Bird v. City of Colorado Springs
| Decision Date | 27 September 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 23701,23701 |
| Citation | 176 Colo. 32,489 P.2d 324 |
| Parties | Eugene O. BIRD, Plaintiff in Error, v. CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, et al., Defendants in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Strand, Holst & Hilbert, Edwin Strand, Colorado Springs, for plaintiff in error.
F. T. Henry, William T. Eckhart, Colorado Springs, for defendants in error.
This case involves the power of a city to change zoning on recently annexed property.
In 1960, plaintiff Bird acquired ownership of a lot located in an unincorporated area of El Paso County. It was zoned C--2 (suburban business district) by the county. In 1967, this lot was in a tract of land annexed to the City of Colorado Springs, which shortly thereafter included plaintiff's lot in an area rezoned to a R--5 (multi-family residential) classification. The use of plaintiff's lot as a storage yard for pulmbing supplies and fixtures, a nonconforming use, continued. The city made no effort to curtail this use nor is this use challenged in this action.
Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 139--21--15, seeking to enjoin the City from enforcing the R--5 classification against the plaintiff's land, and, in the alternative, asking that the land be rezoned C--6 (General Business Zone) as equivalent to El Paso County County C--2 zoning. The trial court, on the basis of stipulated facts, denied plaintiff's requested relief. On writ of error, the plaintiff urges reversal for several reasons which, in our view, are without merit. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff contends that the City's action in changing the zoning was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious without any showing of a need therefor or any change of conditions requiring R--5 zoning in the best interests of public health, safety and welfare. Plaintiff also argues that the county zoning was entitled to a presumption of validity.
To provide for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens and the general public, a city has the power to classify land within its boundaries for specified uses. City of Colorado Springs v. Miller, 95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161. Once this power is exercised, it is entitled to a presumption of validity and one assailing it, bears the burden of overcoming that presumption, and courts indulge every intendment in favor of its validity. Orth v. Board of County Com'rs for Boulder County, 158 Colo. 540, 408 P.2d 974; Huneke v. Glaspy, 155 Colo 593, 396 P.2d 453. To overcome this presumption, the one claiming invalidity must establish such invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Baum v. City and County of Denver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688.
The trial court in substance found that the plaintiff has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the action of the City was unreasonable, artitrary or capricious. The record amply supports the trial court's conclusion. It is axiomatic that the purpose of zoning is to provide for orderly growth of a community and to structure that growth in such a way that it will conform to the desires of the citizens of the community and produce a well ordered and designed result in the end. It is true, as plaintiff suggests, that 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 139--21--14 does not allow the city to impose arbitrary or automatic uniform zoning upon lands which it annexes in the future. In fact, the plaintiff did not allege that the city imposed automatic uniform zoning upon the land in question. The city, however, is allowed to impose zoning restrictions on annexed lands, after annexation, in order that those lands may be accoummodated into the orderly growth patterns of the city. The entire purpose of zoning would be frustrated if a city was strictly bound to zoning restrictions in existence at the time of annexation. The city could then no more provide for orderly growth than if it had no zoning law at all.
The foregoing discussion adequately disposes of plaintiff's argument that the county zoning is entitled to a presumption of validity. What plaintiff says would be true if the county zoning classification was challenged at the county level. However, when the city annexed the land in question, the power to zone that land shifted to the city. The record before us indicates that the city considered the nature of the land and the county zoning at the time it imposed the new zoning classification. As mentioned above, the city is no way bound by the county zoning plan. When the land becomes part of the...
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...our judgment for that of City Council. They cite cases such as Baum v. Denver, 147 Colo. 104, 363 P.2d 688; Bird v. City of Colorado Springs, Colo., 489 P.2d 324; Standard Oil Company v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 49 S.Ct. 430, 73 L. Ed. 856, and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U......
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