Black v. Prince, s. 70558
| Decision Date | 10 October 1985 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 70558,70559,s. 70558 |
| Citation | 176 Ga.App. 465,336 S.E.2d 318 |
| Parties | BLACK v. PRINCE; PRINCE v. BLACK. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Fred L. Belcher, Nashville, for appellant.
Daniel L. Studstill, Elsie H. Griner, Galen P. Alderman, Nashville, for appellee.
Appellant Black, as administrator of the Estate of Lorenzo R. Prince, seeks a reversal of the judgment entered after a jury found that appellee Reginald Prince (also known as Reginald Lumpkin) was the natural son and lawful heir of his deceased father's estate. Black contends that the verdict was contrary to law and should have been set aside, and that his motion for directed verdict should have been granted. Reginald cross-appealed, claiming his motion for directed verdict should have been granted. We have consolidated the cases for appellate purposes.
Lorenzo Prince died intestate on April 27, 1984. Thereafter, appellant Black petitioned to become administrator of the Prince estate after having been selected to do so by Sarah Prince Johnson, sister of the deceased. A caveat to the petition was filed by Reginald's mother, alleging that her son was the illegitimate child and lawful heir of the deceased. The probate court dismissed the caveat, the case was appealed to the superior court, and a jury found that appellee was the natural son and lawful heir of the deceased.
The evidence presented at trial showed that Reginald's mother was married in 1959 to Willie Lumpkin, but separated from him in 1966 and began living with decedent during the early part of that year, shortly after her separation. At the time Reginald was conceived, his mother was living with decedent and engaging in sexual relations only with him. After Reginald's birth on February 1, 1967, decedent visited the mother in the hospital, named the child Reginald, and paid the mother's hospital bills. Decedent continued to live with Reginald and his mother until 1970 when the mother moved to Florida. Reginald remained with decedent, who for the next eleven years raised the child, provided him with clothing and money, enrolled him in school as Reginald Prince, and told people that Reginald was his son. Decedent also purchased various life insurance policies in which he designated Reginald as his son and beneficiary. This treatment continued until 1981, when Reginald moved to Florida to live with his mother.
In March of 1983, decedent filed an application with the Social Security Administration for retirement benefits. The statement he made to the agency regarding whether or not he had children was that, although he had no biological proof, he had been told and he believed that appellee was his son and he treated him as such. The Social Security Administration determined that under federal law Reginald was the child of the decedent, and the agency commenced making child benefit payments to Reginald.
The evidence also showed that decedent was planning to have Reginald's surname changed to Prince, but he died before he could do so, and that Willie Lumpkin, to whom Reginald's mother was married when Reginald was conceived and born, never contributed to the child's support. Reginald's mother testified that she never instituted support proceedings against decedent because the need to do so never arose.
1. We first address the question whether appellant Black's motion for directed verdict should have been granted, and conclude that it should have been.
A child born in wedlock is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband, but that presumption can be overcome by clear evidence to the contrary. OCGA § 19-7-20; Boone v. Boone, 225 Ga. 610(1) 170 S.E.2d 414 (1969). In civil suits and criminal prosecutions, "it is the duty of the jury to weigh the evidence against the presumption, and to decide, as in the exercise of their judgment, the truth as it may appear by the preponderance of the evidence." Thornton v. State, 129 Ga.App. 574(1), 200 S.E.2d 298 (1973). The evidence presented was sufficient to overcome the presumption and to permit the jury to find that the deceased was the natural...
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Families First v. Gooden
...child of the husband, that presumption can be overcome by clear evidence to the contrary. OCGA § 19-7-20; Black v. Prince, 176 Ga.App. 465, 466(1), 336 S.E.2d 318 (1985). Here, there is clear evidence to the contrary. Specifically, the two blood tests performed on the husband by two differe......
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Tolbert v. Whatley, A95A2697
...See Hill v. Newman, 254 Ga. 57(1), 58, 325 S.E.2d 767 (1985); Poulos v. McMahan, 250 Ga. 354, 297 S.E.2d 451 (1982); Black v. Prince, 176 Ga.App. 465, 336 S.E.2d 318 (1985). Prior to Prince, the only interpretation under the language of the statute was that such an order was required. See f......
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Black v. Prince, s. 70558
...Elsie H. Griner and Galen P. Alderman, Nashville, for appellee. BENHAM, Judge. On the first appearance of these cases 176 Ga.App. 465, 336 S.E.2d 318 (1985), we reversed the judgment in Case No. 70558, ruling that the trial court erred in denying Black's motion for a directed verdict; and a......
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Prince v. Black
...B. Brown, amicus curiae. SMITH, Justice. We granted certiorari from the Court of Appeals in Black v. Prince; and vice versa, 176 Ga.App. 465, 336 S.E.2d 318 (1985), and we The appellant, Reginald Prince (also known as Reginald Lumpkin) was conceived and born at a time his mother, Josephine,......