Black v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 28 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-01-00187-CV.,No. 12-01-00195-CV.,12-01-00187-CV.,12-01-00195-CV. |
| Citation | 82 S.W.3d 44 |
| Parties | Deborah K. BLACK, Appellant, v. Bruce JACKSON, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Deborah K. Black, pro se.
David H. Hill, Wellborn, Houston, Adkison, Mann, Sadler & Hill, L.L.P., Henderson, for appellee.
Panel consisted of DAVIS, C.J., WORTHEN, J., and GRIFFITH, J.
Appellant Deborah K. Black ("Black") sued Appellees Bruce Jackson ("Bruce") and Vivian Jackson ("Vivian") in separate actions filed in Rusk County, Texas. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss in each case, and Black challenges the dismissals. We modify the orders of the trial court and as modified, affirm.
Black was married to Michael Black ("Michael"), and two daughters, Stephanie and Stacy, were born to their marriage. During the marriage, Black, Michael, and their daughters left the church they attended and embraced a different religious faith. That action distressed several of Black's family members, who did not share Black's new beliefs. As a result, those individuals made comments about Black's faith and engaged in conduct that Black considered to be harassment. Vivian is Black's sister and one of the family members who did not approve of Black's new beliefs. Bruce is Vivian's husband.
Michael ultimately divorced Black, and she became convinced that Bruce and Vivian played a role in the termination of her marriage and also assisted Michael in obtaining "control of both [their] daughters." She further concluded that Bruce and Vivian were trying to persuade her adult daughter, Stephanie, to return to the church Michael and Black formerly attended.2 As a result, Black, acting pro se, sued Bruce and Vivian on April 24, 2001.3 She also filed an Affidavit of Inability to Pay Costs in each case pursuant to Rule 145 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.4 The pleadings and the procedural history are identical for each case, and we therefore consider the cases together on appeal.
In her Second Amended Petition filed on May 15, 2001, Black alleged that Bruce and Vivian interfered in the lives of Black, her two daughters, and her granddaughter and entered into a conspiracy to slander, harass, and endanger them. She also stated that Bruce and Vivian willfully exploited several passages of the Bible relating to the family, chose to interfere in her family relationships, and "contribute[d] opportunities to cause the demise of [her] family completely." Further, Black alleged that Bruce and Vivian are liable "for making a freewill choice to help [Michael] divide our home illegally and in efforts that violate our religious faiths simultaneously too." Black also averred that Bruce and Vivian urged her to apply for Social Security disability benefits, which violates her faith.5 However, Black pleaded few facts to explain or support her allegations.
Black alleged that Bruce and Vivian's conduct violates her rights under the United States Constitution, the "Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction [Enforcement] Act" ("the UCCJEA"), the "Religious [Freedom] Restoration Act" ("RFRA"), and section 42.003 of the Texas Family Code pertaining to civil liability for interference with a possessory interest in a child. As a result, she sought $300,000 in damages and requested either a court-ordered mediator or a jury trial. She also stated that she wanted an opportunity to reveal the actions of Bruce and Vivian, which' would allow her family members to be fully informed of "all the extenuating circumstances that contributed to [the family's] demise" and make an informed choice about whether to reunite.
On May 21, 2001, Bruce and Vivian each tiled a motion to dismiss Black's claims pursuant to section 13.001(a)(2) of the Texas Practice and Remedies Code, alleging that the claims were frivolous and malicious and that there was no basis in law for the suits.6 On June 6, 2001, the trial court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss. At the hearing, both Black and counsel for Bruce and Vivian argued their respective positions to the court without introducing evidence.
After the hearing, the court informed the parties by letter that both motions to dismiss had been granted. An order granting the motion and dismissing each case with prejudice was entered on .June S, 2001. In support of its order, the trial court included findings that (1) it had no jurisdiction, (2) there is no cause of action presented by the pleadings, and (3) there is no basis in law for any of the relief sought. Black timely filed a notice of appeal and in eight issues contends that the court's dismissal of her actions was erroneous and that the actions should not have been dismissed with prejudice.
The standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to section 13.001 is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Berry v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 864 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1993, no writ). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles or whether the act was arbitrary and unreasonable. McDaniel v. Yarbrough, 898 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.1995); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985). A clear failure by a trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly is an abuse of discretion. McDaniel, 898 S.W.2d at 253. Under section 13.001, a trial court abuses its discretion if it dismisses a case that has an arguable basis in fact or law. Hector v. Thaler, 862 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ).
In her third issue, Black asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that it had no jurisdiction of the dismissed actions. Because jurisdiction is a threshold question, we address Black's third issue first. Whether a trial court has jurisdiction is a question of law that is subject to de novo review. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).
Black initially contends the trial court should not have addressed the issue of jurisdiction because neither Bruce nor Vivian pleaded lack of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense. However, Black's argument is contrary to law. Because the jurisdiction of a court is fundamental and may not be ignored, a court must notice, even sua sponte, the matter of its jurisdiction. Lechuga v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 791 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (op. on reh'g). Therefore, we conclude the trial court's action in that regard was proper and turn to Black's contention that the trial court's finding of no jurisdiction is erroneous and constitutes reversible error.
To issue a binding judgment, a court must have subject matter jurisdiction as well as personal jurisdiction over the parties to the dispute. Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 541, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1943). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the court's power to hear a particular type of suit, while personal jurisdiction relates to the court's power to bind a particular person or party. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex.1996). Personal jurisdiction is acquired by valid service of citation or by appearance. TEX.R. CIV. P. 121; Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 236 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston), rev'd on other grounds, 150 Tex. 398, 241 S.W.2d 142 (1951). Although the trial court in the case at bar did not state the reason for its finding, the record clearly indicates that the court had jurisdiction of the parties. Therefore, an absence of personal jurisdiction could not have been the basis for the court's finding, and we conclude that the court determined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction of Black's claims. Because the trial court did not exclude any of Black's claims from its finding, we further conclude that the trial court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction of all claims asserted by Black.
Subject matter jurisdiction is determined by whether the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Imprecisely pleaded elements of recovery are no impediment to jurisdiction, so long as they do not affirmatively demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction. Martin v. Victoria Indep. Sch. Dist., 972 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied). When jurisdiction has been raised in the trial court, we review the trial court's ruling by looking to the pleadings alone, construing them favorably to the pleader's position, and looking to the pleader's intent. Texas Assn of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. We consider only the pleadings because the pleader ordinarily has a right to amend if the trial court determines jurisdictional facts are not adequately alleged. Id.
A plaintiff who has filed an affidavit of inability to pay does not have a similar right to amend before the trial court grants a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 13.001. Bohannon v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 942 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, writ denied). As a result, that plaintiff is in much the same position as the parties to an action in which the trial court does not address jurisdiction and we review the issue sua sponte on appeal. Because the pleader has no right to amend if we determine, sua sponte, that the trial court had no jurisdiction, we conduct a broader review. In that situation, we construe the petition in favor of the pleader, review the entire record if necessary to determine if any evidence supports the trial court's jurisdiction, and resolve any doubt in favor of the pleader. Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. Because Black had no opportunity to amend, we conclude that same broader review is appropriate in this case.7
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