Big Oak Flat-Groveland Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court of Tuolumne Cnty.

• Decision Date: 22 February 2018
• Docket Number: F074265
• Citation: 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 345,21 Cal.App.5th 403
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: BIG OAK FLAT-GROVELAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Tuolumne County, Respondent; Jane Doe, Real Party in Interest.

21 Cal.App.5th 403

230 Cal.Rptr.3d 345

BIG OAK FLAT-GROVELAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Petitioners,

v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Tuolumne County, Respondent;Jane Doe, Real Party in Interest.

F074265

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Filed February 22, 2018

Johnson Schachter & Lewis, Sacramento, Jason Michael Sherman, Alesa Rose Schachter, Sacramento; Law Offices of Benjamin L. Ratliff and Benjamin L. Ratliff, for Petitioners.

Jennifer B. Henning, for California State Association of Counties as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Lozano Smith, Sloan R. Simmons, Sacramento, Nicholas W. Smith ; Keith J. Bray, Long Beach, for California School Boards Association's Education Legal Alliance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

Weintraub Tobin, Brendan J. Begley, Sacramento, and Melissa M. Whitehead, for California Association of Joint Powers Authorities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Manly Stewart & Finaldi, John C. Manly, Vince W. Finaldi, Irvine; Law Offices of Kenneth N. Meleyco, Kenneth N. Meleyco ; Esner, Chang & Boyer and Holly N. Boyer, Pasadena, for Real Party in Interest.

HILL, P.J.

Petitioners, bring this writ petition, requesting that this court issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling petitioners' demurrers to Jane Doe's first amended complaint, and to enter a new order sustaining their demurrers. Petitioners' demurrers were based on Doe's failure to present a government claim to petitioner school district (district) before commencing her judicial action against petitioners. The trial court concluded Doe's claim was statutorily exempt from the claim presentation requirement. We are called upon to interpret the interaction of two provisions of the Government Claims Act ( Gov. Code, § 810, et seq. ; "the Act") to determine whether they required Doe to present a government claim to a local public entity on her cause of action for childhood sexual abuse under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 prior to filing suit on that claim. This presents a question of first impression. We conclude the Legislature exempted such claims from the claim presentation requirement of the Act, but permitted local public entities to impose their own claim presentation requirements, which the district did. Because Doe failed to allege timely compliance with the district's claim presentation requirement, or an excuse for failure to comply, we conclude petitioners' demurrers to the first amended complaint should have been sustained. We therefore grant petitioners' petition for a writ of mandate.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Doe's first amended complaint alleges that, while she was a 15-year-old sophomore at a high school within the district, she was molested by a teacher, Jeremy Monn, between April 2013 and July 2013. Monn demanded that Doe keep the facts of the sexual abuse a secret. There were red flags in the teacher's conduct that should have caused the district a reasonable suspicion that Monn was engaging in sexual abuse with students. Petitioners counseled Monn about his behavior, but failed to report it to law enforcement authorities. Petitioners suggested Monn find employment elsewhere; he became a teacher in another district. There, he molested another student and that molestation was reported to police. After Monn was arrested, Doe began to understand he had manipulated and exploited her, and she reported the molestation to her guardian. Her guardian reported it to police, and a deputy district attorney instructed the guardian to delay bringing a civil case until Monn's criminal prosecution was resolved. Doe and her guardian followed this advice, although they informed the district of Doe's molestation the day after it was reported to police. After Monn was convicted, Doe filed her action on September 14, 2015. The first amended complaint contained causes of action against petitioners for negligence, negligent supervision, negligent hiring or retention, negligent failure to report the abuse, negligence per se, and sexual harassment. The original complaint alleged that no claim was presented to the district because under Government Code section 905, subdivision (m),¹ her claim for childhood sexual abuse was exempt from the claim presentation requirement.

Petitioners demurred to the first amended complaint, asserting that, although section 905(m) exempted Doe's claim from the claim presentation requirements of the Act, section 935 authorized a local public entity, such as the district, to impose its own claim presentation requirement on claims exempted by section 905 ; the district had enacted a policy and regulation imposing such a claim presentation requirement, and Doe had failed to comply with it. Petitioners contended Doe's action against them was barred by her failure to present a timely claim to the district before filing suit.

Doe opposed the demurrer. The trial court overruled the demurrer, concluding the Legislature's intent in enacting section 905(m) was to exempt claims of childhood sexual abuse from the requirement of presenting a government claim. The trial court stated there was no authority in section 935 allowing the district's ordinances or regulations to circumvent that exemption. Petitioners brought this petition for a writ of mandate to overturn the trial court's decision, asserting sections 905 and 935 are clear and, although section 905(m) exempts causes of action for childhood sexual abuse from the state-imposed claim presentation requirement, section 935 authorizes local public entities to impose their own claim presentation requirements, which the district did. Because Doe did not comply with the district's claim presentation requirement, petitioners contend her action is barred. We issued an order to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted.²

DISCUSSION

I. Review of Order Overruling Demurrer

" ‘An order overruling a demurrer is not directly appealable, but may be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment. [Citation.] Appeal is presumed to be an adequate remedy and writ review is rarely granted unless a significant issue of law is raised, or resolution of the issue would result in a final disposition as to the petitioner.’ " ( Boy Scouts of America National Foundation v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 428, 438, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 819 ( Boy Scouts ).) Here, writ review is warranted because the petition raises a significant issue regarding whether a government claim must be presented to a local public entity, pursuant to an enactment of that entity, before an action may be filed against that entity on a claim of childhood sexual abuse pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. Additionally, unless Doe can amend to allege facts excusing her failure to present a claim to the district, resolution of the petition in petitioners' favor will result in a final disposition of the action in their favor.

"A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint." ( Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 549, 558, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 205.) "The standard of review for an order overruling a demurrer is de novo." ( Casterson v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 182, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 637.) Although the matter arrives in this court "by the unusual path of a writ petition challenging" the order, "the ordinary standards of demurrer review still apply." ( City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 746–747, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 171 P.3d 20 ( Stockton ).) In reviewing the ruling on a demurrer, we use the de novo standard, exercising our independent judgment concerning whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. ( Traders Sports, Inc. v. City of San Leandro (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 37, 43, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 677.) We also review issues of statutory construction de novo. ( Regents , at p. 558, 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 205.) "We deem to be true all material facts properly pled." ( Traders Sports, at p. 43, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 677.) If no liability of petitioners exists as a matter of law, we must hold that the demurrer should have been sustained and grant the writ petition. ( Ibid . )

II. Childhood Sexual Abuse

"Historically, claims of childhood sexual abuse were governed by a one-year statute of limitations," but the statute was tolled until the child reach the age of majority. ( Tietge v. Western Province of the Servites, Inc . (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 382, 385, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 53.) In 1986, the Legislature added Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, which extended the limitations period for some claims of childhood sexual abuse. ( Tietge, at p. 385, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 53.) In 1990, the Legislature rewrote that section, to provide that the time for commencement of an action for childhood sexual abuse " ‘shall be within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever occurs later.’ " ( Ibid. ) In 1998, the Legislature expanded the scope of the statute to include claims against third parties, other than the individual perpetrator. ( Boy Scouts, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 440, 141 Cal.Rptr.3d 819.) The 1998 amendment " ‘expanded the limitations period for actions against entities that employed or supervised abusers until three years from the date the plaintiff discovers that psychological injury occurring after age 18 was due to childhood sex abuse, but no later than the plaintiff's 26th birthday. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘the 1998 amendment imposed an absolute bar against instituting a lawsuit against third party defendants once the plaintiff reached the age of 26.’ " ( Ibid . ) In its most recent amendment in 2002, the Legislature enacted an exception to that absolute bar, applicable to a...