant's contentions in this respect are not well taken and the order of the trial court should be affirmed.

Appellant was charged with a violation of Penal Code, section 647a(1), a misdemeanor, to which charge he pleaded guilty, and having been found by the court to be a mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of Section 5500 of the Welfare and Institutions Code was placed in Atascadero State Hospital for observation and treatment. Sixty days later the superintendent and medical director having reported to the court that appellant could benefit by treatment the court ordered appellant committed to Atascadero for such treatment.

Approximately one year later, pursuant to the provisions of section 5517(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the Superintendent and Medical Director of Atascadero reported to the court that appellant had reached maximum hospital benefit and that he was not amenable to treatment in the hospital setting and remained a danger to society. Whereupon the court ordered appellant's return, a hearing was held pursuant to section 5512 et seq., and appellant's recommitment followed.

Sexual psychopathy proceedings are not criminal actions but special proceedings of a civil nature. (People v. Gross, 44 Cal.2d 859, 860, 285 P.2d 630.) In People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336, 346, 246 P.2d 913, it was pointed out that the primary purpose of the enactment by the Legislature of the sexual psychopathy statutes was to protect society against the activities of sexual psychopaths. The court said (at page 346 246 P.2d at page 918): '* * * [T]he sexual psychopath may be removed from society under the sexual psychopath law until he is cured or until he is no longer considered a menace to the safety of others. The court may thereafter resume the criminal proceeding and impose the punishment allowed by law since the confinement as a sexual psychopath is not a substitute for punishment, the entire statutory procedure being civil in nature rather than penal.' (See also People v. Levy, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 464, 311 P.2d 897.)

Appellant's principal contention is that in his case his confinement is punishment and that because he is not amenable to treatment one of the purposes of the statutes, to wit, the cure of the sexual psychopath cannot be carried out and as to him the statutes are arbitary and unreasonable; that further, as to him, his commitment is akin to life imprisonment without possibility of parole which is cruel and unusual punishment in view of the fact that penal sanctions attached to his criminal conviction are limited to a jail sentence of six months in the county jail. This court does not accept appellant's interpretation.

The individual declared to be a sexual psychopath and declared not amenable to treatment, may, pursuant to section 5519 and at subsequent intervals of not less than six months, be returned to the court for hearing and recommendation for his future care, supervision or treatment. This procedure may continue until the individual is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others. We cannot say on the record before us that appellant has been or in the future will be denied treatment. In People v. Levy, supra, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 468, 311 P.2d 897, the court said:

'The last contention of appellant is closely connected with the points already discussed. It is that the statutory procedure which permits a person convicted of a misdemeanor to be transferred from court to court, and from hospital to court to hospital to court as was appellant, is arbitrary and unreasonable, particularly when such procedure culminates in an indeterminate commitment to San Quentin. This argument is based on a misconception of the purposes of the statute. The main purpose of the Act is to protect society against the activities of sexual psychopaths. The secondary purpose is to rehabilitate the sexual psychopath. See People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336, 246 P.2d 913; People v. Hector, 104 Cal.App.2d 392, 231 P.2d 916. In people v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d at page 346, 246 P.2d at page 918, the Supreme Court properly pointed out that 'the sexual psychopath may be removed from society under the sexual psychopath law until he is cured or until he is no longer considered a menace to the safety of others.' Thus, the place of commitment and the possibility of criminal punishment on the misdemeanor charge does not affect the validity of the objectives of the Act, which are admittedly proper.

'The emphasis that appellant places on the fact that he was originally convicted of a misdemeanor, and now finds himself in San Quentin, possibly for life, is misplaced. This argument would be sound only were his confinement punishment. As we have already seen, the purpose of the confinement is to protect society and to try and cure the accused.'

Appellant's contention that 'the statute is void for uncertainty' is also without merit as the courts have already decided. We find in Levy the following holding of the court, 151 Cal.App.2d at page 465, 311 P.2d at page 901:

'Before the statute can be properly interpreted its purpose and intent must be ascertained. In People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336, 345, 246 P.2d 913, 918, the Supreme Court stated: 'The sexual psychopath law was passed by the Legislature because experience had shown that persons who came within the classification of sexual psychopaths were unable to benefit from ordinary penal confinement and were in need of medical treatment. * * * The Legislature therefore gave the courts power to commit a person determined to be a sexual psychopath to a medical facility for an indeterminate period of time until the person had been cured or was unable to benefit from further treatment * * *.

* * *

* * *

'The United States Supreme Court in State of Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744, has already passed on the constitutional questions here involved. There the Minnesota statute defined (309 U.S. at p. 272, 60 S.Ct. at p. 525) 'psychopathic personality' as 'the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.'

'The state court construed this provision as including (309 U.S. at page 273, 60 S.Ct. at page 525) 'those persons who, by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire. It would not be reasonable to apply the provisions of the statute to every person guilty of sexual misconduct nor even to persons having strong sexual propensities. Such a definition would not only make the act impracticable of enforcement and, perhaps, unconstitutional in its application, but would also be an unwarranted departure from the accepted meaning of the words defined.'

'The Supreme Court...