Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 990484.
| Decision Date | 28 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 990484.,990484. |
| Citation | 993 P.2d 875,1999 UT 110 |
| Parties | Clarence H. BIDDLE, Paul G. Biddle, David E. Christensen, Jess Decaria, Orville L. Greathouse, Lola Morgan, and Harold E. Scott, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. WASHINGTON TERRACE CITY, a Utah municipality, Richard E. Jackson, David Berg, Paula Hensley, Marian Jensen, and Robert Tucker, Defendants and Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Brad C. Smith, Ogden, for plaintiffs.
Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City, and Stephen F. Noel, Ogden, for defendants.
¶ 1 The plaintiffs below, (collectively "Biddles"), appeal a decision upholding the validity of Washington City Terrace Ordinance 4-98 as an appropriate procedure to implement a voter-approved change of municipal government. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 2 The citizens of Washington Terrace City voted on November 3, 1998, to abandon their traditional form of government and to adopt an optional council-mayor form of government pursuant to the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act, sections 10-3-1201 et seq. of the Utah Code ("Optional Forms Act"). An initiative petition had been circulated prior to the election stating that "[t]he mayor and two (2) at large city council members elected at the 1997 municipal elections shall not be required to stand again for election until the regular 2001 municipal elections, and shall retain their positions in the Mayor-Council optional form of government." The final sentence of the initiative petition contained a "voter beware" clause indicating that "[t]he invalidation of any clause or provision herein shall not invalidate any other clause or provision herein." Having obtained the requisite number of registered-voter signatures, a proposition was placed on the November 3, 1998 general election ballot by a vote of the Washington Terrace City Council on June 18, 1998.
¶ 3 Counsel for Biddles prepared an Order for Form of Ballot Title and presented it to this court. On September 1, 1998, this court filed an Order that set forth the Ballot Title containing the language of the proposition:
¶ 4 After voter approval of the proposition, the City Council enacted Ordinance 4-98, entitled the Government Transition Procedures Ordinance ("Ordinance"), in order to implement the electorally-approved change in government. The Ordinance outlined transition procedures to the new council-mayor optional form of government that would take effect, pursuant to section 10-3-1208 of the Utah Code, on January 3, 2000. While the Ordinance allowed current council members to serve out their unexpired terms in the new government, it precluded the current mayor from continuing in office as mayor, unless he ran and was elected as such in an election under the new government. The Ordinance provisions contained the following:
¶ 5 Biddles filed suit in the trial court seeking a declaration that the mayor of Washington Terrace City not be required to run for election for the new office of mayor. Relying on the initiative petition, which expressly called for Mayor Richard Jackson to continue as mayor in the new government, Biddles sought assurance that the mayor could choose to serve out the remainder of his current term.
¶ 6 Cross-motions for partial summary judgment were filed in the trial court to determine whether the Ordinance was consistent with state statute in requiring Mayor Jackson to run for election for the new office of mayor under the new government. The City argued that the issue was one of statutory construction, requiring the reconciliation of the Ordinance with the Optional Forms Act. Arguing that the language of the initiative petition constituted the controlling law, Biddles requested that the trial court find that the Ordinance was invalid to the extent that it was inconsistent with the terms of the initiative petition.
¶ 7 The trial court granted the City's motion for partial summary judgment, finding it proper to reconcile the initiative petition with the Optional Forms Act, rather than with the Ordinance, and finding that the Ordinance was consistent with the Optional Forms Act. Pursuant to a joint stipulation and motions by the parties, the trial court dismissed the remainder of Biddles' claims, after which Biddles initiated this appeal.
¶ 8 The issue before this court is whether the trial court correctly concluded that the Ordinance properly implemented the optional council-mayor form of government under the terms of the Optional Forms Act. Because this is a question of statutory interpretation, we review the trial court's judgment for correctness. See MacKay v. Hardy, 896 P.2d 626, 630-31 (Utah 1995)
; Durham v. Duchesne County, 893 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1995); State v. Lowder, 889 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1994).
¶ 9 In Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978), this court examined the history of municipal government in Utah and the context within which the Optional Forms Act emerged. A review of that history, as set forth in Martindale, is helpful for present purposes.
¶ 10 The Utah Constitution expressly invests the legislature with power to create municipalities within its borders. See id. at 1024 (citing Utah Const. art. XI, § 5). All municipal powers derive from the legislature, and the legislature has traditionally invested both legislative and executive power in a solitary governing body varying in name, depending upon the population classification of the municipality. See id. (citations omitted). Where a single body exercises all governing power, it has been described as "government by committee." Id. Mayors or managers under this system have no significant powers independent from the council and are viewed as merely titular heads of municipal government. See id.
¶ 11 In 1959, the legislature departed from this unitary approach by enacting the Strong Mayor Form of Government Act ("Act") which gave first and second class cities the option of a significantly different form of government than the "government by committee" approach. See id. The major difference in the strong mayor form is a formal separation of powers: the executive power resides with the mayor and the legislative powers with the council. See id. The legislative intent of the Act was to provide an optional form of government based upon state and federal models. See id.
¶ 12 The Act was repealed in 1975 and replaced with provisions (the "1975 Act") substantially similar to the current Optional Forms Act at issue in this appeal. See id. at 1025. The 1975 Act made available to all cities, regardless of population classification, two additional options: the council-manager and the council-mayor forms of municipal government. See id. In 1977, the legislature repealed and recodified the 1975 Act. See id. at 1026. Under the recodified act, the legislature clarified its intent to distinguish the traditional system — where power is vested solely in a single governing body — from the new council-mayor system — where the vested power is shared by the mayor and the council. See id. It stated the distinction as follows:
Each municipality shall have a governing body which shall exercise the legislative and executive powers of the municipality unless the municipality is organized with separate executive and legislative branches of government.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-101 (1977) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the recodification emphasized the legislature's intent to clearly separate executive and legislative powers:
The optional form of government known as the council-mayor form vests the government of a municipality which adopts this form in two separate, independent, and equal branches of municipal government; the executive branch consisting of a mayor and the administrative departments and officers; and the legislative branch consisting of a municipal council.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1209 (1977).
¶ 13 Thus, the express legislative intent behind the council-mayor form of government was to allow for a form of government substantially different from the traditional form of government.
¶ 14 When interpreting a statute, it is axiomatic that this court's primary goal "is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve." Evans v. Utah, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted). In circumstances like those in this case, where the operation of two...
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