Bispo v. Burton
Decision Date | 17 July 1978 |
Citation | 147 Cal.Rptr. 442,82 Cal.App.3d 824 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Patricia R. BISPO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Leonard E. BURTON, M.D., Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 51825. |
Richard M. Hawkins by Mark A. O'Connell, Newport Beach, for plaintiff and appellant.
Bonne, Jones, Bridges, Mueller & O'Keefe, Jerrie S. Weiss, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
This appeal is from summary judgment against appellant on March 16, 1977 1 predicated on the ground that appellant's action for medical negligence (malpractice) against respondent filed April 14, 1975 was barred by the time limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.
The facts are undisputed.
Appellant was respondent's patient from September 11, 1961 until early 1971. In July, 1970, appellant was hospitalized with a fractured left hip. Surgeries were performed by respondent in connection therewith in July and October of 1970; appellant was discharged from the hospital December 31 of the same year and respondent's last contact with her consisted of a postoperative visit on February 8, 1971. In May, 1974, appellant's left leg being found non-viable was surgically removed at the UCLA Medical Center.
From its inception in 1970 and until substantially amended in 1975, Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 provided:
It is conceded the present action turns upon the proper construction of this statute. In making our construction, we are bound by the reasoning contained in Larcher v. Wanless (1976), 18 Cal.3d 646, 135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 557 P.2d 507 and in Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital (1976), 18 Cal.3d 93, 132 Cal.Rptr. 657, 553 P.2d 1129. Larcher analyzed and construed the application of section 340.5 in a case involving wrongful death. The Larcher court discussed the meaning of the word "injury" as used in the statute and fixed manifest "injury" as distinguished from "wrongful act" as the event which starts the running of the overall four-year limitation period and the event of discovery, actual or presumptive, as the commencement date of the one-year statute of limitation. The court observed:
11 Thus the word 'injury,' as used section 340.5 to denote the start of the four-year limitation period, seems clearly to refer to the damaging effect of the alleged wrongful act and not to the act itself. As we noted in Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200, 98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 852, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 'The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm not yet realized does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence.' Budd was an attorney malpractice case, but its rationale seems equally applicable to medical malpractice. Until the patient 'suffers appreciable harm' as a consequence of the alleged act of malpractice, he cannot establish a cause of action. ' "It follows that the statute of limitations does not begin to run against a negligence action until some damage has occurred. " ' (Id. at p. 201, 98 Cal.Rptr. at p. 852, 491 P.2d at p. 436, quoting from Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 30, p. 144; see also Huysman v. Kirsch (1936) supra, 6 Cal.2d 302, 309, 57 P.2d 908; Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 513, 121 Cal.Rptr. 705, 535 P.2d 1161.)"
(Larcher v. Wanless, 18 Cal.3d 646, 655-56, 658, 135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 80, 557 P.2d 507, 512.)
Similarly, in Sanchez, while concluding the one-year limitation of section 340.5 is governed by a plaintiff's actual or constructive awareness while the four-year limitation is contingent upon lack of a defendant's concealment, the court reasoned:
(Sanchez v. South Hoover Hospital, 18 Cal.3d 93, 99, 132 Cal.Rptr. 657, 661, 553 P.2d 1129, 1133.)
Thus under Larcher and Sanchez, supra, the inception of the limitation periods set out in section 340.5 embraces not only discovery in the case of the one-year period and disclosure in the case of the four-year period but also the fact of injury with respect to both periods. 2 This being the case, and since injury and the wrongful act which caused it are separate legal concepts and are not in every instance simultaneous, it is not true that the passage of four years since the last treatment of a patient by a physician necessarily fixes the event of injury and thus requires the patient's malpractice action to fail.
Neither Larcher nor Sanchez addressed the particular issue presented by the case at bench, to wit: the precise point at which a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action for personal injury is "injured" to the extent that the four-year limitation period begins to run.
True, in both Larcher and Sanchez there is considerable discussion concerning the meaning of the word "injury." That discussion, however, must be analyzed in the context of the issue with which the court was dealing in each case.
If one were to simply lift the language from those cases concerning the definition of injury and apply it without analysis to all situations, the result would render the four-year limitation meaningless. It must be presumed that the Legislature did not engage in an idle or meaningless act when it inserted an overall four-year cutoff in these types of actions.
The tenor of Sanchez was a circumscription of plaintiff's right to pursue an action for personal injury in a medical malpractice case. The holding of Sanchez was simply that the "one year from discovery" limitation period was not tolled by concealment on the part of the defendant.
The holding of Larcher was that in wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice the "one year discovery" period commenced to run on the death of the patient and was not shortened by the fact that the "injury " was discovered prior to death.
For our purposes here, the key holding of both Sanchez and Larcher is that "injury" is not synonymous with "wrongful act." The most apt description of the concept is found in a footnote at 18 Cal.3d at page 656, 135 Cal.Rptr. at page 80, 557 P.2d at page 512, of Larcher, supra, where it is stated that the word "injury" refers to "damaging effect of the alleged wrongful act" and that until plaintiff "suffers appreciable harm" he cannot...
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