Black v. Lexington School Dist. No. 2

• Decision Date: 19 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 24649,24649
• Citation: 327 S.C. 55,488 S.E.2d 327
• Parties: Christopher Scott BLACK, Appellant, v. LEXINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Respondent. . Heard
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 327

488 S.E.2d 327

327 S.C. 55

Christopher Scott BLACK, Appellant, v. LEXINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, Respondent.

No. 24649.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Feb. 19, 1997.

Decided July 21, 1997.

[327 S.C. 57] John D. Elliott, Columbia, for Appellant.

George Nicholson, Jr. and Patrick J. Frawley, Lexington, for Respondent.

TOAL, Justice:

Plaintiff Christopher Black ("Student") appeals the circuit court's dismissal of his action against Defendant Lexington County School District 2 ("School District"). Specifically, Student contends the circuit court erred in refusing to consider his affidavit opposing School District's motion for summary judgment and also erred in granting summary judgment. We conclude that summary judgment would have been appropriate even had the affidavit been considered. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 27, 1991, Student injured his hand when a glass door he was opening at Brookland-Cayce High School shattered. At the time of the injury, Student was seventeen years old. He turned eighteen on August 8, 1991.

The South Carolina Tort Claims Act contains a two-year statute of limitations for tort claims against a governmental entity. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-100(a) (Supp.1996). However, section 15-78-100 further provides that the limitations period is extended an additional year (three years total) when the claimant has filed a verified claim pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-80 (Supp.1996). When the claimant is a minor, the running of the statute is tolled until the claimant reaches the age of majority. In the present case, therefore, the statute of limitations on Student's tort claim against School District began to run on August 8, 1991, Student's eighteenth birthday.

Student never filed a verified claim, so the limitations period ended August 8, 1993, two years after Student attained majority. Although Student had retained counsel, his attorney did not serve the Complaint upon School District until February 8, 1995. The Complaint contained allegations that School District had induced Student into not filing a complaint and should be equitably estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense. Nevertheless, School District moved for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations.

On January 4, 1996, at the original hearing on School District's motion for summary judgment, Student attempted to present the "affidavit" of his original lawyer, who had discussed Student's claim with School District's insurance carrier. This "affidavit" was submitted in support of Student's argument concerning equitable estoppel. Although the document was a sworn statement, it did not comply with South Carolina's requirements for a valid affidavit because it was not notarized. The judge granted Student a continuance so that Student could obtain a valid affidavit from his former lawyer.

The second hearing was held at 3:00 p.m. on January 17, 1996. Three hours before the hearing, Student's lawyer faxed the notarized affidavit to School District's lawyer. The new affidavit differed slightly from the sworn statement presented at the original hearing. At the second hearing, the lawyer for School District argued the affidavit was not timely Student appeals.

served as required by Rule 56, SCRCP, and that the affidavit could not, therefore, be considered. The trial court agreed and refused to consider the contents of the affidavit. The court then [327 S.C. 59] dismissed the action, finding the statute of limitations had run on Student's tort claim.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Student argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the affidavit because of Student's failure to comply with the time limits for service of the affidavit. We find no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the affidavit. Moreover, we conclude the affidavit did not create any genuine issue of material fact regarding equitable estoppel and that School District would have been entitled to summary judgment even had the affidavit been considered.

Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the time limits for filing papers in response to motions for summary judgment. It provides: "The motion [for summary judgment] shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits not later than two days before the hearing." (emphasis added). Rule 56 does not state the consequences of failing to comply with this service requirement.

In Folkens v. Hunt, 290 S.C. 194, 348 S.E.2d 839 (Ct.App.1986), the Court of Appeals construed former Rule 44 of the South Carolina Circuit Court Rules. That rule was similar to current Rule 56, SCRCP, except that a party could serve an opposing affidavit as little as one day before the summary judgment hearing. In Folkens, the party opposing the summary judgment motion failed to file his opposing affidavit until the first day of a two-day hearing, and the trial judge excluded the affidavit from consideration. On appeal, that party argued the trial judge erred in refusing to consider the affidavit.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that "[t]o warrant consideration, an affidavit must be served on the opposing party no later than the day before the start of the hearing." Id. at 206, 348 S.E.2d at 846. See also McQuaig v. Brown, 270 S.C. 512, 242 S.E.2d 688 (1978) (finding that where affidavit opposing summary judgment was not timely served and not considered by trial court, appellate court could not properly consider matter contained in affidavit); Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 919 F.2d 304 (5th Cir.1990)(tactical decision not to introduce affidavits at summary judgment motion did not constitute excusable neglect justifying late filing of affidavits); Settecasi v. Board of Pub. Instruction of Pinellas County, 156 So.2d 652 (Fla.Ct.App.1963)(where affidavits were not timely filed, they were properly excluded from consideration at summary judgment motion); Hershiser v. Yorkshire Condominium Assn., 201 Ga.App. 185, 410 S.E.2d 455 (1991)(finding party was not entitled to have affidavits considered in summary judgment motion where they were not timely filed and party made no showing of excusable neglect); Bonnette v. Century Ready-Mix Corp., 369 So.2d 1201 (La.Ct.App.) (court did not err in failing to consider party's affidavits where affidavits were not timely served), writ denied, 373 So.2d 525 (La.1979); Chaplain v. Chaplain, 101 N.C.App. 557, 400 S.E.2d 121 (no error in refusing to consider untimely affidavits where no showing of excusable neglect), rev. denied, 328 N.C. 570, 403 S.E.2d 508 (1991). But see Learch v. Bartell, 122 A.D.2d 596, 504 N.Y.S.2d 918 (N.Y.A.D.1986)(court did not err in considering untimely affidavits where there was no showing of prejudice to opposing party). Folkens and McQuaig stand for the proposition that the trial court may refuse to consider materials that were not timely served such that the opposing party had no time to prepare a response. In the present case, Student's lawyer admits his failure to serve the affidavit within the time required by Rule 56 and does not assert any good excuse for that failure. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to consider the affidavit.

Nevertheless, even if the affidavit of Student's former lawyer had been considered, School District would have been entitled to summary judgment. The affidavit and its Under South Carolina law, "a defendant may be estopped from claiming the statute of limitations as a defense if 'the delay that otherwise would give operation to the statute had been induced by the defendant's conduct.' " Wiggins v. Edwards, 314 S.C. 126, 130, 442 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1994)(quoting Dillon County School Dist. Number Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 286 S.C. 207, 332 S.E.2d 555 (Ct.App.1985), cert. dismissed, 288 S.C. 468, 343 S.E.2d 613 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Atlas Food Sys. & Servs. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, 319 S.C. 556, 462 S.E.2d 858 (1995)). Such inducement may consist either "of an express representation that the claim will be settled without litigation or conduct that suggests a lawsuit is not necessary." Id. Although the issue whether a defendant is estopped from claiming the statute of limitations is ordinarily a question of fact, summary judgment is appropriate where there is no evidence of conduct on the defendant's part warranting estoppel. Vines v. Self Mem. Hosp., 314 S.C. 305, 443 S.E.2d 909 (1994). Moreover, the mere fact that settlement negotiations have been undertaken is no bar to the defendant's assertion of the statute of limitations. See Gadsden v. Southern Railway, 262 S.C. 590, 206 S.E.2d 882 (1974).

attachments purport to show that School District led Student to believe it planned to settle the case and that, based on School District's inducements, Student delayed filing suit. Under such a theory, School District would be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to Student's case. The question here is whether the affidavit and attachments, if admitted, would have presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning equitable estoppel.

In Vines, 314 S.C. 305, 443 S.E.2d 909, which was brought under the Tort Claims Act, the defendant claimed the statute of limitations as a bar, and the plaintiff argued the defendant was equitably estopped from asserting the statute. The plaintiff based her equitable estoppel argument on the fact the defendant's employees assisted her in completing certain claim forms. She argued that this assistance "caused her to believe she had done all that she needed to do." Vines, 314 S.C. at 308, 443 S.E.2d at 911. The trial court rejected this argument and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. On appeal, this Court affirmed, finding there was no showing that the plaintiff had...