E.D. Coats v. New Haven Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 12 March 2020
• Docket Number: A150490
• Citation: 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 784,46 Cal.App.5th 415
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: E.D. COATS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. NEW HAVEN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

46 Cal.App.5th 415

259 Cal.Rptr.3d 784

E.D. COATS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.NEW HAVEN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

A150490

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Filed March 12, 2020

Attorneys for Appellants: Taylor & Ring, John C. Taylor, Natalie Weatherford, Manhattan Beach, Esner, Chang & Boyer, Holly N. Boyer, Pasadena, Joseph S. Persoff, Los Angeles, Haysbert Moultrie, Nazareth M. Haysbert, Woodland Hills.

Attorneys for Respondents: Leone & Alberts, Louis A. Leone, Katherine Alberts, Marina B. Pitts, Seth L. Gordon, Walnut Creek.

Kline, P.J. Appellants E.D. Coats and her foster mother, Tinella B. Coats sued the New Haven Unified School District and others alleging that E.D. had been sexually abused by one of her high school teachers. The trial court entered judgment on the pleadings due to appellants’ failure to comply with the Government Claims Act prior to filing suit. Appellants contend the action was not properly subject to a claim presentation requirement.

As we will explain, due to amendments of the controlling statutes enacted during the pendency of this appeal, we will reverse the judgment as to E.D.’s causes of action and remand for further proceedings. As to Coats’s causes of action, we will affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

According to the allegations of the complaint, in the spring of 2014, when E.D. was 17 years old and a junior in high school, one of her teachers began "grooming" her and then engaging in sexual intercourse and oral sex with her in locations including his classroom and his car in the school parking lot. The situation was discovered in January 2015, after the school’s alarm system was triggered during a vacation, when no one should have been inside, and a representative of the alarm monitoring company heard what sounded like two people engaging in sexual intercourse. A representative sent to campus was met at the door by the teacher, who refused to let him in and said his wife was inside; the teacher was then observed leaving with a young woman later identified as E.D. The teacher admitted engaging in sexual intercourse with E.D. 10 to 20 times while she was a minor and pled no contest to one count of felony unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor ( Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (d).) The school principal had previously disciplined the teacher for inappropriate contact with a student on at least one occasion, but the conduct had not been reported to any authorities and no steps had been taken to monitor the teacher’s contact with other female students.

On June 20, 2016, appellants filed a complaint for personal injuries and damages against the New Haven Unified School District (District), the school principal, the teacher, and others. E.D. alleged causes of action against the teacher for sexual abuse (first cause of action), against the other defendants for negligence and breach of statutory duties in failing to adequately supervise teachers and protect students (second and third causes of action), and against all the defendants for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (fourth and fifth causes of action).

Coats joined in the claims of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Appellants alleged that they were not required to present a claim to the District under the Government Claims Act ( Gov. Code, § 810 et seq. )¹ due to the exemption for claims of sexual abuse of a minor stated in section 905, subdivision (m). The District and the principal, respondents here, moved for judgment on the pleadings as to the second through fifth causes of action, arguing that notwithstanding section 905, subdivision (m), E.D. was required to present a claim to the District pursuant to a District regulation adopted under the authority of section 935, and that the section 905, subdivision (m), exemption did not apply to Coats because she was not an abused minor.

The trial agreed with respondents, granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with respect to all claims against the District and the principal. Judgment was entered on January 3, 2017, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I.

Under the Government Claims Act, personal injury claims against public entities generally must be presented to the entity within six months of accrual of the injury. ( A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1257, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 234.) Absent an applicable exception, "failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity." ( State of California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 534, 90 P.3d 116 ; §§ 911.2, 945.4.) Section 905 enumerates a number of exceptions to the claims requirement, including "[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse" arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009. (§ 905, subd. (m).)

At the time appellants filed this action, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 allowed an action for damages resulting from childhood sexual abuse to be commenced "within eight years of the date the plaintiff attains the age of majority or within three years of the date the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that psychological injury or illness occurring after the age of majority was caused by the sexual abuse, whichever period expires later."

The section 905, subdivision (m), exception undisputedly applies to E.D.’s claims. Pursuant to section 935, however, local entities may prescribe claims presentation requirements, subject to specified restrictions, for claims "which are excepted by Section 905" and "are not governed by any other statutes or regulations expressly relating thereto."² The District’s board policy 3320 provides, "Any and all claims for money or damages against the district must be presented to and acted upon in accordance with Board policy and administrative regulation. Compliance with district procedures is a prerequisite to any court action ...." The District’s administrative regulation for board policy 3320 provides, "Claims for money or damages specifically excepted from Government Code [section] 905 shall be filed no later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action."

In concluding appellants’ suit was barred by their failure to comply with the District’s claims presentation requirement, the trial court rejected appellants’ argument that the District’s policy and regulation " ‘circumvent the express intention of the legislature’ " in section 905, subdivision (m), to exempt victims of childhood sexual abuse from government claims presentation requirements. The trial court reasoned that the other subdivisions of section 905 are subject to section 935, and the Legislature did not indicate that subdivision (m), should be treated differently. The court also rejected appellants’ argument that section 935 does not authorize the local regulation because it only applies to claims "not governed by any other statutes or regulations expressly relating thereto" and claims under section 905, subdivision (m), are "governed by" Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. The court followed cases holding that the reference in section 935 to "other statutes or regulation expressly relating thereto" was to statutes prescribing procedures for filing a claim against the public entity ( Tapia v. County of San Bernardino (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 375, 384, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 431 ; California School Employees Assn. v. Azusa Unified School Dist. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 580, 587, fn. 3, 199 Cal.Rptr. 635 ).

Appellants’ appeal challenged these determinations. Prior to the enactment of subdivision (m) of section 905, the California Supreme Court held in Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 212–214, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 164 P.3d 630 ( Shirk ), that despite an amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 reviving certain claims of childhood sexual abuse that previously had been barred due to expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff’s suit was precluded by her failure to present a timely claim to the entity under the Government Claims Act. Subdivision (m) was added to section 905 in 2008, in direct response to Shirk. ( Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 914, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 761, 400 P.3d 372 ( Rubenstein ); A.M. v. Ventura Unified School Dist., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1258, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 ; Assem. Comm. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 640 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 2008 ["This bill is intended to address the Shirk decision by expressly providing that childhood sexual abuse actions against public entities are exempted from government tort claims requirements and the six-month notice requirement."].) The legislative history, noting that Code of Civil Procedure section "340.1’s delayed discovery provisions recognize" that "[f]or many victims, the emotional and psychological trauma from childhood sexual abuse does not manifest itself until well into adulthood," states the intention "to ensure that victims severely damaged by childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those responsible, whether those responsible are private or public entities." (Assem. Comm. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 640 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 2008 [author’s statement].) Appellants argue that allowing a local ordinance to impose a six-month claims filing requirement violates the clear legislative intent of section 905, subdivision (m), to allow victims asserting claims of childhood sexual abuse against governmental entities the same time within which to do so as victims of private actors.

Respondent’s brief relies on a series of cases considering the interplay between sections 905 and 935, culminating in the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s since-vacated decision in Big Oak...