Biggs v. Donovan-Corkery Logging Co.
| Decision Date | 04 February 1936 |
| Docket Number | 26001. |
| Citation | 54 P.2d 235,185 Wash. 284 |
| Parties | BIGGS v. DONOVAN-CORKERY LOGGING CO. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Grays Harbor County; H. W. B. Hewen Judge.
Action by Arthur Biggs against the Donovan-Corkery Logging Company. From a judgment dismissing the action, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
F. W Loomis, of Aberdeen, and A. P. Wilson, of Montesano, for appellant.
Hogan & Adams, of Aberdeen, for respondent.
This action is one arising under Rem.Rev.Stat. § 7680, the Workmen's Compensation Act, in which it is provided: 'If injury or death result to a workman from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury, or death, the workman, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the workman shall have the privilege to take under this act, and also have cause of action against the employer, as if this act had not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this act.'
In what amounts to the third amended complaint, it is alleged that appellant has been awarded $210 on account of his injuries claimed as a partial permanent disability and $705 time loss; in all, $915 from the industrial insurance fund, and in this action he asks $10,000, less the amount received from the industrial insurance fund.
The amended complaint, in effect, pleads that the employer had full knowledge of the laws and regulations established under Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 7729-7731, 7734, 10832, 10838, prescribing the statutory duty of every employer to furnish a safe place to work and to adopt regulations or standards of safety prescribed by the director of labor and industries; that that department promulgated a safety regulation or standard which was in full force and effect, to wit: ; that all of the foregoing statutes and standards on November 18, 1933, at which time the alleged accident occurred, were in full force and effect, compliance with which was mandatory, and violation thereof rendered the violator subject to penalty and punishment; that the employer had full knowledge of all thereof.
It is further alleged that the logging equipment belonging to respondent had been badly burned in a forest fire during 1933, necessitating repairs to its donkey engine; that its main line for hauling logs had been so damaged that it had lost its temper and would pull flat; that the employer continued to use the line for several days prior to the accident described; that a day or two Before the accident the engineer, who was operating the donkey engine, called the attention of the superintendent of respondent to the condition of the line and told him that it was not fit for use, that, when shown the line, the superintendent only laughed and continued to use the same with an utter and deliberate disregard of the consequences of the act and of the safety of the employees of respondent, including this appellant; that thereafter the line broke and he suffered injuries to his left arm, wrist, and hand by reason of which his earning capacity has been diminished; and that he had suffered pain. He further avers that he was working between the donkey engine and the high-lead block and that he had assumed that his employer had furnished him a safe place to work. There are other details alleged in the complaint not necessary to set forth.
A demurrer was interposed to the amended complaint which the trial court sustained and dismissed the action. This appeal results.
The sole errors assigned are in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint and in dismissing the action.
In Delthony v. Standard Furniture Co., 119 Wash. 298, 205 P. 379, which was attempted to be maintained under the same statute, where the workman was injured by the explosion of a boiler in the furniture factory of his employer and received an award from the insurance fund, we said, among other things: 'If the question were one as to whether the respondent was negligent in the manner in which it maintained the boiler, the case would present a question for the jury.'
We there defined 'deliberate intention' as used in our statute as it had been defined in Jenkins v. Carman Mfg Co., 79 Or. 448, 155 P. 703,...
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Folsom v. Burger King, I-V and J
...not constitute a specific intent to injure. Peterick v. State, 22 Wash.App. 163, 189, 589 P.2d 250 (1977); Biggs v. Donovan-Corkery Logging Co., 185 Wash. 284, 54 P.2d 235 (1936). Even an act that has substantial certainty of producing injury does not rise to the level of specific intent to......
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...863, 904 P.2d 278 (citing Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 579, 580, 547 P.2d 856 (1976); Biggs v. Donovan–Corkery Logging Co., 185 Wash. 284, 285–86, 54 P.2d 235 (1936); Delthony v. Standard Furniture Co., 119 Wash. 298, 299–300, 205 P. 379 (1922); Nielson v. Wolfkill Corp., 47......
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Breimhorst v. Beckman
... ... Sander, 168 ... Mass. 296, 47 N.E. 90 ... [ 12 ] Biggs v. Donovan-Corkery Logging Co., ... 185 Wash. 284, 54 P.2d 235; Delthony v. Standard Furniture ... ...
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Birklid v. Boeing Co.
...nor failure to observe safety procedures and laws governing safety constitutes a specific intent to injure. Biggs v. Donovan-Corkery Logging Co., 185 Wash. 284, 54 P.2d 235 (1936); Peterick v. State, 22 Wash.App. 163, 189, 589 P.2d 250 (1970), overruled on other grounds by Stenberg v. Pacif......