Biloxi Firefighters Association v. City of Biloxi

• Citation: 810 So.2d 589
• Decision Date: 14 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-01293-SCT.,2000-CA-01293-SCT.
• Parties: BILOXI FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF BILOXI, Mississippi.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

810 So.2d 589

BILOXI FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF BILOXI, Mississippi.

No. 2000-CA-01293-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

March 14, 2002.

Ralph Preston King, II, Wendy C. Hollingsworth, Ocean Springs, for appellant.

Tere R. Steel, Biloxi, for appellee.

Before PITTMAN, C.J., WALLER and CARLSON, JJ.

CARLSON, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Feeling aggrieved by the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Biloxi (City), the Biloxi Firefighters Association, Local 1583, IAFF (Association) has appealed to this Court on the key issue of whether the City should be bound by a prior city council's resolution recognizing the Association as the bargaining agent for certain employees of the fire department. Finding that the City's motion for summary judgment was properly granted on this and other issues raised by the Association, this Court affirms the action of the circuit court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶ 2. On March 20, 1996, the Association filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the City in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Second Judicial District, pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 57. The complaint sought, inter alia, judicial enforcement of a prior city council's resolution which directed the "mayor or his designee" to enter into good faith negotiations with the Association so as to establish a "written memorandum of understanding concerning wages, hours of work and conditions of employment." Specifically, the complaint requested the circuit court to order the City to timely commence negotiations with the Association. In its answer and amended answer to the complaint, the City basically denied that the Association was entitled to any relief. The Association filed a motion for summary judgment, and the City filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Association filed an emergency motion to dismiss all of defendant's pleadings. On March 5, 1999, both the motion and cross-motion were heard in open court. On April 13, 1999, the trial court issued and filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and concluding that the City was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. This ruling by the trial court had the practical effect of granting the City's cross-motion for summary judgment and denying the Association's motion for summary judgment. The trial court likewise denied the Association's emergency motion to dismiss all of defendant's pleadings. Final judgment was entered for the City on July 19, 2000. The Association timely filed its notice of appeal to this Court.

FACTS

¶ 3. On December 21, 1992, the Biloxi City Council adopted Resolution 429-92, which was signed and approved by then-Mayor Pete Halat on December 23, 1992. The resolution provided that the Association would be the sole organization representing "certain employees of the Fire Department of the City ...," and provided, in pertinent part:

Section 3: The mayor or his designee shall enter into good faith negotiations for the purpose of establishing a written memorandum of understanding concerning wages, hours of work, and conditions of employment.

Section 1 stated that the Association represented all firefighters "who are not ranked higher than Captain." One interesting note is that current Biloxi Mayor A.J. Holloway cast the sole dissenting vote as council member when the resolution was passed in 1992.

¶ 4. Including the officials who were in office at the time of passage of Resolution No. 429-92, there have been four sets of elected municipal officials from that date forward. None of the current city council members occupied a seat on the council when the resolution was enacted. Mayor Halat's term ended in July 1993, and there is no evidence in the record that the Association took any action to initiate negotiations with Mayor Halat or his designee before a new mayor and city council had taken office. There is also no evidence of the Association initiating contact with the City before November of 1995, when former Mayor Halat, acting as the Association's legal counsel, made contact with the City. This suit was filed almost three years after the expiration of the terms of the officials who enacted Resolution 429-92.

¶ 5. Of further interest is the fact that Resolution 390-96 was approved by the city council on August 20, 1996. This resolution "recognized" the Association and further stated that:

.....the mayor is to meet with union members and non-union employees, to determine the reasons for employee dissatisfaction and poor employee morale, and make appropriate recommendations to the City council for further action.

However, Mayor Holloway vetoed Resolution 390-96 on September 6, 1996. Thereafter, on September 10, 1996, the city council attempted to override Mayor Holloway's veto, but such efforts failed to achieve the required two-thirds vote.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 6. The inquiry in this case is a question of law. Specifically, it is for this Court to decide whether the City was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. "[The court] may only determine whether there are issues to be tried ..." Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983) (quoting Miss. R. Civ. P. 56 adv. comm. note). A de novo standard of review is used in analyzing a trial court's grant of a summary judgment. Baptiste v. Jitney Jungle Stores of Am., Inc., 651 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Miss.1995) (citing Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss.1988)). A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To prevent summary judgment, the non-moving party must establish a genuine issue of material fact by means allowable under the rule. Baptiste, 651 So.2d at 1065 (citing Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 398 (Miss.1991)).

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER RESOLUTION NO. 429-92 IS BINDING UPON SUBSEQUENT ADMINISTRATIONS OF THE CITY OF BILOXI.

¶ 7. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-17-5(1) (2001) provides in pertinent part:

The governing authorities of every municipality of this state shall have the care, management and control of the municipal affairs and its property and finances....

Additionally, the statute grants a municipality the power to adopt any orders, resolutions, or ordinances not inconsistent with the state constitution or code, or any other statute or law of the state. The statute also affords the appropriate municipal authorities the power to "alter, modify, and repeal" such orders, resolutions, or ordinances.

¶ 8. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-25-3(1) (2001) provides that governing authorities of a municipality have the power to "provide for the prevention and extinguishment of fires," and "to provide for and maintain a fire department and system, and to regulate the same." ¶ 9. In Webb v. City of Meridian, 195 So.2d 832 (Miss.1967), this Court stated:

[i]f a power is conferred and the law is silent as to the mode of exercising it, municipal authorities are clothed with a reasonable discretion to determine the manner in which it shall be carried out.

195 So.2d at 835. Additionally, in Scott v. Lowe, 223 Miss. 312, 318, 78 So.2d 452, 454 (1955), this Court stated that the city's dealings with employees are discretionary. Specifically, the Court in Scott stated:

The city authorities in transferring an employee of the fire department from one post to another act in an administrative and executive capacity, and necessarily are vested with a wide discretion in the discharge of their duties are officers of the city ... the governing bodies of municipalities have the power to organize, operate and maintain fire departments and `to regulate the same.'

78 So.2d at 454.

¶ 10. In Edwards Hotel & City R. Co. v. City of Jackson, 96 Miss. 547, 51 So. 802 (1910), the Court directly addressed the issue of a mayor and board of aldermen binding their successors:

Each mayor and board of aldermen cannot exercise full jurisdiction if predecessors may tie their hands in the matter of requiring to be done any matter which is comprehended in the exercise of full jurisdiction....

51 So. at 805. Edwards also issued a caveat concerning one set of municipal officers undermining the powers of a subsequent set of municipal officers:

If we were to hold otherwise, one set of city officers could defeat the powers delegated to the city and preclude a succeeding set of officers, however necessitous might be the cause (from using the powers granted it).

Id. at 805. As if to speak directly to the instant case, Edwards continued:

The mayor and board of aldermen are the mere agents of the city, having power to bind the city only within the scope of authority delegated to them. If a city could be estopped on an ultra vires contract by its mere agents, there would be little force in charter restrictions on the power of the agents of the city to bind it, since they could be easily destroyed in this way.

Id. at 805.

¶ 11. In Tullos v. Town of Magee, 181 Miss. 288, 179 So. 557 (1938), one administration of the town entered into a lifetime contract with a man to compensate him for maintaining the town's water supply, which originated at a spring on his land. When a subsequent town administration sought to lower his compensation, he brought suit. This Court sided with the town of Magee, reasoning:

[I]t is beyond the power of municipal officers to bind their successors in office in the exercise of their discretionary authority ...

179 So. at 558. Tullos concisely stated that, under Edwards, if a contract entered into by municipal officials is ultra vires, it is unenforceable. Id. at 558-59.

¶ 12. In American Oil Co. v. Marion County, 187 Miss. 148, 192 So. 296 (1939), this Court expressly forbid the Marion County Board of Supervisors from leasing county property used as part of the land surrounding the county courthouse for a term of years, stating:

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