Biddeford Nat. Bank v. Hill

• Decision Date: 24 January 1907
• Citation: 66 A. 721,102 Me. 346
• Parties: BIDDEFORD NAT. BANK v. HILL et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

66 A. 721

102 Me. 346

BIDDEFORD NAT. BANK

v. HILL et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Jan. 24, 1907.

Action by the Biddeford National Bank against Etta O. Hill and others. Verdict for defendant, and plaintiff moved for a new trial. Motion overruled.

Argued before WHITEHOUSE, STROUT, SAVAGE, PEABODY, and SPEAR, JJ.

Anthony Dwyer, for plaintiff. B. P. Hamilton and Cleaves, Waterhouse & Emery, for defendant Etta O. Hill.

SPEAR, J. This is an action of assumpsit upon a promissory note for $344.44, dated July 5, 1905, purporting to be signed by Etta O. Hill and D. O'Connor & Co. The undisputed facts show that Etta O. Hill at some time previous to the date of the note had sold and delivered to D. O'Connor & Co. a quantity of pressed hay, the consideration for which amounted to $344.44. Early in the morning of the date of the note she called upon O'Connor & Co., meeting D. O'Connor himself, for the purpose of obtaining a settlement for the hay. When the object of her call was made known to Mr. O'Connor, he informed her that he desired to settle for the hay by giving her the promissory note of the company for the amount due. This she peremptorily declined, upon the ground that, being left in entire charge of her father's farm, it would be necessary for her to make use of money at once in harvesting the hay upon the farm. Thereupon Mr. O'Connor wrote her a check for $344.44, the delivery of which she took from him and started to leave his place of business, when he called her back, requesting her to sign a receipt for the mony received for the hay. She returned to his desk, where a receipt for $344.44, all written out, was lying for her signature. Mr. O'Connor stepped along, placed his finger upon the paper, and directed her where to sign. She signed the receipt as requested. It proved, however, that, instead of signing the receipt as she supposed she was doing, she was deceived and tricked by O'Connor into affixing her signature either to a blank with the note in question aterwards written upon it, or upon a blank already filled in with the contents of the note. It is evident from the history of this transaction that the contract manifested by the note in suit was not the contract of the defendant Etta O. Hill. This proposition is too obvious and too well settled to require citation. If the note was not her contract, was she so negligent in placing her name upon the paper upon which the note appears, when she thought she was signing a receipt, that she is estopped from denying her act under the just and well-settled rule that of two innocent parties he whose negligence has occasioned the loss must bear it?

No exceptions were taken either to the ruling of the charge of the presiding justice in presenting the case to the jury, and it is therefore presumed that every element of law in the case was properly given. It therefore follows that the question of negligence imputable to Etta O. Hill in signing the note purporting to be a receipt was properly submitted to the jury as a question of fact, and their verdict shows that they found this issue in favor of the defendant. The verdict must stand. We are of opinion that it was not only not erroneous, but fairly deducible from the undisputed facts.

This brings us to the proposition of law whether, in the absence of any negligence on the part of Etta O. Hill in affixing her signature to the note, she thereby became liable for its payment. The bank was undoubtedly an innocent holder of the note for value, but, in view of the fact that Etta O. Hill was fraudulently induced to sign the note without laches on her part, makes the note, not only her contract, but a forgery with respect to her signature.

It is contended, however, that the fact that her signature is genuine relieves the note from the character of a forged paper, and instead renders it a paper obtained by fraud and deceit.

But that a paper, obtained like the note in question, partakes of the character of a forged instrument, has long been the doctrine of the law in this and many other states.

State v. Shurtliff, 18 Me. 368, decided in 1841, is a case wherein the grantee agreed with the grantor to purchase an acre of his farm and prepared the draft of a deed correctly describing the land agreed to be conveyed, and exhibited it to the grantor, who examined it and found it to be correct, but the execution of it was delayed and the draft was retained by the grantee. The grantee afterwards fraudulently prepared the draft of another deed, describing the grantor's whole farm, and presented it to the grantor for his signature as the deed before examined, and it was executed and delivered, but the court held this to be a forgery. In the opinion the court say: "Forgery has been defined to be a false making, a making malo animo, of any written instrument for the purpose of fraud and deceit. 2 Russell, 317, and the authorities there cited. The evidence fully justifies the conclusion that the defendant falsely made and prepared the instrument set forth in the indictment, with the evil design of defrauding the party whose deed it purports to be. It is not necessary that ...