Bigelow v. Syneos Health, LLC
| Decision Date | 27 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 5:20-CV-28-D,5:20-CV-28-D |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | ANDREA BIGELOW, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. SYNEOS HEALTH, LLC, Defendant. |
On October 7, 2019, Andrea Bigelow ("plaintiff" or "Bigelow") filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against Syneos Health, LLC ("defendant" or "Syneos"), alleging both interference and retaliation in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq., and its implementing regulations [D.E. 1]. On January 23, 2020, the Middle District of Florida transferred the action to this district [D.E. 17]. On February 7, 2020, Syneos filed a partial motion to dismiss and to strike the class claims and a supporting memorandum [D.E. 20, 21]. On March 13, 2020, Bigelow moved for leave to file an amended complaint and filed a supporting memorandum [D.E. 24, 25]. On March 26, 2020, Syneos responded in opposition [D.E. 26]. As explained below, the court grants Syneos's partial motion to dismiss, dismisses Bigelow's FMLA interference claim, strikes Bigelow's class claims, and denies as futile Bigelow's motion to amend.
Bigelow is a resident of St. Johns County, Florida. See Compl. [D.E. 1] ¶ 11. Bigelow telecommutes from her home in St. Johns County for her job as a Clinical Operations Lead at Syneos. See id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Syneos is a "biopharmaceutical solutions organization" that employs 22,000 employees globally. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9 (quotation omitted). Bigelow has worked for Syneos since July 10, 2017, and reports to Syneos's headquarters in North Carolina. See id. at ¶¶ 10-11.
From April 1, 2019, through May 29, 2019, Bigelow used FMLA leave due to the birth of her child. See id. at ¶ 14. At the end of her FMLA leave, Bigelow "returned to work without consequence at that time, and commenced her job duties and responsibilities without issue." Id. at ¶ 15. In August 2019, Bigelow "discovered that [Syneos] promoted one of her male peers, who had not recently utilized FMLA, into a position of Senior Clinical Operations Lead." Id. at ¶ 16. She believes that she was as qualified, if not more qualified, than this peer. See id. at ¶ 17. On August 30, 2019, Syneos management told Bigelow that, per company policy, employees are ineligible for promotions that occur during their FMLA leave. Id. at ¶ 19. According to Bigelow, Syneos management "corroborated that [Syneos] uniformly and negatively considered its employees' use of FMLA leave in making promotion decisions, pay decisions, and/or taking adverse employment actions against with regard to its employees." Id. at ¶ 20.
On September 9, 2019, Bigelow emailed Syneos management and asked management to describe other factors besides FMLA leave that led to her failure to receive a promotion. See id. at ¶ 24. On September 13, 2019, Bigelow and Syneos management met for a second time. See id. at ¶ 25. Syneos management confirmed Syneos's policy concerning FMLA leave and promotion. See id. at ¶ 26. Bigelow notified Syneos management "that it was illegal for management to use her FMLA against her as part of the promotion process." Id. at ¶ 27. On September 27, 2019, the Syneos's Human Resources Manager confirmed this policy. See id. at ¶ 28. On October 7, 2019, Bigelow filed suit. See id.
Bigelow makes two claims under the FMLA and asserts them as part of a proposed class action. First, Bigelow alleges FMLA interference because Syneos negatively considered her FMLA leave in an employment decision. See id. at ¶¶ 43-48. Second, Bigelow alleges FMLA retaliation because Syneos considered her FMLA leave when it failed to promote her. See id. at ¶¶ 49-55. Bigelow seeks, inter alia, class certification, compensatory damages, liquidated damages, interest, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs. See id. at 9.
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-63 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. In considering the motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences "in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving party]." Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015). A court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions, "unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted): see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Rather, a plaintiff's factual allegations must "nudge[ ] [her] claims," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, beyond the realm of "mere possibility" into "plausibility." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials "attached or incorporated into the complaint." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016); Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A court may also consider a document submitted by a moving party if it is "integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity." Goines, 822 F.3d at 166. Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of public records without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).
"The FMLA provides covered employees with two types of rights and protections." Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 546 (4th Cir. 2006). First, the FMLA contains prescriptive protections that "set substantive floors for conduct by employers, and creating entitlements for employees." Id. (alteration and quotation omitted). For example, under the FMLA, "an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period" for, inter alia, "the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for such son or daughter." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Second, the FMLA "contains proscriptive provisions that protect employees from discrimination or retaliation for exercising their substantive rights." Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 546. Within its proscriptive provisions, the FMLA distinguishes between interference claims and retaliation claims. See id. at 546-51. Interference claims stem from section 2615(a)(1), which states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c). Retaliation claims, by contrast, originate from section 2615(a)(2), which states that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any othermanner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2). Specifically, "employers cannot use the taking of FMLA leave as a negative factor in employment actions, such as hiring, promotions or disciplinary actions." 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).
"To make out an 'interference' claim under the FMLA, an employee must thus demonstrate that (1) [s]he is entitled to an FMLA benefit; (2) [her] employer interfered with the provision of that benefit; and (3) that interference caused harm." Adams v. Anne Arundel Cty. Pub. Sch., 789 F.3d 422, 427 (4th Cir. 2015); see Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89 (2002); cf., e.g., Corbett v. Richmond Metro. Transp. Auth., 203 F. Supp. 3d 699, 709 (E.D. Va. 2016) (). "When the eligible employee returns from leave, he or she must 'be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced,' or 'be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.'" Anderson v. Sch. Bd. of Gloucester Cty., Virginia, No. 3:18CV745, 2020 WL 2832475, at *29 (E.D. Va. May 29, 2020) (unpublished) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 2614(a)(1)(A) and 2614(a)(1)(B)).
As for the first factor, the parties agree that Bigelow was entitled to FMLA leave. In fact, Bigelow received FMLA leave from April 1, 2019, through May 28, 2019, "returned to work without consequence at that time, and commenced her job duties and responsibilities without issue." Compl. at ¶¶ 14, 15. As for the second factor, Bigelow has not plausibly alleged that Syneos "interfered with the provision of that [FMLA leave] benefit." Adams, 789 F.3d at 427; Corbett, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 709-10. Syneos cannot interfere with Bigelow's FMLA leave if she has taken the FMLA leave that she was entitled to take. See Anderson, 2020 WL 2832475, at *29; Downs v. Winchester Med. Ctr., 21 F. Supp. 3d 615, 619 (W.D. Va. 2014): see also Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d274, 283 (6th Cir. 2012); Campbell v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 3:12-CV-00306, 2013 WL 5164635, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2013) (unpublished).
As for the third factor, Bigelow has not plausibly alleged that she suffered harm from Syneos's interference, even assuming such interference occurred. See Compl. at ¶¶ 8-34. Syneos restored Bigelow to the same position...
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