Biggs v. City of Md. Heights
| Decision Date | 09 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:20-cv-01499-JCH |
| Parties | DEMETRIUS BIGGS, et al, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MARYLAND HEIGHTS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. [51]. The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.
Facts and background
Plaintiff Demetrius Biggs and his daughter, A.B., initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state law claims on October 16, 2020, and later filed an Amended Complaint on March 26, 2021. Docs. [1], [25]. Plaintiffs name as Defendants the City of Maryland Heights and Officer Adam Munoz, who is sued in both his individual and official capacity. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint sets forth seven claims for relief against Defendants. Counts I and II are Fourth Amendment claims brought under Section 1983 against Munoz for unreasonable seizure and excessive force. Counts III through VII are state law claims against both Defendants: Count III is for assault; Count IV is for false imprisonment; Count V is for intentional infliction of emotional distress; Count VI is for negligent infliction of emotional distress; and Count VII is for battery.
Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs for purposes of the Motion before the Court, the record establishes the following:
This case arises out of a traffic stop that occurred in Maryland Heights, Missouri, on December 1, 2019, at approximately 7:00 p.m. Biggs, who had his daughter A.B. in the back seat of his Chevrolet Trailblazer, was driving on Westline Industrial Drive in the area that Officer Munoz was assigned to patrol that evening. Munoz noticed that Biggs's vehicle was missing a front license plate, which is a violation of Mo Rev. Stat. § 301.130. Munoz activated his emergency lights and followed the Trailblazer in an attempt to stop the vehicle. However despite Officer Munoz's attempts to stop Biggs, Biggs continued driving. After Biggs did not pull over, Officer Munoz activates his emergency siren and continued following the Trailblazer for approximately a quarter of a mile. Officer Munoz became concerned that the driver of the Trailblazer may be intoxicated or may be attempting to conceal evidence. As the Trailblazer continued to drive forward at a slow pace, Officer Munoz pulled in front of the vehicle to force it to stop. Once the Trailblazer came to a stop, Munoz believed the Trailblazer had struck the police vehicle because its headlights were so close to the cruiser, so Munoz called in a “10-50” message on his radio, which indicates that a police vehicle had been hit.[1]
Officer Munoz then exited his vehicle and called for back-up. At this time, Officer Munoz had no idea why the driver of the Trailblazer has failed to stop, and he feared for his safety. Munoz drew his firearm and pointed it towards Biggs, ordering him to raise his hands. As Munoz pointed his firearm, he also activated the flashlight affixed to the top of the weapon so that he could see inside the Trailblazer. Biggs raised his hands, and Officer Munoz, believing that Biggs was no longer a threat, moved the line of sight for his firearm away from Biggs.[2]
Officer Munoz then waited for backup to arrive. When Sergeant Scot Dunn arrived to assist, Biggs was taken out of the Trailblazer, handcuffed, and placed in the backseat of a patrol vehicle. The officers then learned that Biggs's daughter A.B. was in the back of the Trailblazer. She remained in her seat while her father was detained in the patrol vehicle. Biggs explained that he did not stop because he wanted to find a well-lit spot to pull over. Officer Munoz and Sergeant Dunn discussed the situation and decided to release Biggs with a verbal warning for failure to display a license plate, and Plaintiffs left the scene.
Following the incident, Biggs filed a complaint with the Maryland Heights Police Department, and the Department conducted an investigation of the encounter. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the Department issued a reprimand to Officer Munoz, finding that he had violated Department policy by using a rolling roadblock to stop Bigg's vehicle, and by failing to report that he drew his firearm during the stop. Officer Munoz was not found to have violated any Department policy by stopping Biggs other than the manner used to effectuate the stop.
Additionally, Officer Munoz did not violate Department policy, and was not reprimanded for drawing his firearm.
Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on November 19, 2021, claiming that Munoz is entitled to qualified and official immunity and Maryland Heights is entitled to sovereign immunity.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court must grant a motion for summary judgment if it finds, based on the factual record, that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, ” and there is a genuine dispute where “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to “present specific evidence, beyond ‘mere denials or allegations [that] . . . raise a genuine issue for trial.'” Farver v. McCarthy, 931 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Wingate v. Gage Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 34, 528 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2008)).
Motions for summary judgment in qualified immunity cases are “unique in that the court should not deny summary judgment any time a material issue of fact remains on the constitutional violation claim ....” Jones v. McNeese, 675 F.3d 1158 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark., 503 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2007)) (cleaned up). Because qualified immunity “is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability[, ] it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). Therefore, in a qualified immunity case, the court must “take a careful look at the record, determine which facts are genuinely disputed, and then view those facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party so long as those facts are not so blatantly contradicted by the record that no reasonable jury could believe them.” Id. (quoting O'Neil v. City of Iowa City, Iowa, 496 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2007)) (cleaned up).
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code imposes civil liability upon one: who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is “not itself a source of substantive rights, ” but affords “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 (1979)). Thus, in considering a Section 1983 claim, a court must “identify the specific constitutional right infringed.” Id. at 271 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989)).
“Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability in a § 1983 action unless their conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable official would have known.” Burnikel v. Fong, 886 F.3d 706, 709 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). This standard “gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991). See also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) ().
To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court asks the following two-part question: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Morgan v. Robinson, 920 F.3d 521, 523 (8th Cir. 2019) (en banc) “Unless both of these questions are answered affirmatively, [a defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity.” Nord v. Walsh Cnty., 757 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2014). The Court may decide which determination to make first, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 235 (2009), and “the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity unless the answer to both of these questions is yes.” McCaster v. Clausen, 684 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 2012).
Although “[q]ualified immunity is an affirmative defense for which the defendant carries the burden of proof, ” the “plaintiff . . . must demonstrate that the law is clearly established.” Sparr v....
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